Supreme Court Archives

Case Report G0154 – Little v the Chief Appeals Officer, Social Welfare Appeals Office and Minister for Social Protection [2023] IESC 25

Little v the Chief Appeals Officer, Social Welfare Appeals Office and Minister for Social Protection [2023] IESC 25

Title of Payment: Domiciliary Carers Allowance

Date of Final Decision: 14 November 2023

Keywords: Domiciliary Care Allowance, Social Welfare Appeals, Judicial Review, Severe Disability, Continual Care, Social Welfare Consolidation Act 2005; section 317 review; eligibility as at date of application

Organisation who represented the Claimant: N/A

Casebase No. Case G0154

Case Summary:

Background

This case relates to a decision of the Supreme Court dismissing an appeal of a decision of the High Court in relation to an appeal on a point of law under the Social Welfare Consolidation Act 2005, as amended (the “2005 Act”). The crux of the case related to the refusal of the applicant’s application for Domiciliary Care Allowance (“DCA”) in respect of her young son.

In dismissing the appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed that the legislative framework requires eligibility to be assessed and based on the conditions at the time of the application. The Supreme Court ruled that the appellant had to establish eligibility for DCA as of the date of the original application in 2018, and that new evidence from 2020 could not be used to revise the original decision.

Initial application:

The appellant initially applied for DCA in June 2018 with respect to her son, who was five years and two months old at the time. The application was assessed by a deciding officer who concluded that her son’s care needs did not meet the qualifying conditions for DCA, which require that the child has a severe disability necessitating continual or continuous care substantially in excess of that required by children of the same age without disabilities. This decision was communicated to the appellant on 30 August 2018. Following this, the appellant appealed the decision. A subsequent review by another deciding officer in December 2018, in accordance with s.301 of the 2005 Act upheld the original decision.

Appeal to Social Welfare Appeals Office (“SWAO”)

The appellant’s appeal of the initial decision was then heard by an appeals officer in February 2019. The appeals officer also disallowed the appeal on similar grounds, concluding that her son’s care needs were not substantially in excess of those required by other children of the same age. The appellant sought a review of this decision under section 317 of the 2005 Act, which allows for a decision to be revised by an appeals officer if new evidence or facts come to light. However, the appeals officer determined that there were no new facts or evidence to warrant a revision and upheld the original decision in June 2019. The appellant then requested a review by the Chief Appeals Officer, who also found no error in fact or law in the appeals officer’s decision and declined to revise it in September 2019.

Additional evidence

In late 2020, an assessment by the Health Service Executive (“HSE”) concluded that the appellant’s son had a substantial restriction in capacity due to an enduring impairment, meeting the criteria for disability under the Disability Act 2005. Based on this assessment, in April 2021 the appellant sought another review of the 2019 decision of the appeals officer pursuant to section 317 of the 2005 Act, arguing that the new assessment demonstrated that the original decision was erroneous. However, the appeals officer refused to revise the decision, stating that the new evidence pertained to her son’s condition in 2020 and did not provide new information about his condition at the time of the original application in 2018.

Key Legislation:

Social Welfare Consolidation Act 2005, particularly sections 186C, 301, 317, and 318
Disability Act 2005
Legal Services Regulation Act 2015, section 169

Decision of the High Court

The appellant brought judicial review proceedings in the High Court. The High Court dismissed the challenge, on the basis that the issue to be decided was whether at the time of her son’s original application for DCA he had met the criteria.

The High Court concluded that none of the additional information provided addressed whether or not the applicant’s son met the criteria for DCA as at the time of his original application.

The High Court held that the test in section 301 of the 2005 Act means that if new material only goes to a change of circumstance since the original decision, then it cannot be considered as a basis for concluding that the original decision was erroneous in the light of new evidence or new facts which have been brought to the notice of the deciding officer since the date on which the decision was given.

Appeal to the Supreme Court

The appellant was granted leave to appeal the matter to the Supreme Court.

The key arguments on behalf of the appellant were as follows:

The 2005 Act should be interpreted broadly to allow for eligibility determination based on new evidence. New did not mean having only come into existence after the original appeal but instead means that the evidence or facts in question simply must not have been before the original decision maker at the time the decision was made.
The appeals officer should have considered new evidence from 2020 demonstrating her son’s disability. In refusing to revise the decision under s. 317(1) of the 2005 Act, the appeals officer must be satisfied that the outcome would remain unchanged if the new material had been before them previously. It does not follow that an appeals officer’s review jurisdiction is confined to a reversal of the original decision; rather, it may consist simply of an adjustment of some kind.
The High Court erred in focusing on the date of the original application rather than the evidence available at the time of the appeal.

The key arguments on behalf of the respondent were as follows:

Eligibility for DCA must be assessed based on the conditions at the time of the original application. The legislative framework does not permit retrospective eligibility based on new evidence of changed circumstances as it is clear from the ordinary, basic, and natural meaning of the words in the relevant legislative provision that the assessment to be made is whether the evidence establishes eligibility for the benefit as of the date of the application and not as of some future date as the relevant words are in the present tense.
The intention of the Oireachtas to allow only evidence as to the circumstances present at the date of the original application is clear by the fact that an assessment of the eligibility is made by reference to whether a child has a severe disability requiring care and attention substantially in excess of “the care and attention normally required by a child of the same age” and the care and attention needs of a child aged five years and two months differ to those of a child who is seven years and seven/eight months which is a different question to be assessed in the first instance.
The statutory wording must be viewed within the full context including the other sections of the 2005 Act. The structure of the 2005 Act is such that it is the question that is originally determined by the deciding officer that frames the subsequent appeal or revision jurisdiction. The question originally determined by the deciding officer is whether the eligibility criteria were met when the application was made, and this must also be the question for an appeals officer exercising their revision jurisdiction.

Decision of the Supreme Court:

The Supreme Court distilled the case to the following net issue: “…when seeking a revised decision in 2021, did the appellant in this case have to establish eligibility for DCA as of the time of the original application for DCA in 2018, or did it suffice to show entitlement as to the date of the revision application in 2021”.

The Supreme Court, in dismissing the appeal, found that an appellant has to establish eligibility as at the date of the making of the original application. In this regard, it further held that the legislative framework does not permit retrospective eligibility based on new evidence of changed circumstances. It held that while retrospective payments in respect of periods prior to the date of the claim are premised on the assumption that claimants have the right to benefits as at the time of the claim.

The Supreme Court further held that this requirement remains even where there is an appeal under section 311 of the 2005 Act, or an application for revision of a decision of an appeals officer under section 317 of the 2005 Act. In this regard, the Supreme Court found the legislative history to be instructive, and placed significance on the fact that section 317 had been amended in 2013 to remove the ability of an appeals officer to revise a decision where there had been a change of circumstances. This amendment meant that any change of circumstances since the date of application must trigger a fresh claim.

Date of final Decision: 14 November 2023

Observations:

The ruling underscores the importance of assessing eligibility for social welfare benefits based on the conditions at the time of the original application, rather than allowing for retrospective eligibility based on new evidence of changed circumstances.

The Court’s findings clarify that if an applicant’s situation changes after the initial application, they cannot use this new information to argue for a revision of the original decision. Instead, the applicant needs to submit a new application reflecting the current circumstances. Applicants should be aware of this limitation and plan accordingly. For example, in the case of DCA, applicants should be mindful that any significant changes in their child’s condition or care needs will require a new application, rather than a revision of the previous one. For completeness, it should be noted that the Court did also refer to the fact that if a claim is successful, DCA can be backdated if appropriate having regard to section 241(4A) of the 2005 Act.

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Case Report G0151: BM And JM (A Minor Suing By His Mother And Next Friend BM) v Chief Appeals Officer, Social Welfare Appeals Officer, Minister For Social Protection, Ireland and The Attorney General [2024] IESC 51

Title of Payment: Carer’s Allowance

Date of Final Decision: 12 November 2024

Keywords: Carer’s Allowance; means test; reduced rate; classes of carers; constitutional challenge; Article 41.2 and the role of mothers in the home

Organisation who represented the Claimant: N/A

Casebase No. G0151

Case Summary:

This case concerned judicial review proceedings, where BM and JM (the “Applicants”) challenged the payment of Carer’s Allowance to BM at a reduced rate, pursuant to the Social Welfare Consolidation Act 2005 (the “2005 Act”).

BM is the mother and carer of JM and has been a recipient the Carer’s Allowance since 2007. BM began to reside as a couple with JM’s father, which meant that her weekly means are assessed by reference to her own means and JM’s father’s means, so as to reduce the rate of Carer’s Allowance payable to her. The Applicants challenged the payment of Carer’s Allowance to BM at a reduced rate and asserted an entitlement to its payment at the full scheduled rate. BM asserted that having regard to JM’s profound dependence on her, and the corresponding commitment that being his full-time carer demands of her, it was highly unjust that she should receive anything less than the full rate of Carer’s Allowance. In particular, the allowance payable to her has been reduced by reference to her own means and not the means of her partner.

The High Court dismissed the Applicants’ application and Hyland J held that the provisions of section 186(2) of the 2005 Act were permissive and conferred a power on the Minister rather than a duty to make regulations increasing the level of allowance payable.

The High Court granted leave to appeal directly to the Supreme Court in respect of the following two issues:

Whether the Minister for Social Protection (the “Minister”) is under any obligation under section 186(1) and section 186(2) of the 2005 Act to make regulations which would dispense with the means-tested calculation of carer’s payment?

The extent (if any) to which Article 41.2 of the Constitution has any bearing on the proceedings and whether Hyland J was correct to state that Article 41.2 of the Constitution cannot be regarded as dictating the level at which the State must provide a carer’s allowance or otherwise mandating the making of regulations by the Minister under section 186(1) of the 2005 Act.

Key Conclusions:

The entitlement to Carer’s Allowance is subject to reduction (or exclusion) on the basis of a uniformly applicable prescribed means test.

The Minister has a power but is not under any duty to make regulations to provide for two classes of Carer for the purposes of means testing of Carer’s Allowance under Chapter 8 of the 2005 Act.

With respect of Article 41.2 of the Constitution, significant financial support is already being provided to BM and JM. The payment of a reduced rate of Carer’s Allowance to BM does not engage Article 41.2 which does not preclude the application of a generally applicable means test to carers such as BM, i.e. mothers providing full-time, long-term care to a profoundly dependent child in the home. It does not require that a sub-set of carers be treated preferentially or be subject to more favourable rules than other carers.

Relevant Legislation:

The Social Welfare (Consolidation) Act 2005, namely Chapter 8 of the 2005 Act; section 186(1) and section 186 (2)

Social Welfare (Consolidated Claims, Payments and Control) Regulations 2007 (SI 142/2007)

Article 41.2.2 of the Constitution

Key Arguments:

The Applicant argued:

The Minister acted unlawfully in failing to make regulations under section 186(2) of the 2005 Act, which would (or might) provide for payment of Carer’s Allowance at the scheduled rate to BM and other similarly situated persons.

Section 186(2) clearly contemplates that there might be a category of recipients who ought to receive payment of Carer’s Allowance at the full rate, irrespective of means, and provides the Minister with power to make regulations to that effect. The ‘class of classes of person’ are carers whose caring commitment significantly exceeds 35 hours per week, who face a life-long care commitment and who, as a result, have no prospect of ever being in the position to take up employment.

Payment of a reduced rate of Carer’s Allowance to BM is inconsistent with the State’s obligations under Article 41.2 of the Constitution. Article 41.2 provides that “mothers shall not be obliged by economic necessity to engage in labour to the neglect of their duties in the home”

The Respondents argued that what is now section 186(2)(b) of the 2005 Act was enacted so as to enable the Minister to make regulations addressing any difficulties that may arise in the transition from the previous regime, the Prescribed Relatives Allowance (PRA), which was not means tested.

Decision of the Supreme Court:

Issue 1

The Supreme Court held that the Applicants’ contention that section 186(2) of the 2005 Act requires the Minister to make regulations the effect of which would be to provide for two classes of carer was unpersuasive. On the face of section 186(2), the Minister had been given a broad and largely unbounded power to dispense with and/or modify the application of statutory rules relating to the means test for Carer’s Allowance, for the benefit of an unspecified class or classes of carer. The Court held that the Minister has a power, but is not under any duty, to make regulations providing for the matters in section 186(2).

The Supreme Court acknowledged the remedial nature of the 2005 Act, so as to encourage and support the provision of essential care, in a residential setting, to persons having such a disability as to require full-time care and attention. However, it was held that recognition of the 2005 Act as a remedial statute does not alter the interpretative exercise that the Court must undertake.

It was noted that the use of the word “may” in section 186(2) of the 2005 Act could indicate that the power is truly discretionary rather than mandatory in character. The Court held that the wider statutory context does not provide any support for the Applicants’ contention that section 186(2) should impose a mandatory obligation on the Minister. It was noted that the Oireachtas has in Chapter 8 set out a detailed scheme for the payment of Carer’s Allowance, and that it would not appear to make any sense for the Oireachtas simultaneously to legislate to impose a duty on the Minster to make regulations departing from that carefully delineated statutory scheme by dispensing with or relaxing the application of the rules relating to means. The Court agreed with Hyland J’s conclusion that the reference to “may” in section 186(2) is “truly permissive and confers a power on the Minister rather than imposing a duty”.

Issue 2

It was held that nothing in Article 41.2 of the Constitution precludes the application of a generally applicable means test to carers such as BM, i.e. mothers providing full-time, long term care to a profoundly dependent child in the home, or requires that sub-set of carers be treated preferentially or to be subject to more favourable rules than other carers (as would be the case if the general means testing regime did not apply, or apply in the same way, to them.

Collins J held that it appears that Article 41.2 has generally been understood to apply to the marital family only, which Woulfe J expressed the view in his concurring judgement. It was held that no court has ever held that Article 41.2 of the Constitution extends to a legally enforceable duty to provide financial support to mothers in respect of their work in the home. It was held that BM has not been obliged to work outside the home and instead she has been and is being supported in staying at home to care for JM.

Date of final Decision: 12 November 2024

Observations:

The judgement provides clarity on the entitlement to Carer’s Allowance under the 2005 Act. The rate of Carer’s Allowance payable will continue to be calculated using a uniformly applied means test, as prescribed by statute (and set out 2005 Act and the related regulations). The Minister is not permitted to derogate from the Carer’s Allowance rates prescribed by statute despite the full-time demands that carers may face.

The effect of Article 41.2.2 of the Constitution simply requires that the State through its policies and laws seeks to support the rights of mothers, as a class, not to be obliged to work outside the home. It does not commit the State to the provision of any particular form or level of support or giving individual mothers any legally enforceable right to support from the State.

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Social Welfare Appeal G0138: The O’Meara Case (Widow’s Contributory Pension)

Title of Payment: Widow’s (Contributory) Pension

Date of Final Decision: 22 January 2024

Keywords: Widow – Widower – Contributory – Pension – Marriage – Family

Organisation who represented the Claimant: FLAC

Casebase no: G0138

Case Summary:

This case relates to an appeal challenging the constitutionality of the refusal of the Widower’s Contributory Pension (“WCP”) to non-marital families.

Mr O’Meara and his life partner, Ms Michelle Batey, began their relationship around 2002. They had their first child in 2007, their second child in 2008 and their third child in 2010. The Court acknowledged that they “lived together in a committed, stable and long-term family unit”. The couple had decided not to get married as Ms Batey had a negative experience of her own parents’ marriage and did not want to replicate this for her children. In 2021, Ms Batey passed away from breast cancer and COVID-19.

Following the death of his partner, Mr O’Meara applied for WCP under the Social Welfare Consolidation Act, 2005 (the “Act”). He was refused WCP on the basis that he did not fall within the definition of “widower”, as he had not been married to his partner. Mr O’Meara and his three children brought a claim to the High Court that section 124 of the Act infringed their right to equality under the European Convention on Human Rights and the Constitution. The High Court dismissed this claim.

On appeal to the Supreme Court (the “Court”), however, the decision to refuse WCP to Mr O’Meara was quashed. The applicants were successful, and the appeal was allowed.

Relevant Legislation:

The Social Welfare Consolidation Act, 2005 is the key piece of legislation in this case.

Section 123 of the Act defines “widower” as “a widower or a man who would otherwise be a widower but for the fact that his marriage has been dissolved, being a dissolution that is recognised as valid in the State”.

Section 124(1) of the Act provides that “subject to this Act, a widow or widower shall be entitled to pension…”.

Therefore, this Act clearly set outs that only those who fall within the definition of “widower” i.e., those who are married, shall be entitled to the WCP.

Key Arguments:

The applicants (John O’Meara, Jack O’Meara (a minor suing by his father and next friend John O’Meara), Thomas O’Meara (a minor suing by his father and next friend John O’Meara), and Aoife O’Meara (A minor suing by her father and next friend John O’Meara)) argued that:

section 124 of the Act is repugnant to the Constitution on the basis that the O’Mearas are a Family for the purpose of Article 41 of the Constitution’.
1. This argument was an equality argument. It was argued that if the O’Mearas are a family under Article 41 of the Constitution, then each family should be treated equally before the law.
1. Both children of married and unmarried parents must rely on their parents emotionally and financially, and they both suffer the same loss when a parent passes away. Therefore, it was submitted that there was ‘stark differential treatment’ of these children by section 124 of the Act.
1. Similarly, both married and unmarried parents suffer emotional and financial loss on the death of their partner. This effects both parents’ ability to provide for their children.
1. These distinctions were found by the Court to be ‘arbitrary and capricious’, failing to hold parents ‘equal before the law’.
1. The applicants also relied on Re McLaughlin, which at paragraph 52 of its judgement stated, ‘a policy in favour of marriage or civil partnership could constitute justification for differential treatment where children were not involved but could not do so in relation to a benefit targeted at the needs and well-being of children’.

‘the statement of Walsh J. for this Court in The State (Nicolau) v. An Bord Uchtála [1966] I.R. 567 (“Nicolau”) that the Article 41 Family was limited to a marital family, was wrong and should be overruled or disavowed.’
- In the judgement of Nicolau, the Court held that ‘Article 41 deals with only one kind of family, namely a family founded on the institution of marriage’.
- The applicants argued that this statement should be disavowed on the basis that the O’Meara’s were a Family under the meaning of Article 41.
- The Court however held that it was not necessary to address this to resolve the case at hand. The Court focused instead on the argument of equality outlined above.

The respondents (The Minister for Social Protection, Ireland and the Attorney General) argued that:

they relied on the reasoning in the judgement of Michael and Emma v. The Minister for Social Protection, The Attorney General and Ireland [2019] IESC 82, [2021] 3 I.R. 528 (“Michael and Emma”) to allow differentiation to be made ‘on the basis of the marital status of the parent recipient of the benefit’.

The case of Michael and Emma dealt with whether asylum seekers could be eligible for the payment of child benefit. In its judgement, the Supreme Court held that it was ‘permissible’ for a distinguishment to be made between ‘children of parents habitually resident in Ireland’ and ‘children of asylum seekers’. Therefore, child benefit would not be payable to asylum seekers.
1. The respondents argued that this same reasoning be applied to the case at hand.
1. The Court rejected the idea of applying the reasoning of Michael and Emma as it found the facts of each case to be too dissimilar.

Decision of the Supreme Court:

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal. The Court held that refusal to extend WCP to Mr O’Meara ‘as a parent of the second, third, and fourth appellants’ was unconstitutional. The Court declared that section 124 of the Act was inconsistent with the Constitution, and subsequently quashed the Minister’s decision to deny Mr O’Meara WCP.

The Court did not however declare section 124 of the Act as unconstitutional due to the ramifications this would have on individuals who currently receive WCP. Instead, the Court stated that this is a matter for the Oireachtas to legislate on.

It should be noted that although the Court did not decide on the correctness of the Nicolau Family statement in this judgement, it was held that this should await to be decided upon in a future case in which it is necessary to do so.

Date of final Decision: 22 January 2024

Observations:

It could be said that the Court have implied that where there is a family with non-married parents, and one parent passes away, the surviving parent should be entitled to WCP.

As stated in paragraph 52 of the judgement, ‘in the ordinary way, therefore, the operation of the system involves the court stating definitively, what the law is…and allowing the Oireachtas…and the people…to consider if they are content with the outcomes that the law as so interpreted produces and if so, to build upon it, and if not, to qualify it or perhaps change it entirely’.

Therefore, it is ultimately now up to the Government to consider amending legislation in light of this judgement.

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Social Welfare Appeal G0129: Widowed Parent’s Allowance

Types of Social Welfare: Widowed Parent’s Allowance, One-Parent Family Payment; Widows pension; Widowed or Surviving Civil Partner Grant.

Title of Payment: One Parent Family Payment

Date of Final Decision: 30 August 2018

Keywords: Widowed Parent’s Allowance; Discrimination; European Convention on Human Rights; Judicial Review: One-Parent Family Payment; Widows pension; Widowed or Surviving Civil Partner Grant

Organisation who represented the Claimant: n/a

Casebase no: G0129

Case Summary:

This is a case concerning legislation applicable in Northern Ireland.

Widowed parent’s allowance (‘WPA’) is a contributory, non-means-tested, social security benefit payable to men and women with dependent children, who were widowed before March 2017. Under s 39A Social Security Contributions and Benefits (Northern Ireland) Act 1992 (‘s 39A’) the widowed parent can only claim the allowance if he or she was married to, or the civil partner of, the deceased. The issue in this appeal is whether this requirement unjustifiably discriminates against the survivor and/or the children on the basis of their marital or birth status, contrary to article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights (‘ECHR’) (when read with either the right to respect for family life under article 8, or the protection of property rights in Article 1 of the First Protocol (A1P1)).

Ms McLaughlin and her husband, John Adams, lived together (apart from two short periods of separation) for 23 years until he died on 28 January 2014. They never married and had four children who were aged between the ages of eleven and nineteen when their father died. He had made sufficient National Insurance contributions for Ms McLaughlin to be able to claim bereavement payment and WPA, had she been married to him. Ms McLaughlin’s claims for both bereavement payment and widowed parent’s allowance were refused by the Northern Ireland Department for Communities. She applied for judicial review of that decision on the ground that the relevant legislation was incompatible with the ECHR. That claim succeeded in part before Treacy J in the High Court: In the matter of an application by Siobhan McLaughlin for Judicial Review: [2016] NIQB 11.

He made a declaration of incompatibility under section 4(2) of the Human Rights Act 1998, that s39A is incompatible with article 8 of the ECHR in conjunction with article 14 “insofar as it restricts eligibility for WPA by reference to the marital status of the applicant and the deceased”. The Court of Appeal unanimously held that the legislation was not incompatible with article 14, read either with article 8 or with A1P1: [2016] NICA 53.

Ms McLaughlin therefore appealed to the Supreme Court.

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Social Welfare Appeal G0127: Domiciliary Care Allowance

Title of Payment: Domiciliary Care Allowance

Date of Final Decision: 4 July 2022

Keywords: Domiciliary Care Allowance; Social Welfare Payment; Discrimination; Irish Constitution; European Convention on Human Rights.

Organisation who represented the Claimant: N/A

Casebase no: G0127

Case Summary:

The case is that of Donnelly & Anor v Minister for Social Protection & Ors [2022] IESC 31.

This case concerned a challenge to legislation that excluded the first named appellant (“Mr. Donnelly”) from eligibility for a social welfare payment in respect of his severely disabled son, Henry, the second named appellant during a prolonged period when Henry was in hospital. The challenge was brought, under Article 40.1 of the Constitution and Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights, to a decision of the Minister of Social Protection and to certain provisions of the Social Welfare Consolidation Act 2005. The appellants argued that they have been unlawfully discriminated against as compared to families who are in a similar position but caring for a severely disabled child at home. The payment in question is the Domiciliary Care Allowance (“DCA”).

Henry was born with Down syndrome in June 2015 and has suffered with multiple other serious medical conditions. As a result, he was hospitalised for all the time from his birth until November 2017. During the time he was in hospital, Mr. Donnelly gave up his employment. It is apparent from the evidence that the level of care provided to Henry by his parents during this time, while undoubtedly onerous, was to an extent expected by the hospital. Mr. Donnelly applied for the DCA in July 2016 and his application was refused. He sought an internal departmental review of the decision which came to the same conclusion. Henry was discharged home in late 2017 and Mr. Donnelly has been in receipt of the payment since.

Relief was refused in the High Court ([2018] IEHC 421). The Court of Appeal ([2021] IECA 155) affirmed the decision of the High Court. The appellants were granted leave to appeal to the Supreme Court by determination of the 29th July 2021 ([2021] IESCDET 89).

Key Conclusions: The Supreme Court concluded that the appellants had failed to discharge the burden of proving that the measure in question was either invalid having regard to the Constitution or incompatible with the Convention.

Relevant Legislation:

Social Welfare Consolidation Act 2005:

Sections:

186B.— In this Chapter—

‘institution’, means a hospital, convalescent home or home for children suffering from physical or mental disability or ancillary accommodation and any other similar establishment providing residence, maintenance or care where the cost of the child’s maintenance in that institution is being met in whole or in part by or on behalf of the Executive or the Department of Education and Science;

‘international organisation’ means an international intergovernmental organisation, including, in particular and without limiting the generality of the foregoing—

(a) the United Nations Organization and its specialist agencies,

(b) the institutions and agencies of the European Communities,

(d) the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development;

‘qualified child’ has the meaning given by section 186C;

‘qualified person’ has the meaning given by section 186D.

186C.— A person who is under the age of 16 years (in this section referred to as ‘the child’) is a qualified child for the purposes of payment of domiciliary care allowance if—

(a) a medical practitioner has certified, in such manner as is prescribed, that—

(i) the child has a severe disability requiring continual or continuous care and attention substantially in excess of the care and attention normally required by a child of the same age, and

(ii) the disability is such that the child is likely to require full-time care and attention for at least 12 consecutive months,

(b) the child—

(i) is ordinarily resident in the State, or

(ii) satisfies the requirements of section 219(2),

and

186E.— (1) Subject to subsections (2) and (3), domiciliary care allowance is not payable for any period during which a child is resident in an institution.

186D.— (1) A person is a qualified person for the purpose of receiving domiciliary care allowance in respect of a qualified child if—

(a) the child normally resides with that person,

(b) that person provides for the care of the child, and

(i) that person is habitually resident in the State, or

(ii) the requirements of section 219(2) are satisfied in relation to that person.

(2) For the purposes of subsection (1)(a) the Minister may by regulation make rules for determining with whom a qualified child is to be regarded as normally residing.

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Social Welfare Appeal G0126: Maternity Benefit

Title of Payment: Maternity Benefit

Date of Final Decision: 16 December 2021

Keywords: Maternity Benefit, Immigration, Work Permit, PRSI Payments, PAYE Tax, Contract of Services

Organisation who represented the Claimant: N/A

Casebase no: G0126

Case Summary:

This case concerns PAYE and PRSI contributions made while working in Ireland without a valid work permit, and whether they should be taken into account by the Department of Social Protection when assessing eligibility for social insurance payments, such as maternity benefit.

Ms. Shardha Sobhy, a citizen of Mauritius, arrived in Ireland on 5 March 2005, and registered with the Garda National Immigration Bureau (GNIB). From the time she arrived in Ireland until the 26 June 2012, she was granted five consecutive Stamp 2 visas. During that time she was a student and worked in a part-time job. She was lawfully in the State until 26 June 2012. On 21 November 2011, Ms. Sobhy applied to change her Stamp 2 to a Stamp 4. She received a letter from the Irish Naturalisation and Immigration Service (INIS), dated 11 May 2012, refusing her request to change to a Stamp 4. Ms. Sobhy sought an extension of her visa on 20 July 2016.

On 5 August 2016, the Residents Division of the INIS refused to extend her visa, reasoning that the visa had already expired by the time the application for an extension had been received. This letter outlined her rights under the Immigration Act 2004, highlighting that it is illegal to reside in the State without permission from the Minister for Justice and Equality, and the penalties that went with failing to follow the law under The Immigration Act of 2004. This letter also specified that, without her visa, Ms. Sobhy was not entitled to work.

A firm of solicitors representing Ms. Sobhy wrote to the Residents Division of the INIS, in a letter dated 23 November 2016, requesting a review of the decision. It is unknown whether a response was received to this letter.

In 2018, the Minister for Justice introduced a scheme that allowed certain non-EEA nationals, who had a valid student permission during the period of 01 January 2005 to 31 December 2010 and who had not acquired an alternative immigration permission in the intervening period, to apply for permission in the State. Ms. Sobhy applied to the scheme and the INIS addressed this application on 26 February 2019, granting her temporary permission to reside in the State under Stamp 4s conditions for a period of two years from the date of the letter.

Between 2008 and 2019, Ms. Sobhy made numerous social welfare contributions. The respondent and her employer made all of the necessary PRSI and PAYE contributions necessary to receive maternity benefit. The case turns on the period of 26 June 2012 to 03 March 2019 when Ms. Sobhy was a resident of and working in the State without permission to remain or work.

The following is the number of paid contributions Ms. Sobhy made during the specified years:

Year	Paid Contributions	Reckonable Paid Contributions for Pension
2008	38 A, 1 J	38
2009	26 A	26
2010	29 A	29
2011	48 A	48
2012	44 A, 1 J	44
2013	33 A	33
2014	52 A	52
2015	53 A	52
2016	48 A	48
2017	51 A	51
2018	37 A	37

Ms. Sobhy went on maternity leave on 15 December 2018 and gave birth on 9 January 2019. On 11 April 2019, while a lawful resident in the State, Ms. Sobhy applied for maternity benefit. On 04 June 2019, a Deciding Officer refused her claim for maternity benefit on the basis that she did not have a valid work permit, making her employment uninsurable.

Ms. Sobhy appealed this decision on 23 June 2019. The Appeal was disallowed.

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Social Welfare Appeal G0117

Title of Payment: Domiciliary Care Allowance

Date of Final Decision: 21^st May 2021

Keywords: Domiciliary Care Allowance; Refusal to revise a decision, Revised decision, Right to appeal to the Chief of Appeals Officer.

Organisation who represented the Claimant: KOD Lyons

Casebase no: G0117

Case Summary:

This case is that of Brigid Wilton McDonagh v. The Chief Appeals Officer and Minister for Social Protection [2021] IESC 33. The case concerned whether the refusal of a deciding officer to revise an earlier decision of a deciding officer constituted a new “decision” or “revised decision” so that the refusal would give rise to the right of the applicant to appeal to the Chief of Appeals Officer.

Ms McDonagh (The Applicant) is the primary carer of her child who has a diagnosis of learning/developmental difficulties. On the 10 June 2011, the applicant applied, pursuant to s.186(D) of the Social Welfare Consolidation Act 2005 as amended (2005 Act), to become a recipient of Domiciliary Care Allowance. On the 21^st September 2011, a deciding officer refused the applicant’s application pursuant to s.300(2)(b) of the 2005 Act.

The applicant was informed of her right to seek a review/revision of the decision under s.301(1) of the 2005 Act and her right to seek an appeal of the decision pursuant to s.311(1) of the 2005 Act. The applicant did not seek an appeal of the decision but after an interval of four and half years sought a revision of the decision by the deciding officer under s.301(1) of the 2005 Act on three separate occasions. On each occasion the application for a review was refused, the last of these refusals being issued on the 23^rd May 2017.

On the 12^th July 2017, the applicant’s solicitor wrote to The Chief Appeals Officer (the first-named respondent) seeking an appeal of the decision to refuse a revision of the decision. The first named respondent wrote to the applicant informing her there was no possibility to appeal to The Chief Appeals Officer as the 21-day appeal time limit for the decision made on the 21^st September 2011 had expired and there was no avenue to appeal to the Chief Appeals Officer where a deciding officer reviewed a decision but refused to revise the decision.

The applicant was subsequently granted leave to seek judicial review of the decision of the first named respondent and sought an order of certiorari quashing the decision of the first-named respondent and an order of mandamus compelling the first-named respondent to determine the appellant’s appeal. In doing so, she argued that a decision of a deciding officer refusing to revise an original decision constituted either a fresh “decision” or a “revised decision” under the legislation so that it gave rise to the right to appeal to the Chief of Appeals Officer.

The applicant’s arguments were rejected in the High Court and the reliefs sought were refused. The Court of Appeal affirmed the decision of the High Court, again rejecting the applicant’s arguments. The Supreme Court subsequently allowed the applicant’s appeal holding a decision of a deciding officer not to revise an original decision is a decision, just as a decision to revise is a decision and that as a result the applicant was entitled to appeal the decision not to revise her application for Domiciliary Care Allowance.

Key Conclusions: The refusal of a deciding officer to revise an earlier decision of a deciding officer is a decision that may be subject to appeal.

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Social Welfare Appeal G0110

This is one of two judgments delivered by the Supreme Court in the case of Petecel concerning the refusal of an application for Disability Allowance under the Social Welfare Consolidation Act 2005. This particular judgment deals with the substantive issue of the legal classification of Disability Allowance, as opposed to the appellant’s entitlement to seek judicial review. The procedural issue is addressed in the earlier judgment and is detailed in Casebase Report No. G0109.

The appellant was Catalin Petecel, a Romanian national who lawfully lived and worked in Ireland from 2008-11. He was diagnosed with MS (multiple sclerosis) in 2011 and travelled to Romania for treatment. He returned to the State briefly from February to April 2012 but otherwise has remained in Romania ever since. While there, his condition deteriorated to the point that he was physically unresponsive and being cared for full-time by his mother.

In 2016, Mr. Petecel applied through his legal guardian for Disability Allowance pursuant to section 210(1) of the 2005 Act. The deciding officer refused his application on the basis that he was not resident in the State. The appellant’s solicitors sought a review of that decision pursuant to section 301 submitting that Mr. Petecel was still habitually resident in the State, as his absences were for the purpose of receiving medical care. Furthermore, it was argued that Disability Allowance was a “sickness benefit” for the purpose of Article 3(1)(a) of EU Regulation 883/2004 and therefore “exportable”. The request for a revision was refused by a second deciding officer on 9^th June 2017.

Mr. Petecel sought to challenge the said refusal by way of judicial review seeking to quash the relevant decisions and obtain additional declaratory relief. The appellant grounded his leave application on two points. First, he submitted that the deciding officer had erred in finding the appellant was not habitually resident in Ireland. Second, he contended that the State had incorrectly categorised Disability Benefit as a non-exportable “special non-contributory benefit” and sought a preliminary reference to the Court of Justice of the European Union on that basis.

When the matter came before the Supreme Court, and having determined the procedural issue, O’Malley J. invited the parties to make further written submissions on the classification issue. She was particularly interested in two issues, namely the “rehabilitative work” aspect of the earnings disregard that applied in the means test for Disability Allowance and the relevant disqualification criteria. O’Malley J. was of the view that there were elements of sections 210 and 212 of the 2005 Act that possibly indicated there may have been a medical purpose to the overall conditions of eligibility attached to Disability Allowance at the time of Mr. Petecel’s claim and sought supplemental submissions on that basis. The Supreme Court concluded that Disability Allowance was a form of social assistance payment properly classified as a non-exportable “special non-contributory cash payment” within the meaning of Article 70(2) of Regulation 883/2004. The payment was not linked to any medical purpose. Accordingly, Mr. Petecel was not entitled to Disability Allowance and his appeal was dismissed.

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Social Welfare Appeal G0109

This is one of two judgments delivered by the Supreme Court in the case of Petecel concerning the refusal of an application for Disability Allowance under the Social Welfare Consolidation Act 2005. This particular decision deals with the procedural issue as to the appellant’s entitlement to seek judicial review in the absence of having exhausted the statutory appeals process. The substantive issue of the legal classification of Disability Allowance is dealt with in a later judgment as detailed in Casebase Report No. G0110.

Despite all aspects of the case being fully argued in the High Court, Barrett J. declined to consider the substantive issue raised in circumstances where Mr. Petecel has failed to exhaust the statutory appeals process. He found that the 2005 Act contained adequate remedies in the form of a de novo appeal to an appeals officer (section 311), a revision by the Chief Appeals Officer (section 318), and an appeal on a point of the law to the High Court (section 327). Even if it was inevitable that the case would end up in the High Court in some shape or form, Barrett J. was of the opinion that it should do so at the end of the appeals process.

The Court of Appeal was prepared to accept that judicial review was not preconditioned on engaging in a futile or pointless appeals process. Costello J. was of the view, however, that the issues of EU law raised by Mr. Petecel could be dealt by way of a reference to the High Court by the Chief Appeals Officer pursuant to section 306 of the 2005 Act or an ordinary appeal on a point of law. The Court was influenced by the fact that the High Court would have a broader jurisdiction in the context of a statutory appeal than in judicial review to find that the appellant was entitled to Disability Allowance.

Ultimately, the Supreme Court determined that the appellant was entitled to bring judicial review proceedings in circumstances where the question of the classification of Disability Allowance was not one which could be properly ventilated through the statutory appeals process. Further, it would not have been appropriate to bring an appeal on a point of law as the High Court’s jurisdiction in such matters is confined to the interpretation of statute. Acknowledging that the habitual residence might have been more appropriately addressed within the Departmental process, O’Malley J. held that this did not act as a barrier to judicial review.

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Social Welfare Appeal GO108

This is a joint decision in respect of two cases that both address the question of when a parent of as of yet undetermined immigration status is entitled to a child benefit payment in respect of a child who either is an Irish citizen or holds refugee status.

Ms. Agha and Osagie each applied for child benefit while living in Direct Provision as they awaited the outcome of their respective requests for permission to remain in the State, The said applications were refused on the basis that absent a legal right to reside in the State they were not considered “habitually resident” for the purposes of s.220 of the Social Welfare Consolidation Act 2005. Following the regularisation of their immigration status, further applications for child benefit were made by both applicants which the Department of Social Protection acceded to and backdated to the date they were granted permission to remain. They then sought to have child benefit further backdated to the date that the relevant child became a “qualified child” under s.219 of the 2005 Act. The Department refused to do so.

The applicants, on behalf of their children, challenged the decision not to backdate the child benefit on the basis that it breached the equality provisions under Article 40.1 of the Constitution and EU Law.

In the High Court, both cases were unsuccessful with White J. holding that the restricting of child benefit to parents who were habitually resident in the State was not unconstitutional or contrary to EU law because it applies equally to Irish citizens and non-Irish citizens and the equality guarantee in the Constitution does not require identical treatment for all persons without recognition of difference of circumstances. Although for the benefit of children, child benefit was paid to parents, and the distinction between people lawfully in the State and people without permission to be here was a valid one that the Oireachtas was entitled to make.

The decision at first instance was overturned in the Court of Appeal. Hogan J. found that the State had not provided objective justification for withholding child benefit in respect of an Irish citizen regardless of Ms. Osagie’s immigration status and that constitutional equality was breached in the refusal to backdate payments. Insofar Ms. Agha’s application related to a child who was granted refugee status, child benefit entitlements accrued from the date that the relevant child became entitled to reside in the State. There could be no basis for withholding child benefit in respect of a qualified child simply because the person applying for the benefit on the child’s behalf did not have a regularised immigration status. To do so would be to disproportionately deny parents a payment designed for the benefit of children.

The State was ultimately successful in its appeal before the Supreme Court. Dunne J. held that the Court of Appeal had fallen into error by focusing on the children rather than considering the positions of their respective parents as the claimants of child benefit. The Court held that there was no requirement in EU law to backdate child benefit payments in the manner claimed and that the equality provisions were not breached in circumstances where the habitual residency requirements applied to all prospective applicants equally.

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