Thematic Note G0144: Jobseeker’s Allowance

Theme: Jobseeker’s Allowance 

Period of Analysis: SWAO Annual Reports 2009-2022 

Keywords: Habitual Residence Condition, Right of Residence in the State, Means Test, Ownership of Property, Co-habiting Partners, Full-time Education, Capable of Work, Genuinely seeking Work, and Available for Employment/Work. 

Casebase No. Case G0144 

Summary of the relevant law: 

Jobseeker’s Allowance is a weekly means tested payment made by the Department of Social Protection to a person who is (i) unemployed;  (ii) who does not qualify for Jobseeker’s Benefit; (iii) whose entitlement to Jobseeker’s Benefit (a payment based on social insurance (PRSI) contributions) has expired;  or (iv) who does qualify for Jobseeker’s Benefit but chooses to claim Jobseeker’s Allowance on an optional basis. 

Conditions of Eligibility for Jobseeker’s Allowance 

The conditions of eligibility for Jobseeker’s Allowance are set out in Sections 140 – 148A of the Social Welfare Consolidation Act 2005 (as amended) (the “2005 Act”) and Articles 14 – 16 and 116 – 121 of the Social Welfare (Consolidated Claims, Payments and Control) Regulations 2007 (as amended) (the “2007 Regulations”).  

In accordance with Section 141 of the 2005 Act, a person is entitled to receive Jobseeker’s Allowance in respect of any week of unemployment (defined as any four days of unemployment within a 7 day period, whether consecutive or not) in circumstances where they meet the following criteria: 

  1. Aged between 18 and 66: 

Pursuant Section 141 (1)(a) of the 2005 Act the applicant must be over the age of 18 years and under the age of 66 years. In the case of people born after 1 January 1958, they may claim up to the age of 70 provided they have not yet claimed the State Contributory Pension. By virtue of SI/2003/088 of 2021, applicants who have reached the age of 65 do not have to comply with the specific requirements in relation to availability for work, genuinely seeking work, signing-on and activation for the labour market. Persons approaching pensionable age are advised to apply for a State (Contributory or Non-Contributory) Pension 3 months in advance of the relevant age limit.  

  1.  Unemployed and proves unemployment in the prescribed manner: 

The applicant must prove unemployment by signing an electronic declaration as part of their application according to Section 141 (1)(b) of the 2005 Act. Additionally, pursuant to Section 141A(3)(a) of the 2005 Act it is a requirement that a person prove unemployment by attending an Intreo Centre or a Social Welfare Branch Office (or other designated place) on a day and at a time that an officer of the Minister may direct for the purpose of making a written declaration that they  have been continuously unemployed since the last signing-on date or that they  expect to be unemployed for a future period.  

Continuous unemployment refers to any 2 consecutive weeks of unemployment not separated by more than 52 weeks pursuant Section 148 (4) (b) of the 2005 Act.  

Penalty payment rates will apply to applicants for refusal or failure to attend activation meetings, pursuant Section 141A, and refusal or failure to participate in prescribed schemes, programmes or courses pursuant Section 141B. 

An applicant is entitled to Jobseeker’s Allowance with respect to any week of unemployment, which is defined in Section 141(3) of the 2005 Act as any 4 days of unemployment, whether consecutive or not, within a period of 6 consecutive days out of 7 days. An applicant can work for up to 3 days and still claim Jobseeker’s Allowance. 

Pursuant the 2005 Act, a ‘day of unemployment’ occurs where the applicant is: 

(i) capable of work (Section 141 (4)(a)); 

(ii) deemed by regulations to be, or is exempted from being required to be, available for employment (Section 141 (4)(a)); and  

(iii) genuinely seeking, but is unable to obtain, employment suitable having regard to their age, physique, education, normal occupation, place of residence and family circumstances (Section 141 (4)(c)). 

Additionally, pursuant Article 117 of the 2007 Regulations, a person is not regarded as unemployed in respect of any day on which they are in receipt of wages.  

Capable of work’ – If a person is unable to work because of illness/disability, they are ineligible for Jobseeker’s Allowance. “Incapable of work” is defined in the 2005 Act as incapable of work by reason of some specific disease or bodily or mental disablement or is deemed, in accordance with regulations, to be so incapable. A person is considered to be capable of work if there is no evidence to the contrary (for example, unless they state otherwise), or where, on request, they fail to produce a final medical certificate following a period of illness. When a person has been disallowed Illness Benefit because they have been found “capable of work” following an examination by the Medical Assessor, it may be accepted that they  fulfil the requirement of being capable of work – notwithstanding any statement by the person that they do not consider themselves to be capable of work.  

Available for employment’ – A person must be available for suitable full-time work in respect of each day for which they declare that they are unemployed. Pursuant Article 15(1) of the 2007 Regulations, a person is regarded as available for employment if they are prepared to accept at once any offers of suitable employment. There must be no legal restriction on the person taking up employment (for example, visa restrictions on taking up employment in the case of non-EEA nationals). The onus is on the applicant to demonstrate that this condition is satisfied.  

Article 15 (2) of the 2007 Regulations sets out that a person may be regarded as not being available for work if (i) they impose unreasonable restrictions on the nature of the employment, (ii) the hours of work, (iii) the rate of pay, (iv) the duration of the employment, (v) the location of the employment, or (vi) any other conditions of employment which they are prepared to accept. A person who is not legally entitled to work, e.g. a non-national without a work permit, cannot be regarded as available for employment. 

Genuinely seeking suitable employment’ –Article 16 of the 2007 Regulations provides that in order to be considered ‘genuinely seeking suitable employment’ it is necessary for the person to demonstrate that they have taken reasonable steps to secure employment during the relevant period of unemployment for which they are claiming and provide examples of such steps. These steps include replying to job advertisements, seeking information on the availability of employment from employers and employment agencies, availing of reasonable opportunities for training, acting on the advice of a departmental or Solas official concerning the availability of employment or taking steps towards becoming self-employed.  

A jobseeker who engages in voluntary work within the State may continue to be entitled to a Jobseeker’s Allowance payment provided that, while engaging in the voluntary work, they continue to satisfy the statutory conditions of being available for and genuinely seeking work. 

Detailed information on how the Available and Genuinely Seeking conditions are deciding regarding EEA Nationals, Non-EEA Nationals, Asylum seekers, and other miscellaneous categories of person is available at the following link: https://www.gov.ie/en/publication/1a5134-operational-guidelines-jobseekers-allowance/#part-2-qualifying-conditions

The Habitual Residence Condition  

The Habitual Residence Condition consists of two parts – (1) right of residence in the State and (2) the five-factor test relating to the individual which are determined on a case-by-case basis. Firstly, a person must have an established right of residence in the State, pursuant to Section 246(5) of the 2005 Act and in accordance with SI/548/2015 – European Communities (Free Movement of Persons) Regulations 2015 (the “2015 Regulations”). This right of residence must be unconditional in that it does not preclude the person from accessing social welfare payments. Secondly, pursuant to Section 246(4) of the 2005 Act, a person’s situation and intentions will be taken into consideration by a Deciding Officer or Designated Person, in particular: (i) the length and continuity of residence in the State or any other country; (ii) the length and purpose of any absence from the State; (iii) the nature and pattern of the person’s employment; (iv) the person’s main centre of interest, and (v) the future intentions of the person concerned. This list is non-exhaustive and other information may be considered relevant in arriving at a decision.  

Article 6(1) of the 2015 Regulations provides that EU citizens and certain family members have a right of residence for a period of three months without any conditions or any formalities other than the requirement to hold a valid identity card or passport. Article 17(2) of the 2015 Regulations provides that a person to whom Article 6(1) applies is not entitled to receive social assistance under the 2005 Act. Article 6(1) of the 2015 Regulations sets out that an EU citizen who has entered the State seeking employment, and their family members, may continue to reside in the State for a period that is longer than 3 months where the Union citizen concerned can satisfy the Minister that they continue to seek employment and has a realistic prospect of being engaged in employment. 

Also see Thematic Note on Right to Reside and Habitual Residence Condition (Thematic Note G0116). 

Satisfaction of a Means Test 

The means test for Jobseeker’s Allowance is set out in Part 2 of Schedule 3 to the 2005 Act. Detailed information on how means are assessed is available at the following link: https://www.gov.ie/en/publication/11f23e-means-assessment-guidelines/

It is important to note the assessment of means for Jobseeker’s Allowance includes the assessment of the earnings of an applicant’s spouse/civil partner/cohabitant from both insurable and self-employment. The main provisions relating to the assessment of spouse/partner’s earnings are contained in Rule 1(2), 1(7), of the 2005 Act and Article 153 of the 2007 Regulations as amended by Art 10 of SI 700/07. 

‘Cohabitants’ refers to couples who are living together (both the same or opposite sex). The term ‘cohabitant’ is defined in the social welfare code in accordance with Section 172 (1) of the Civil Partnership and Certain Rights and Obligations of Cohabitants Act, 2010, which states that “… a cohabitant is one of two adults (whether of the same or the opposite sex) who live together as a couple in an intimate and committed relationship and who are not related to each other within the prohibited degrees of relationship or married to each other or civil partners of each other“. Detailed information on how the means of a spouse/civil/partner or cohabitants earning are assessed is available at the following link: https://www.gov.ie/en/publication/812bc6-operational-guidelinesjobseekers-allowancepre-retirement-allowance-a/ 

When determining if Jobseeker’s Allowance is applicable, consideration is given to each of the following:  

  1. property owned by the applicant and their spouse/cohabitant/civil partner, other than property personally used or enjoyed by the applicant. Account would be taken, under this heading, of, for example, a second house, savings, stocks and shares, and the weekly value of property assessed here is calculated in accordance with Table 1 to Schedule 4 of the 2005 Act; 
  1. all income that the applicant and their spouse/cohabitant/civil partner may reasonably expect to receive in the coming year, including earned income from employment or self-employment, social security payments from other countries and maintenance.  In the case of earnings of a spouse, civil partner or cohabitant from PRSI insurable employment, 60% of the average weekly earnings from that employment is taken into account. Certain forms of income are disregarded, including social welfare payments, money from recognised charities, and certain compensation payments paid by the State. A new statutory rental disregard of up to €269.23 per week (€14,000 per year) has been introduced and applies from the 12 July 2022 in respect of rental income from renting out a room(s) in your home to someone who is not an employee or an immediate family member. This also applies where an increase for a qualified adult is paid; 
  1. the value of any advantage accruing to a person and their spouse/cohabitant/civil partner from the use of property (other than a domestic dwelling or farm building, owned and occupied, furniture and personal effects) personally used or enjoyed by the applicant and their spouse/cohabitant/civil partner.; 
  1. any property disposed of by the applicant and their spouse/cohabitant/civil partner in order to qualify for Jobseeker’s Allowance; and  
  1. the value of any benefit or privilege enjoyed by the applicant and their spouse/cohabitant/civil partner. This is applied to applicants under the age of 25 who are still living at home, and it allows the Department to take account of 34% of the parents’ assessable income. An applicant under the age of 25 who has moved back into the parents’ home with their partner is exempt from this assessment while someone who has moved back home after at least three years’ independent living is assessed at €7 per week. 

Disqualification: 

  1. Disqualification for attendance on a Course of Study: 

Sections 68A and 148 of the 2005 Act provide that a person shall be disqualified from receipt of Jobseeker’s Allowance while attending a full-time day course of study, instruction or training which may take place over more than one academic year (including school/college holiday periods) and for the 3 month period after leaving second level education, except in such circumstances as may be prescribed. 

Article 121 of the Regulations 2007 provide for the following exceptions to this disqualification: 

a) persons aged between 18 and 20 years inclusive who: have been in receipt of Jobseeker’s Allowance for at least 6 months who are participating in approved courses of education, training or development and have not been enrolled in or attending an institute of education, for the purposes of completing a course of education or a course of instruction, within the 2 years immediately preceding the commencement of the course of study;  

b) Youthreach participants who complete their Junior Certificate/ Leaving Certificate or who leave second level education early; and 

c) mature students, that is, persons over 23 years of age on or before 1 January in the year in which the course of study commences are exempt from the student disqualification for the period in between academic years only. The student disqualification applies during the academic year. 

Persons who wish to pursue part-time courses under the Back to Education – Part-Time Option must demonstrate that their participation does not restrict reasonable availability for work. Availability for/genuinely seeking work opportunities must take precedence over course attendance, should a conflict arise. 

ii. Disqualification for loss of employment through misconduct 

Section 147(4) of the 2005 Act provides that a person may be disqualified from receipt of Jobseeker’s Allowance for up to 9 weeks where they have lost employment through their own misconduct. In addition, where an employee has been suspended from employment without pay, Jobseeker’s Allowance claims should be examined under the “availability” and “genuinely seeking work” conditions rather than the “not unemployed” condition. Payment may be allowed where all relevant statutory conditions are satisfied. 

iii. Residence in State Institution/ Imprisonment 

A person in receipt of Jobseeker’s Allowance will be disqualified while they are residing in an institution maintained out of public monies.  

Key grounds of appeals by applicants: 

From a review of the case studies of the SWAO Annual Reports from 2009 to 2022, the following areas arise in the appeals against refusals of JSA. The case studies of the appeals are included further below.  

 Satisfaction of a Means Test 

There were sixteen appeals relating to the satisfaction of a “means test”. Six appeals related to the evidential burden needed to prove or disprove cohabitation. Other appeals were taken on the grounds of departmental error, and the failure to provide all relevant information when submitting a claim for Jobseeker’s Allowance (Case 2021/75).  

Habitual Residence  

There were eleven appeals in relation to the requirement of proof of habitual residence as criterion for Jobseekers Allowance. In these cases, applicants appealed decisions that they had not satisfied the five-factor test established to determine habitual residence per Section 246(4) of the 2005 Act. Three cases dealt with the applicant having to prove that their ‘centre of interest’ was in Ireland or to justify long or frequent absences from the State. Other cases dealt with providing evidence of cohabitation (Case 2012/12) and reversal of a departmental error (Case 2016/318/35). 

Right to Reside  

Of the eleven appeals taken on ground of the Habitual Residence Test, three appeals related to the right to reside as a pre-requisite to the Habitual Residence criterion for Jobseeker’s Allowance. One concerned the 3 months right to reside of EU citizens under Article 6(2) of the 2015 Regulations and another whether the applicant could be considered a jobseeker per the definition provided under Article 6(2) of the same legislation.  

Failure to Attend Activation Meetings and to Attend Meetings Requested in order to Prove Unemployment, to Provide Information and Penalty Rates 

In the two cases appealing the imposition of penalty payment rates on grounds failure to attend activation meetings, the applicant did not demonstrate good cause for non-attendance at the activation meetings. A third (Case 2018/318/60) dealt with an appeal of a penalty rate imposed due to the applicant’s failure to provide further information regarding their circumstances and to attend a meeting to support their claim for Jobseeker’s Allowance. This appeal was disallowed. 

Overpayment & Departmental Error 

One case (Case 2017/40) dealt with a decision ordering an applicant to repay a significant overpayment made to them due to departmental error, which the appellant and her partner did not notice had been issued to them. This appeal was allowed. Another case (Case 2018/39) dealt with an appeal of a decision requiring the applicant to repay payments she claimed in error during the first few weeks of her new employment on the grounds that she had been advised she was entitled to claim Jobseeker’s Allowance up until her first paycheck by her local departmental office. This appeal was allowed. 

Observations on appeal outcomes: 

The most common barrier to claiming Jobseeker’s Allowance which applicants sought to overcome via appeal was failure of the Habitual Residence Test in the case studies selected for the SWAO Annual Reports.  

Applicants had to prove they satisfied the five-part test set out in Section 246(4) of the 2005 Act. Most appeals fell to be decided on the ‘centre of interest’ and ‘frequency and length of absences from the State’ legs of this test. In deciding whether Ireland was the applicant’s centre of interest, particularly significant weight was given by Appeals Officers to whether the applicant was in a long-term relationship with an EU or Irish Citizen residing in Ireland long-term. Where this was the case, the Habitual Residence test was considered satisfied unless there is evidence of a significant absence from the state with no good reason. An applicant having a child residing in Ireland, employment in the State, or being enrolled in an educational course in the State were also significant considerations. The Appeals Officers looked to establish a centre of interest and allow the appeal where at all possible. Where the applicant could point to a specific personal or educational reason for long or frequent absences from the State, this leg of the test was satisfied. It is important to note that applicants who did not have the pre-requisite right to reside, or who were EU applicants applying for a payment within their first three months in the State, were unsuccessful in their appeals. These circumstances definitely preclude an applicant from claiming the payment, and a successful appeal outcome will not be reached where these circumstances apply to the applicant. 

Applicants who appealed on the grounds of the Means Test appear to have a low success rate. Most commonly the applicant appealed the calculations of the original Deciding Officer. In most appeals of calculations, the original decision was upheld. Appeals on the grounds of departmental error were more commonly allowed. Several applicants appealed their assessment as forming part of a co-habiting couple. In these cases, the applicant was required to disprove evidence of Cohabitation.  

The onus is on the Department to establish on the balance of probabilities that the applicant and an induvial with whom they reside meet the statutory definition of a Co-Habiting Couple which requires the individual be in an “intimate and committed relationship”.  Where two individuals had resided with one another over a long period of time or across multiple addresses, had previously applied for Departmental resources listing one another as their partner or co-habiting couple, or where the individuals declined to provide requested information to the Department, the Appeal’s Officer tended to disallow appeals. 

Appeals on grounds of failure to meet the statutory requirements to attend activation meetings or provide requested information were all unsuccessful. In all three cases on these grounds, the applicant had not demonstrated good cause for non-attendance of the activation meetings. The threshold for proving ‘good cause’ for missing an activation meeting is high, and as noted by one Appeals Officer, will only be satisfied where the good cause was communicated at the time of invitation in a timely manner.  

Applicants should be advised to attend all required meetings and provide all information requested by the Department. Applicants should note that these statutory requirements will not be considered as legitimate grounds for an appeal, unless perhaps an extremely exceptional extenuating circumstance which was communicated to the Department at the time of the meeting invitations or could not have been communicated at the time of invitation for a proven reason, although no such case arose in this review. Appeals Officer’s noted that applicants are issued multiple notifications and invitation to meetings before a penalty rate is finally imposed and therefore do view the applicant as having had a fair chance to attend or respond to invitations to reschedule.  

Where one applicant claimed they did not receive the correspondence, the Appeals Officer ruled it is applicant’s responsibility to update the Department with an address at which they are contactable each time they move residence, therefore correspondence is considered received once sent from the Department to the registered address. In another case, an applicant claimed he did not attend a meeting due to privacy and data protection concerns. These arguments were considered irrelevant by the Appeal’s Officer, who noted provision of information on personal circumstances is a core element upon which the social welfare system relies and must be respected. 

Relevant Case Studies of the SWAO Annual Reports 2009-2022 

A. 2009  
 N/A  
 2010  
1. 2010/10 Supplementary Welfare Allowance (Basic Income) & Jobseeker’s Allowance Question at issue: Eligibility (means assessment) 
 2011  
1. 2011/09 Jobseeker’s Allowance Question at issue: Habitual Residence 
2. 2011/12 Jobseeker’s Allowance Question at issue: Habitual Residence 
3. 2011/20 Jobseeker’s Allowance Question at issue: Habitual Residence 
 2012  
1. 2012/12 Jobseeker’s Allowance & Co-habitation Question at issue: Means & Co-habitation 
 2013  
 N/A  
 2014  
 N/A  
 2015  
1. 2015/14 Jobseeker’s Allowance Question at issue: Means Assessment 
 2016  
1. 2016/23 Jobseeker’s Allowance Question at issue: Eligibility (Means) 
2. 2016/24 Jobseeker’s Allowance Question at issue: Eligibility (Habitual Residence) 
3. 2016/25 Jobseeker’s Allowance Question at issue: Eligibility (Means) 
4. 2016/26 Jobseeker’s Allowance & SWA Question at issue: Eligibility (Right to Reside) 
5. 2016/318/35 Jobseeker’s Allowance Question at issue: Habitual Residence 
 2017  
1. 2017/39 Jobseeker’s Allowance Question at issue: Eligibility (Means) 
2. 2017/40 Jobseeker’s Allowance Question at issue: Overpayment (Departmental Error) 
3. 2017/41 Jobseeker’s Allowance Question at issue: Eligibility (Means) 
4. 2017/318/62 Jobseeker’s Allowance Question at issue: Whether an Appeals Officer had erred when partially allowing an appeal in relation to overpayment 
 2018  
1. 2018/39 Jobseeker’s Allowance Question at issue: Eligibility (Whether a Person is Unemployed) 
2. 2018/40 Jobseeker’s Allowance Question at issue: Eligibility (Means) 
3. 2018/41 Jobseeker’s Allowance Question at issue: Eligibility 
4. 2018/42 Jobseeker’s Allowance Question at issue: Eligibility (Habitual Residence) 
5. 2018/43 Jobseeker’s Allowance Question at issue: Eligibility (Habitual Residence) 
6. 2018/44 Jobseeker’s Allowance Question at issue: Eligibility (Failure to Attend Activation Meetings) 
7. 2018/318/58 Jobseeker’s Allowance Question at issue: Assessment of means derived from seasonal employment 
8. 2018/318/60 Jobseeker’s Allowance Question at issue: Information to be given when making a claim  
9. 2018/318/64 Jobseeker’s Allowance Question at issue: Attending a course of study 
 2019  
1. 2019/38 Jobseeker’s Allowance Question at issue: Eligibility (Failure to Attend Activation Meetings) 
2. 2019/39 Jobseeker’s Allowance Question at issue: Eligibility (Means) 
3. 2019/40 Jobseeker’s Allowance Question at issue: Eligibility (Failure to Attend Activation Meetings) 
4. 2019/44 Jobseeker’s Allowance Question at issue: Eligibility (Full-Time Education) 
5. 2019/318/64 Jobseeker’s Allowance Question at issue: Entitlement (Pay Rate) 
 2020  
1. 2020/34 Jobseeker’s Allowance Question at issue: Eligibility (Available for and Genuinely Seeking Work) 
2. 2020/35 Jobseeker’s Allowance Question at issue: Eligibility (Habitual Residence) 
3. 2020/36 Jobseeker’s Allowance Question at issue: Eligibility (Means) 
4. 2020/37 Jobseeker’s Allowance Question at issue: Eligibility (Means) 
5. 2020/318/65 Jobseeker’s Allowance Question at issue: Entitlement (Penalty Rate) 
6. 2020/318/66 Jobseeker’s Allowance Question at issue: Entitlement (Penalty Rate) 
7. 2020/318/67 Jobseeker’s Allowance Question at issue: Eligibility (Right to Reside in the State) 
 2021  
1. 2021/49 Jobseeker’s Allowance Question at issue: Eligibility (Habitual Residence) 
2. 2021/50 Jobseeker’s Allowance Question at issue: Eligibility (Means) 
3. 2021/51 Jobseeker’s Allowance Question at issue: Eligibility (Means) 
4. 2021/75 Jobseeker’s Allowance Question at issue: Eligibility (Means) 
 2022  
1. 2022/46 Jobseeker’s Allowance Question at issue: Eligibility 
2. 2022/47 Jobseeker’s Allowance Question at issue: Income Support 
3. 2022/48 Jobseeker’s Allowance Question at issue: Eligibility (Right to Reside & Habitual Residence) 
4. 2022/49 Jobseeker’s Allowance Question at issue: Eligibility (Full-Time Education) 

2010: 

2010/10 Supplementary Welfare Allowance (Basic Income) & Jobseeker’s Allowance 

Question at issue:  Eligibility (means assessment) 

Question at issue: There were two appeals dealt with in this case – concerning the appellant’s entitlement to Supplementary Welfare Allowance (basic income) and/or to Jobseeker’s Allowance. Her means had been assessed at €210 per week derived from the capital value of property, an amount in excess of the qualifying threshold for both schemes. 

Background: The appellant left the family home in 2008, following the breakdown of her marriage. Her husband was retired and in receipt of a private pension. He received a lump sum on retirement which he used to clear the mortgage on the family home; he continued to live there with one of the couple’s adult daughters. 

Oral hearing: The appellant was accompanied by a counsellor. The Community Welfare Officer (CWO) who had assessed the appellant’s entitlement to Supplementary Welfare Allowance attended at the request of the Appeals Officer, as did the Social Welfare Inspector who had investigated her claim for Jobseeker’s Allowance. 

The appellant reported that she had left the marriage in 2008. She confirmed that the family home was held in the joint names of her husband and herself. She said that she had worked during her marriage, as had her husband, and that they had shared household expenses. Her husband had been responsible mainly for the mortgage while she looked after the daily necessities for the family. 

In terms of her current circumstances, the appellant reported that she had lost her job and had claimed Jobseeker’s Benefit. When the period of entitlement ceased, she applied for Jobseeker’s Allowance and her claim was disallowed. She said that she had nothing to live on and was staying at a friend’s apartment. She asserted that it was very unfair to assess her with capital from property based on her family home as the property was still a family home. She said that if she looked for her share, her husband could not afford to buy her out. The other alternative, insisting on the house being sold, would render her husband and son homeless. She advised that she did not intend to seek a judicial separation, and that she would not apply for maintenance as it was she who had walked out on the marriage. The appellant went on to say that the HSE had also refused her a medical card as the property was assessed as means under that scheme also. 

The Social Welfare Inspector stated that the property at issue had been valued at some €170,000. Based on her investigation, she advised that the appellant’s interest in the property was deemed to be capital; as she no longer lived there, it was not regarded as her family home in spite of the fact that her husband and daughter continued to reside there. The Inspector said that the appellant was expected to realise her share of the property. 

In response, the appellant reiterated that she was the one who left the marriage and said that she felt her husband was entitled to more of the property as he was the one who had paid off the mortgage when he retired. 

Consideration of the Appeals Officer: The Appeals Officer observed that the appellant had appeared somewhat overawed by the oral hearing. She considered that she had been very open regarding her current circumstances but reticent to discuss her separation. Having considered all of the evidence, including that presented at the oral hearing, the Appeals Officer concluded that the property in question should not be assessed as means. In making that decision, she referred to the Social Welfare (Consolidation) Act, 2005 (Part 2, section 1), as follows: 

In the calculation of means of a person for the purposes of Chapters 2, 3, 10 and 11 of Part 3, account shall be taken of the following – 

(1) other than in the circumstances and subject to the conditions and for the periods that may be prescribed, the weekly value of property belonging to the person or to his or her spouse (not being property personally used or enjoyed by the person or his or her spouse or a farm of land leased either by the person or his or her spouse) which is invested or otherwise put to profitable use or is capable of being, but is not, invested or put to profitable use and the weekly value, calculated in accordance with Table 1 to this Schedule, constitutes the weekly means of a person from that property … 

The Appeals Officer held that, although the appellant had left the property, it was still functioning as the family home and was being personally used and enjoyed as such by the appellant’s husband and daughter. In accordance with the provisions of social welfare legislation, and the Department of Social Protection’s own Guidelines (‘Assessment of Second or Multiple Properties’), the Appeals Officer concluded that the property was not capable of being sold, let or put to profitable use and should not be assessed as means in this case. Accordingly, the appellant was assessed with nil means and the appeal was successful. 

Outcome: Appeal allowed. 

2011: 

2011/09 Jobseekers Allowance 

Question at issue: Whether the appellant may be deemed to meet the Habitual Residence Condition (HRC) for purposes of his claim to Jobseeker’s Allowance. 

There were two claims for Jobseeker’s Allowance disallowed on grounds of habitual residence not being satisfied. The initial claim was made in 2009, and the subsequent claim had a date some fourteen months later in 2010. 

Background: The appellant, a Polish national, came to this country in 2007. He returned to Poland some three months later and came back to Ireland early in 2008. He took up employment with a construction company and worked there to the end of that year. In his letter of appeal, he stated that he had resided continuously in the State since that time. He asserted that his centre of interest was in Ireland and stated that his closest family lived here. 

For his part, the Deciding Officer considered that the appellant’s length and continuity of residence in Ireland did not support habitual residence; he had resided outside Ireland for most of his life; his centre of interest was not in Ireland; he had no established employment record in Ireland; his future intentions of remaining were considered short-term and, from the evidence provided, there was nothing to substantiate that he was habitually resident in the State. 

The appellant was in receipt of Supplementary Welfare Allowance (Basic Income and Rent Supplement) for four months in 2010 when payment stopped as he became a student. 

Parties attending oral hearing: The appellant attended the hearing alone. 

Report of oral hearing: At the outset, the issue was explained and an outline provided of all relevant documentation available to the Appeals Officer. The appellant confirmed the details as to his residence in the State. He reported that he had returned to Poland in 2007 to pursue a training course and to improve his educational achievements with the purpose of enhancing his employment prospects. He stated that he had returned to Ireland subsequently as his father had sourced employment for him with the construction company where he worked. He reported that on his return to Ireland he worked with that company for eight months until he was let go, through a downfall in business 

The appellant advised that since returning to Ireland in 2008, he had not left the country. He stated that he had received Supplementary Welfare Allowance, as a former EU worker, for dates specified in 2009. He stated that, thereafter, he lived off some accrued savings and was supported by his parents, with whom he resides. He reported that he found work again in 2010 which lasted for some four months. He advised that he commenced a training course (FETAC Level 5) later that year and was hopeful of finding related employment once he completed his studies. 

The appellant referred to his family and advised that his father came to Ireland in 2004 to take up employment and his mother and brother followed some time afterwards. He reported that that both his father and mother were employed and that their intentions were to remain in Ireland indefinitely. He advised that the family had always rented accommodation whilst residing in Poland and that they did not own any property there. He stated that he had two other siblings residing with a relative in Poland whilst they complete their education and said that both were intent on coming to Ireland to join the rest of the family once their studies were complete. In conclusion, he submitted that his centre of interest was in Ireland and that his future intentions were to remain here indefinitely. 

Consideration of the Appeals Officer: The Appeals Officer took into account the details of the appellant’s residence in the State and was satisfied that he had been continuously resident since 2008. He considered that the appellant’s return to Poland was for a temporary period, to pursue a course in education as he was unable, at that time, to find work here. He noted that his father and mother had established some permanence in Ireland and that the appellant had made meaningful efforts himself to integrate into the local community and establish a centre of interest in this country. He noted also his current participation on an educational course and his involvement with the local sports club. Having considered all the available evidence, he concluded that the appellant’s centre of interest, at that time, had been established as being in Ireland and that his future intentions were to remain here indefinitely. He concluded that the appellant was habitually resident in the State for social welfare purposes and held that this decision should take effect from the date of the oral hearing, at which time the appellant might be deemed to have established habitual residence. 

Outcome: Appeal partially allowed. 

2011/12 Jobseekers Allowance 

Question at issue: Whether the appellant may be deemed to meet the Habitual Residence Condition (HRC) for purposes of her claim to Jobseeker’s Allowance. 

Background: The appellant, a Polish National, came to live in Ireland in 2008. She was issued with a Public Social Services (PPS) number in March 2009. Her social insurance record showed a total of 22 weeks of insurable employment in the State. 

Parties attending oral hearing: The appellant and her partner. 

Report of the oral hearing: The Appeals Officer read the formal decision and advised the appellant of the information which had been relied on in making that decision. A discussion followed during which it was established that the appellant had lived in Ireland since 2008, despite not obtaining a PPS number until March 2009; that she worked in a number of jobs but only one employer would appear to have been PRSI 

compliant; that she was currently in a relationship with an Irish national, and that he was in receipt of a social welfare payment with payment being made for her as a qualified adult on his claim. 

The appellant reported that she holds a Polish bank account (but the Appeals Officer observed that in the age of modern technology, this was not unusual). She advised that she has gone back to Poland for holidays, usually at Christmas, but had always returned to Ireland. She indicated that she had spent a slightly longer break in Poland in 2008 when she had undergone surgery. She reported that she was registered with FAS and that she had made numerous efforts to find work. She stated that she had supported herself from savings as most of her jobs had been live in, or she had relied on friends.  

Consideration of the Appeals Officer: In reaching a conclusion in this case, the Appeals Officer indicated that she was mindful of the five factors to be considered in deciding on habitual residence, and she examined them separately, as follows: 

Length and continuity of residence in the State: She noted that the appellant came to Ireland as an au-pair in 2008 and had lived in the State since then. 

Length and frequency of absences from the State: She noted that the appellant had spent ‘a few weeks’ in Poland in 2008 for surgery and had returned to Ireland after this, only returning to Poland for holidays since. 

Nature and pattern of employment: She took account of the fact that the appellant had only 22 weeks of insurable employment. She also noted, however, that the evidence presented indicated that the appellant had worked for a number of different employers, some of whom did not comply with PRSI legislation and make returns on her behalf. 

Main centre of interest: She noted that the appellant was in a relationship with an Irish national, and had been for some time, and that he was in receipt of a Qualified Adult Increase on his Jobseeker’s Allowance in respect of the appellant. 

Future Intentions: She took account of the statement made by the appellant in completing the HRC1 form, indicating that she intended to remain in Ireland for longer than five years and work in the State. She noted also that the appellant was in a relationship and was hopeful that this would continue. 

Having considered all of the evidence in this case, including that adduced at oral hearing, the Appeals Officer was satisfied that the appellant could be considered to be habitually resident in the State with effect from the date of her claim. 

Outcome: Appeal allowed. 

2011/20 Jobseeker’s Allowance 

Question at issue: Whether the appellant may be deemed to meet the Habitual Residence Condition (HRC) for purposes of her claim to Jobseeker’s Allowance. 

Background: The appellant, a Romanian national, came to Ireland in 2006. He lived here with his partner and their child who was born here in 2010. They have another child, born in 2000, who remains in Romania. The appellant was engaged in part-time employment but did not have a work permit His claim to Jobseeker’s Allowance was disallowed on grounds that he had not established that he was habitually resident in the State for social welfare purposes. The Deciding Officer had concluded that details as to his residence and means of support for the period between his arrival and the date of his claim were unknown, and referred also to the fact that he did not hold a valid work permit. The appellant’s partner was awarded Supplementary Welfare Allowance in 2011, with means assessed at €70 per week. 

Parties attending oral hearing: The appellant attended alone. 

Report of oral hearing: The appellant opened by saying that he had been working in his home country of Romania until 2006 when his sister was killed tragically in a road traffic accident in Ireland. He reported that he came to Ireland initially to represent his family in legal and other proceedings arising from her death. He said that his sister was buried in Ireland and that her child lives here with her father. In addition, he indicated that all the legal issues of compensation arising from his sister’s death had not been settled and said that he intended to remain until they were. 

The appellant referred to his employment here since 2006 and submitted tax certificates as proof. He acknowledged that he did not hold a valid work permit. He said he was unclear as to why his employer had not applied for a work permit on his behalf. He confirmed that his partner and child lived with him. He stated that his partner had been in the State for more than five years, and was currently engaged in some small self-employment, working at home. He submitted evidence of her registration with the Revenue Commissioners and said that business was slow to pick up; she might earn €70 per week on average. He confirmed that she was in receipt of Supplementary Welfare Allowance but not Child Benefit, and he advised that she was pregnant. He said he could not understand that her work history appeared not to have been considered in relation to Child Benefit. In conclusion, the appellant stated that he was looking for work and had registered with FAS. 

Consideration of the Appeals Officer: The Appeals Officer noted that the appellant was a Romanian national who did not hold a valid work permit. He considered, therefore, that any employment he had undertaken was illegal and could not be taken as a valid employment record for determining the question as to habitual residence. However, he took account of the fact that the appellant had formed a relationship with an EU national who did not require a work permit, and that the couple had one child and were expecting another. He noted that she had been in the State for more than five years and that she had been in employment, with 84 social insurance contributions paid. In addition, she had commenced self-employment and proof of her registration with Revenue had been submitted. He concluded, therefore, that the appellant’s partner was legally permitted to reside in the State in accordance with the provisions of S.I. 656 of 2006, European 

Communities (Free Movement of Persons) (No. 2) Regulations, 2006. 

The Appeals Officer noted that the appellant’s partner was in receipt of Supplementary Welfare Allowance which included an increase in respect of the appellant and their child. He observed that the appellant was, therefore, the dependant of a person who was legally resident in the State and as such was himself legally resident. Accordingly, he considered that the question as to habitual residence fell to be considered under the five factors set out in the legislation. He noted that the length and continuity of his residence was substantial. He noted also that his work record indicated that he had paid 101 PRSI contributions and, although the employment was undertaken without a valid work permit it could not be considered to constitute a valid work record, it did indicate his actual presence in the State. He noted also that there was no evidence to suggest that the appellant had been coming and going from Ireland since his arrival and considered that he could not, therefore, be said to have continued to maintain a centre of interest outside Ireland. 

The Appeals Officer considered that the appellant had a significant centre of interest in the State as he had a partner and a child. He noted the appellant’s original reason for coming to Ireland, the tragic death of his sister, but considered that his connection with the State had moved beyond that. He noted also that the appellant’s niece continued to reside in the State and that the appellant had indicated that he remained here in the child’s interest. When considered with his own family commitments, the Appeals Officer considered that this added to the assertion that his centre of interest is now here. 

The Appeals Officer considered that there was a case to be made for regarding the appellant as habitually resident in relation to four of the five factors outlined in legislation. He concluded that the fact that his employment had been undertaken without a work permit, and that he continued without a work permit, should not determine the issue alone. He observed that he had recourse to obtaining a work permit which would remedy his situation into the future and held that, in all the circumstances, the appeal must succeed. 

Outcome: Appeal allowed. 

2012: 

2012/12 Jobseeker’s Allowance & Co-habitation 

Decision under appeal: claim awarded at reduced rate – reason(s) stated: – 

You are entitled to Jobseeker’s Allowance from [specified date] at the rate shown – half the rate for a couple less means of €41.00 per week. As your spouse/civil partner/cohabitant is also getting a social welfare payment, your weekly rate of payment is limited to this amount. 

Issue: Co-habitation. 

Background: The appellant was assessed with means of €41.00 based on his partner’s income from part-time employment. The Deciding Officer concluded that he was co-habiting with a person [named] who, having made a claim for Jobseeker’s Allowance in her own right, had named the appellant as her partner. The appellant denied that they were partners and said she had made a mistake. He said they were cousins. 

At oral hearing: the Appeals Officer explained to the appellant how his rate of payment of €115 had been calculated. He advised him that the Deciding Officer considered that the person [named] was his partner as she had completed a form stating this to be the case. The Appeals Officer had called the person [named] to the oral hearing, but she had failed to attend. 

The appellant said that when the claim form was being completed, the person named had been asked who was living in the house with her and she said the appellant. When the Appeals Officer asked how she had known his PPS number, he said that she had phoned him and asked for it. He was adamant that the person named was not his partner. He said he had moved out of his parent’s house as it was too crowded. He advised that his brother had a disability and needed a room of his own, and he had medical evidence confirming his brother’s disability. The appellant said that he paid his rent separately and he had a letter from the Private Residential Tenancies Board (PRTB), addressed to him only, stating that he had been registered as a tenant. He said that if he lost the appeal he would move back home, and his sister would move into the house with the person named. He went on to say that he owed his mother about €2,500. 

Comment/Conclusion: In this case, the appellant had been awarded Jobseeker’s Allowance from a date [specified] in 2012 at half the rate for a couple less means of €41.00 per week. The Deciding Officer concluded that he was co-habiting with a person named as she had earlier signed a Jobseeker’s Allowance repeat claim form stating that the appellant was her partner. The file was sent subsequently to the Social Welfare Inspector to review his means. The Appeals Officer noted that the Inspector did not proceed with the means review as the decision was under appeal. However, she had interviewed the appellant twice and on both occasions, he had denied being in a relationship. The Inspector had taken the view that he was in a relationship based on the form signed by the person named. 

The Appeals Officer noted the appellant’s statement that when the person named was making her claim, she had been asked who was living in the house with her and she had said the appellant and phoned him for his PPS number. He observed that this may or may not have been the case but in the circumstances that it was a somewhat plausible explanation. He examined the claim form at issue and noted that it had been completed by the local social welfare Branch Office Manager and then signed by the person named. He observed that she may or may not have realized what she was signing as her signature was not on the same page as that on which the appellant had been listed as her partner. The Appeals Officer noted that there was no other evidence of co-habitation, nor was co-habitation investigated as set out in Operational Guidelines issued by the Department of Social Protection to its staff (www.welfare.ie/en/Pages/Cohabitation.aspx). In the absence of such an investigation, he concluded that the evidence of co-habitation was very limited and open to question. In the circumstances, he considered that he had no option but to conclude that co-habitation had not been proved. 

Decision of the Appeals Officer: The appeal is allowed 

2015: 

2015/14 Jobseeker’s Allowance 

Question at issue: Assessment of means 

Background: The appellant’s claim for Jobseeker’s Allowance was referred to a Social Welfare Inspector for an investigation of means. The Inspector reported that the appellant had been renting a house for a year and a half with a [named] person and, prior to that, they had been renting a house together for two years. The Inspector noted that a means assessment for an earlier claim in 2011 had included an assessment of that person’s income and that the appellant had not made an appeal against the decision at that time, although she conceded that the income assessed had been considerably lower at that time. The Inspector noted also that the appellant had received an award following an unfair dismissals action and that he had transferred €12,500 of that award to the other person for what he said were loan repayments. Accordingly, the Inspector considered that they were cohabiting and submitted a report to the Deciding Officer on that basis. Ultimately, the appellant was assessed with means of €522.00 per week derived from his own and his partner’s self-employment, and his claim was disallowed on grounds that his means were in excess of the statutory limit. 

Oral hearing: The appellant attended alone, while the Social Welfare Inspector attended at the request of the Appeals Officer. The Inspector outlined the details of her report, making reference to the house that the appellant and his partner had purchased for €235,000 in 2007 – financed by means of the appellant’s contribution of €100,000 from his divorce settlement and a joint mortgage of €165,000. She said that the appellant had reported that he was paying the mortgage while his partner paid utility bills although the accounts were held in his name. She noted that, at interview, the appellant had denied cohabitation. 

The Inspector reported that the appellant’s income from self-employment had been assessed on the basis of invoices submitted; these were not complete, and the assessment had been completed with reference to bank statements. She stated that she had reported annual profit at €10,523, or €202.36 per week. She stated that the appellant had claimed the [named] person as a qualified adult when in receipt of a Back to Work Allowance payment between specified dates in 2012 and 2014. In conclusion, she noted that the appellant’s investment in the house appeared to far outweigh that of the other person and she reiterated her assertion that they continued to cohabit. 

For his part, the appellant denied cohabitation. He said that he had rented a room from the [named] person at two properties. He advised that, subsequently, he got a job in another county, and he became aware of a further vacancy in the company and advised her as she had lost her job in the meantime. He stated that they had purchased the house together as a commercial transaction intending to refurbish it and sell it on at a profit. However, that had not worked out. He said that currently the [named] person was barely speaking to him as he was making no contribution to the house, and she was paying interest only on the mortgage. He stated that they lead completely separate lives. He said that income details for the [named] person referred to 2012, with income of €20,240 and rent of €3,640 but no other expenses taken into account. 

The appellant said also that the [named] person had paid for most of the work done on the house and he believed she contributed more than he had. He made reference to the Inspector’s statement about the claim in 2011 and said he had not made an appeal as he had been paid Jobseeker’s Allowance, albeit at a reduced rate. He said he had never put down on any application form that the person concerned was his partner. 

The appellant advised that he had ceased self-employment as he had had to sell his equipment to get money. The Appeals Officer advised that if he wished to submit further evidence, such as accounts in respect of the [named] person which would allow a more accurate assessment of expenses to be taken into account, he would allow a further period of two weeks before determining the appeal; in the absence of any further information, he would proceed to make a decision based on the evidence available. 

Consideration: The Appeals Officer noted that the appellant had lived with the [named] person at three different locations over a protracted period and that they had moved together from the northeast to the south of the country. In addition, they had obtained a joint mortgage and bought a house together. He noted that the appellant did not appeal a previous decision in 2011 although he acknowledged that the means assessed at the time were small and he noted also that the appellant had claimed for the person concerned as an adult dependant on his Back to Work Allowance between 2012 and 2014. He considered that the evidence indicated cohabitation. He noted that, following the oral hearing, the appellant had written to advise that the [named] person had declined to give details of her income and that the appellant had reiterated his assertion that he should be treated as an individual for means purposes and not as one of a couple. In the absence of any additional details as to income, the Appeals Officer concluded that the appellant had not established that his weekly means were less than the limit provided for in legislation and he noted that even when the appellant’s own income from self-employment was excluded, his means exceeded that limit. 

Outcome: Appeal disallowed. 

2016: 

2016/23 Jobseeker’s Allowance 

Question at issue: Eligibility (Means) 

Background: In connection with a claim for Jobseeker’s Allowance made in 2009, the appellant provided details of bank and credit union accounts which he held at the time. His means were assessed, and his claim was awarded. It appears that his file was examined in connection with a claim which his partner made for Carer’s Allowance in 2013. Additional information had been provided, indicating that the appellant had opened a further account in the meantime. When his claim came under review in 2015, however, it emerged that no adjustment had been made to take account of that new information. A revised decision was made and the appellant was held to have been entitled to a lower rate of payment with effect from a date in 2013. Initially, this was applied with reference to the provisions of Section 302(a) of the Social Welfare Consolidation Act 2005, which deals with fraudulent intent. When it came to light that all of the information had been disclosed at the appropriate time but that there had been a failure to revise the means assessment accordingly, the decision was applied with reference to Section 302(c). These are the provisions usually applied where a Deciding Officer has made an error or where information was provided but not acted upon. An overpayment of some €15,000 was assessed. In his appeal submission, the Deciding Officer acknowledged that the overpayment had arisen solely as a consequence of a Departmental error as the appellant had provided the relevant information but it had not been taken into account. 

Consideration: The Appeals Officer noted that the appellant had provided details of his means in full and that the Department had been made aware of the additional bank account when his partner was interviewed in 2013 in connection with her claim for Carer’s Allowance. In the circumstances, he determined that the means from savings were assessable from a specified date in 2015, that is the date from which the retrospective decision had been applied, with the effect that the overpayment was eliminated. 

Outcome: Appeal allowed. 

2016/24 Jobseeker’s Allowance 

Question at issue: Eligibility (Habitual Residence) 

Background: The appellant, in her late 20s, was born in Spain. She came to live in Ireland originally in 2010 and worked for periods between 2010 and 2013. She went back to Spain, where she worked until her return to Ireland in 2015. She made a claim for Jobseeker’s Allowance some six months later. This was refused on grounds that she was not habitually resident in the State. 

Oral hearing: The appellant reported that during her previous residence in Ireland, she had worked in a number of jobs and lived with her Irish partner. She advised that she had made a claim for Jobseeker’s Allowance in 2013 and had been paid for a few months at a reduced rate as her means had been assessed with reference to her partner’s earnings from employment. She advised that she returned to live with her family in Spain when the relationship ended. She outlined details of her living arrangements since her return in 2015 and advised that, between then and the date of making her claim, she had one day of employment and ten days subsequently. She said that she was registered with an agency and paid on the basis of self-employment. She said that, since her return, she had been to Spain only once to renew her identity card and that she considers Ireland to be more her home than Spain at this stage. She advised that she had been refused renewal of her European Health Insurance Card (EHIC) in Spain and had been told that she had to apply for her card in Ireland. She submitted a certificate from the Spanish Embassy stating that she is resident in Ireland, a copy of her current tenancy agreement, Notice of Income Tax registration with Revenue, a Spanish identity card with an Irish address, as well as documentary evidence confirming her involvement in a range of social activities. 

Consideration: The Appeals Officer noted that the decision in the case had been made with reference to the five factors to be taken into account in determining habitual residence, outlined in Section 246(4) of the Social Welfare Consolidation Act 2005. She observed that the appellant must be assumed to have a right to reside in the State as this had not been addressed in the decision. Accordingly, habitual residence fell to be determined with reference only to the five factors. She noted that the appellant had been paid Jobseeker’s Allowance in 2013 so that she must have satisfied the habitual residence condition at that time. She noted that the Department of Social Protection has issued Guidelines on the Habitual Residence Condition (HRC), which state that a person who had previously been habitually resident in the State, moves to live and work in another country and then resumes his/her long-term residence, may be regarded as being habitually resident immediately on their return. The Appeals Officer noted that the appellant had been deemed to be habitually resident in 2013 and that her circumstances were in line with those outlined in the HRC Guidelines. She noted that the evidence submitted had served to establish that her centre of interest was in Ireland and concluded that the appellant must be deemed to meet the habitual residence condition for purposes of her Jobseeker’s Allowance claim. 

Outcome: Appeal allowed. 

2016/25 Jobseeker’s Allowance 

Question at issue: Eligibility (Means) 

Background: The appellant was in his early 20s and living at home when he made a claim for Jobseeker’s Allowance. As he had not reached the prescribed age of 25 years, his means were assessed with reference to the ‘benefit and privilege’ of living with his parents. The rules which govern the calculation of means are outlined in Schedule 3 of the Social Welfare Consolidation Act 2005. Rule 1(10) provides that: 

in the case of a person entitled to or in receipt of jobseeker’s allowance and who has 

not attained the age that may be prescribed [25 years], the yearly value of any 

benefit or privilege enjoyed by that person by virtue of residing with a parent or step- 

parent, and the Minister may prescribe by regulations the manner in which the value 

of the benefit and privilege may be calculated. 

The manner in which the value of ‘benefit and privilege’ is to be calculated has not been prescribed in Regulations but the Department of Social Protection has issued guidelines for the information of Deciding Officers. These indicate that deductions from parental income are made for income tax, Pay Related Social Insurance (PRSI), Universal Social Charge (USC), pension levies, income levies, superannuation, private health insurance contributions, union fees and rent/mortgage payments. In addition, a disregard of €600 per week applies in relation to the parents’ own needs and one of €30 per week in respect of any other dependent child. The balance of parental income is then assessed at 34%. 

Consideration: The Appeals Officer calculated the means attributable to the appellant based on the details of parental income he had provided, in line with the formula outlined above. This indicated net parental income of €1,005.55, less a disregard of €600 for the parents and €30 in respect of one dependent child. The balance, €375.55, was assessed at 34% to give a figure of €127.70. He determined that the appellant’s means, at €127.70 per week, were in excess of the maximum rate of Jobseeker’s Allowance (€100.00) which may be payable to a young person living with their parents. 

Outcome: Appeal disallowed. 

2016/26 Jobseeker’s Allowance & Supplementary Welfare Allowance 

Question at issue: 

Background: The appellant had two short periods of employment in Ireland, having worked for seventeen weeks in 2014 and for a further ten weeks in 2015. He had been doing seasonal farm work which finished in August 2015. He made a claim for a basic income payment under the Supplementary Welfare Allowance scheme in November 2015 and a claim for Jobseeker’s Allowance in April 2016. Both claims were disallowed on grounds that he was not habitually resident in the State as he was held not to have a right to reside. In an appeal against those decisions, the appellant submitted that he was seeking further employment since finishing work in August 2015 and had remained in Ireland as a jobseeker. 

Governing legislation: Section 141(9) of the Social Welfare Consolidation Act 2005 provides that a person must be habitually resident in the State for purposes of establishing entitlement to Jobseeker’s Allowance, while Section 192 outlines the same requirement in relation to Supplementary Welfare Allowance. The legislation governing application of the Habitual Residence Condition (HRC) is outlined in Section 246 of the Act and subsection (5) provides that a person who does not have a right to reside in the State may not be regarded as being habitually resident. 

The legislation which governs the rights of European citizens to reside in Ireland is outlined in the European Communities (Free Movement of Persons) Regulations 2015 (Statutory Instrument No. 548 of 2015). Article 6(2) prescribes that an EU citizen who has entered the State seeking employment continues to have a right of residence as long as he or she continues to seek employment and to have a realistic prospect of engagement. 

Consideration: In determining whether the appellant had established that he had a right to reside, the Appeals Officer considered his presenting circumstances in accordance with Statutory Instrument No. 548 of 2015. Having done so, he noted the appellant’s employment in Ireland since he arrived first as a jobseeker: seventeen weeks in 2014 and a further ten weeks in 2015. He concluded that these periods of employment gave him a right of residence in accordance with Article 6(3)(d) of Statutory Instrument No. 548 of 2015. This prescribes that where a person has been employed for a period of less than one year and becomes involuntarily unemployed, he or she may retain a right of residence as a worker for six months after the cessation of employment. Accordingly, as the appellant ceased working on a date in August 2015, his right to reside as a worker ended on a date in February 2016, as he had not secured further employment within that six month period. 

The Appeals Officer noted that the governing legislation, outlined in Article 17(2) of Statutory Instrument No. 548 of 2015, prescribes that a person whose right to reside derives from Article 6(2) of that Regulation is not entitled to receive assistance under the Social Welfare Acts. He noted further that the only question before him for appeal purposes was whether or not the appellant had established a right to reside and whether he could be held to meet the habitual residence condition for purposes of his social welfare claims. He concluded that it had been established that he had a right to reside in Ireland as a jobseeker in accordance with Article 6(2) of the European Communities (Free Movement of Persons) Regulations 2015 (Statutory Instrument No. 548 of 2015). With regard to the habitual residence condition, he was satisfied that the appellant could be deemed to be habitually resident in accordance with the statutory criteria provided in Section 246(5) of the Social Welfare Consolidation Act 2005. He noted, however, that the governing legislation prescribes that a person whose right to reside derives from Article 6(2) is not entitled to receive assistance under the Social Welfare Acts. He observed, therefore, that it was for the Department of Social Protection to determine whether the other statutory qualifying criteria were met in this case. 

Outcome: Appeal allowed. 

2016/318/35 Jobseeker’s Allowance 

Question at issue: Habitual Residence 

Grounds for Review: A review was requested on the grounds that the Appeals Officer erred in finding that the appellant was not habitually resident in the State. The terms of the request specifically referred me to a statement in the Appeals Officer’s decision that the appellant’s family, including his wife, live in [country], so that his centre of interest could be deemed to be stronger there. It was submitted that the Appeals Officer erred by giving undue weight to this as if it were fact. 

Background: The appellant came to Ireland in 2005. He applied for Jobseeker’s Allowance in October 2015 having been outside of the State for a period of 3 months and in that connection he also completed an application form entitled Habitual Residence Condition (HRC1). By a decision in November 2015 and relying on Sections 149(1) and 246 of the Social Welfare Consolidation 2005, a Deciding Officer of the Department advised him that he did not satisfy the habitual residence condition for the following reasons: length and continuity of residence in the State does not provide for HRC approval – three absences in two years; centre of interest stronger elsewhere – got married on last visit to [country], close family members abroad – wife, mother, brother and sister; residency not continuous; no established employment record in the State; no apparent means of financial support: one of the conditions of temporary permission to remain in the State is that persons make every effort to gain employment and not be a burden on the State. By a decision in March 2016, an Appeals Officer disallowed the appeal. Having examined the evidence with reference to the five factors to be considered in determining if the appellant met the habitual residence condition, the Appeals Officer outlined the reasons for the decision as follows: 

The appellant was refused as he was absent for three periods in three years, his centre of interest  is stronger elsewhere, his close family members are abroad, his residency is not continuous, and he has no established employment record or apparent means of support. 

Review: Habitual residence is a question of fact depending on the circumstances of each case, decided in accordance with the statutory provisions set out in Section 246 of the Social Welfare Consolidation Act 2005. Section 246(4) sets out the following five factors to be taken into account when deciding whether a person is habitually resident in the State: 

(a) the length and continuity of residence in the State or in any other particular 

country, 

(b) the length and purpose of any absence from the State, 

(c) the nature and pattern of the person’s employment, 

(d) the person’s main centre of interest, and 

(e) the future intentions of the person concerned as they appear from all the 

circumstances. 

From my review, I noted that the appellant had been living in Ireland since 2005. He is a [specified] national and returned to [country] for the following periods: July-September 2013, July- September 2014 and July-October 2015. It appeared, but this was not clear from the evidence, that he had been in receipt of Jobseeker’s Allowance and did not encounter any difficulties with re-claiming until his return to Ireland in October 2015. The main reason cited by the Deciding Officer for the disallowance related to length and continuity of residence in the State, in particular the fact that the appellant returned to [country] on three occasions and, on his third visit, got married to a person who had no stated plans to come to Ireland. I noted also an incorrect reference to a ‘2 year presumption clause’ in the Department’s appeal submission of January 2016. 

The Appeals Officer in disallowing the appeal expressed the view that the appellant’s centre of interest could be stronger in [country] and found that his centre of interest had shifted there. On behalf of the appellant, it was submitted that he had lived in the State for a period of 12 years and that the only change in his position was that he got married. It was stated that he had made many friends and acquaintances in Ireland and had integrated fully in his local community and that his intentions were to remain indefinitely. In support of his request for a review the following was submitted: 

  • Letter from the Irish Naturalisation and Immigration Services (INIS) informing the appellant that the Minister for Justice and Equality had decided to renew his temporary permission to remain in the State, on a Stamp 4 basis, for three years until 2019. Certain conditions were attached to that permission. 
  • Letter from his local Education and Training Board (ETB) confirming that he had been accepted on a Computer Basics (Equal Skills) Course.  
  • A number of documents as evidence that he had been actively and genuinely seeking employment in the State. 

It seems to me that the overwhelming reason in finding that the appellant was not habitually resident in the State was that both the Deciding Officer and the Appeals Officer considered that his marriage in his home country had the effect of shifting his centre of interest from Ireland where he had lived since 2005, to the country where his wife and immediate family members reside. It was stated that he married in 2012, whereas the Deciding Officer and Appeals Officer were of the view, based on information he provided, that he married during his most recent visit in 2015. The appellant merely stated that the third time he went to [country] he got married. The certificate relating to the marriage is somewhat ambiguous – a date in 2015 is shown but it is not clear if this is the date of issue or the date of marriage. In any event, the date does not coincide with his absence in 2015. 

It appeared to me that, despite the lack of clarity surrounding the date of marriage and certain other aspects of the information available, the only change in the appellant’s position since he came to Ireland in 2005 was that he got married and his wife resides in [country]. While accepting that he has a centre of interest there, this does not of itself preclude him from satisfying the habitual residence condition in Ireland. From my review of the evidence, I find that insufficient weight was given to the fact that he had been resident in Ireland since 2005 and I note that he provided evidence of his efforts to find employment and that he was given a place on an ETB course. 

While accepting that the appellant’s marriage is a significant event which is relevant in the consideration of whether he is habitually resident in Ireland or not, I am satisfied that its significance is far outweighed by the length and continuity of residence in Ireland since 2005 – some 11 years. 

I am satisfied that the Appeals Officer gave disproportionate weight to the appellant’s marriage and the fact that his wife resides outside the State and did not fully consider all the other factors in determining if he could be deemed to be habitually resident in the State at the date of his claim in October 2015. In the circumstances I revised the decision of the Appeals Officer and allowed the appeal. 

Outcome: Decision revised and appeal allowed. 

2017: 

2017/39 Jobseeker’s Allowance 

Question at issue: Eligibility (habitual residence condition) 

Background: The appellant, an EU national, applied for Jobseeker’s Allowance. That application was refused on the basis that the appellant was not regarded as being habitually resident in the State. The Department’s decision was based on the ‘five factors’ outlined in the legislation and found that the appellant had not worked since arriving in Ireland, did not have sufficient resources to support herself, and that her right of residence had expired. 

Oral Hearing: According to her evidence, the appellant came to Ireland with her partner on foot of a job offer he had. The couple was apparently confident that between the resources they brought with them and his earning potential he could support both of them while she looked for employment. The promised job did not last, however, as a contractual dispute arose almost immediately after her partner started work. Despite being highly qualified in IT, he failed to secure alternative employment. The couple became homeless and there was evidence on file from various organisations to attest to their presence in the State for the previous two years. Despite the difficulties encountered, the appellant and her partner stated that they were determined to remain in Ireland. She had secured employment shortly before the appeal hearing and at the time he was still looking for employment. 

Consideration: The habitual residence condition is a two-part provision which requires the establishment of a right of residence and then an assessment of the person’s situation in accordance with the ‘five factors’ outlined in Section 246 of the Social Welfare Consolidation Act 2005. The Department had decided that the right of residence had expired and that the five factors were not satisfied. 

Right of residence 

Right of residence is governed by Regulation 6 of S.I. 548 of 2015 (the European Communities (Free Movement of Persons) Regulations 2015). All EU citizens have an unqualified right of residence for up to three months. Thereafter, the right of residence (and associated entitlements) is qualified, and paragraph (3) requires that the person: 

“(i) is in employment or in self-employment in the State, 

(ii) has sufficient resources for himself or herself and his or her family members not to become an unreasonable burden on the social assistance system of the State, and has comprehensive sickness insurance in respect of himself or herself and his or her family members, 

(iii) is enrolled in an educational establishment accredited or financed by the State for the principal purpose of following a course of study there and has comprehensive sickness insurance in respect of himself or herself and his or her family members and, by means of a declaration or otherwise, satisfies the Minister that he or she has sufficient resources for himself or herself and his or her family members not to become an unreasonable burden on the social assistance system of the State, or 

(iv) subject to paragraph (4), is a family member of a Union citizen who satisfies one or more of the 

conditions referred to in clause (i), (ii) or (iii).” 

While the appellant came to Ireland with her partner, they were not married and so the Appeals Officer concluded that she did not meet the definition of a ‘family member’ contained in this legislation or any of the other criteria set out above. Accordingly, he decided she must establish that she is entitled to be resident in her own right. 

The appellant stated that she came to Ireland to look for work and on that basis the Appeals Officer decided that she came within the terms of Regulation 6(2) of S.I. 548 of 2015 which states: 

“(2) A Union citizen to whom Regulation 3(1)(a) applies, who has entered the State seeking employment, and his or her family members, may continue to reside in the State for a period that is longer than 3 months where the Union citizen concerned can satisfy the Minister that he or she continues to seek employment and has a realistic prospect of being engaged in employment.” 

Subsequent to her claim for social welfare, she did commence employment and so her residence became based on Regulation 6(3)(i) as set out above, from the date of commencement of that employment. 

The Appeals Officer also had regard to Regulation 17(2)(a), which provides that a person to whom Regulation 6(1) or 6(2) applies shall not be entitled to receive assistance under the Social Welfare Acts. Paragraph (b) of the same Article does, however, allow recourse to exceptional needs payments. Accordingly, the Appeals Officer found that at the time of claiming Jobseeker’s Allowance the appellant had an established right of residence as a jobseeker, but that status did not and does not confer any entitlement to access the social assistance system of which\ Jobseeker’s Allowance is part. 

An assessment under the ‘five factors’ set out under Section 246 of the Act of 2005 Based on supporting documentation from voluntary bodies dealing with people who are homeless, the Appeals Officer accepted that the appellant had been in the country since the summer of 2015. The Appeals Officer accepted that the appellant’s centre of interest was now in Ireland. The appellant had experienced very serious difficulties over the previous two years but had persisted with her efforts to make a life in Ireland and had finally secured permanent employment. However, the Appeals Officer found that at the time of claiming Jobseeker’s Allowance her status was as a jobseeker only and while that gave her a right of residence in accordance with EU legislation, that status did not confer any right to access the social assistance system. 

Outcome: Appeal disallowed. 

2017/40 Jobseeker’s Allowance  

Question at issue: Overpayment (Departmental error) 

Background: The appellant was in receipt of Jobseeker’s Allowance. She claimed assistance when her husband’s claim was stopped as it was considered he was in full-time education. Some months later, the appellant’s husband re-applied and his payment was reinstated. However, the Department failed to apply the maximum payment provisions that apply to a couple with the result that the appellant and her husband each received the full payment of €432 per week in respect of the family. This resulted in an overpayment of almost €14,000. The error only came to light when the appellant informed the Department that she had commenced a Tús scheme. 

Consideration: The Appeals Officer identified the relevant legislation as Section 144 of the Social Welfare Consolidation Act 2005. Based on the legislation and the facts of the case, it was clear that the appellant was overpaid Jobseeker’s Allowance. However, the overpayment arose in this case because of a Departmental error. From enquiries made by the Appeals Officer, it appears that a maximum payment indicator was not inserted on the appellant’s claim record and as a result both she and her husband received full payments. The Appeals Officer noted that when the appellant’s husband re-claimed Jobseeker’s Allowance, he clearly stated on his application form that the appellant was already receiving full payment in respect of the family. According to the letter of appeal, the couple had numerous interactions with the Intreo Centre over the course of their claims and always went there together when issues or queries arose. Their ongoing engagement with various activation measures was also mentioned. The appellant also got statements of payments received on four occasions for submission to the university where she studied in the UK. The letter of appeal also states that the couple had never claimed separately before, and they were not aware of the level of payment each would receive. Given their ongoing engagement with the Intreo Centre, they assumed they were receiving their correct entitlement. 

The Appeals Officer considered that the over-payment was due to Departmental error. The Appeals Officer acknowledged that it could be argued that the appellant should have realised she was receiving too high a payment, however, given the ongoing engagement with the Department during the claims, the fact that the couple had not claimed separately before and that the appellant’s husband declared her payment when re-claiming assistance, an assumption on their part that they were receiving the correct payment was not unreasonable. Having considered the appellants’ submission and that of the Department, and given the circumstances in which the overpayment arose, the Appeals Officer considered it fair to revise the decision in this case to eliminate the overpayment. He applied Section 302(c) of the Social Welfare Consolidation Act 2005, which gives discretion to vary the effective date of a decision. 

Outcome: Appeal allowed. 

2017/41 Jobseeker’s Allowance Summary decision 

Question at issue: Eligibility (means) 

Background: The appellant had been in receipt of Jobseeker’s Allowance for some nine years when a decision was made to disallow her claim on grounds that she had failed to establish that her weekly means were not in excess of the limit provided for in the governing legislation. The reason cited was that her husband had failed to supply documentation to a Social Welfare Inspector in connection with a review of his claim. In an appeal against that decision, she stated that the decision had been made without contacting her to hear her side of the story. She submitted that her financial circumstances were strained and that she was feeling in some distress as a consequence. 

Consideration: The Appeals Officer noted that, as the appellant had asserted, no notice appeared to have been given to her to indicate that her claim was under review or to invite her to comment. She noted that the evidence indicated that the review of her husband’s social welfare claim appeared to be ongoing, and that there was nothing to indicate that any decision had been made regarding his entitlement. Given that the appellant’s claim had been in payment for some time, there was a burden of proof to be discharged before it was disallowed. Having had regard to her grounds of appeal, the Appeals Officer concluded that 

such a burden had not been discharged and that the manner in which the appellant’s claim had been disallowed was in conflict with the duty to act fairly. 

Outcome: Appeal allowed 

2017/318/62 Jobseeker’s Allowance 

Question at issue: Whether an Appeals Officer had erred when partially allowing an appeal in relation to an overpayment 

Grounds for review: The Department contended that the Appeals Officer had erred in law in arriving at her decision, which was somewhat favourable to the appellant, in that the appellant appeared to have acknowledged during interview that the full details of all her financial means should have been provided at the date of application but were not. 

Background: The appellant had been employed on a casual basis and applied for Jobseeker’s Allowance at a date when her employment was reduced to three mornings per week. She would have been entitled to Jobseeker’s Benefit based on her social insurance contributions, but she was assessed by the Department as having no financial means and, on that basis, received a higher rate of Jobseeker’s Allowance which she opted to receive. A review of her claim was carried out by the Department a couple of years later when the Department received information from the Revenue Commissioners which outlined interest earned on accounts held by the appellant. Her claim was referred for investigation and she was invited to attend for interview with a Social Welfare Inspector. The appellant disclosed at that point that she held three other bank accounts which she had not declared when she made her claim. The capital amounts were duly assessed and an overpayment in the amount of over €15,000 in relation to the Jobseeker’s Allowance was calculated. 

At appeal, the appellant acknowledged that she should have declared that she had savings but also asked whether she had any other entitlement during the period at issue. She repaid in full the amount assessed as having been overpaid. The Appeals Officer concluded that the revised decision should have been made with reference to the provisions of Section 302(b) rather than 302(a) of the Social Welfare Consolidation Act 2005 and, accordingly, the overpayment could be offset against the entitlement that she would have had to Jobseeker’s Benefit during the period. The appeal was therefore partially allowed, with the reduced amount of overpayment to be calculated by the Department. 

Review: Section 302 of the Social Welfare Consolidation Act 2005 provides for the date of 

effect of revised decisions as follows: 

302.—A revised decision given by a deciding officer shall take effect as follows: 

a. where any benefit, assistance, child benefit, family income supplement, continued payment for qualified children or back to work family dividend will, by virtue of the revised decision be disallowed or reduced and the revised decision is given owing to the original decision or determination having been given, or having continued in effect, by reason of any statement or representation (whether written or verbal) which was to the knowledge of the person making it false or misleading in a material respect or by reason of the wilful concealment of any material fact, it shall take effect from the date on which the original decision or determination took effect, but the original decision or determination may, in the discretion of the deciding officer, continue to apply to any period covered by the original decision or determination to which the false or misleading statement or representation or the wilful concealment of any material fact does not 

relate; 

b. where any benefit, assistance, child benefit, family income supplement, continued payment for qualified children or back to work family dividend will, by virtue of the revised decision be disallowed or reduced and the revised decision is given in the light of new evidence or new facts (relating to periods before and after the commencement of this Act) which have been brought to 

the notice of the deciding officer since the original decision or determination was given, it shall take effect from the date that the deciding officer shall determine having regard to the new facts or new evidence and the circumstances of the case; 

Section 302(a) of the Social Welfare Consolidation Act 2005 relates to situations where there is evidence that the person deliberately gave false or misleading information or deliberately concealed relevant information. The standard of proof is a high one and there must be evidence, not just that the person gave false information or withheld relevant information, but also that he/she did so deliberately. 

Having considered the documentary and oral evidence, the Appeals Officer concluded that the Department’s Deciding Officer had incorrectly relied on Section 302(a) rather than Section 302(b) in determining the effect of the revised decision. In partially allowing the appeal, the Appeals Officer found that the Department’s decision as to the appellant’s financial means was correct, but that the appellant still had an underlying entitlement to Jobseeker’s Benefit based on her PRSI contributions which was not offset, but should have been offset, against the overpayment of Jobseeker’s Allowance, thus serving to reduce the sum at issue. 

I concluded that the Appeals Officer’s evaluation of the evidence and her conclusion that the standard of proof required by Section 302(a) of the 2005 Act had not been fulfilled was correct and that Section 302(b) should instead have been the legal basis used. 

Outcome: Decision not revised. 

2018: 

2018/39 Jobseeker’s Allowance  

Question at issue: Eligibility (whether a person is unemployed) 

Background: The appellant had been in receipt of Jobseeker’s Allowance but secured full- time employment during the period 2 May 2017 to 23 May 2017 and was therefore deemed to be not unemployed for that period resulting in an overpayment of €901.55. The appellant contacted the Department in May 2017 to state that she had commenced employment and had received a Commencement of Employment form in the post. She stated that the Local Employment Service (LES) Mediator advised her that she could collect payment until she had received the first payment from her employer. The Department told the appellant that she would be assessed with an overpayment. In June 2017, the Department wrote to the appellant advising that she appeared to have been overpaid for the period 2 May 2017 to 23 May 2017. The appellant stated that she had been in regular contact with the LES “who advised me I could continue to claim my allowance up until my first wage”. In her appeal, the appellant did not dispute the dates of employment or the fact that she had commenced work, did not inform the Department that she was working and continued to claim and collect her Jobseeker’s Allowance. The appellant stated that she received incorrect information from the LES. In the appeal submission, the Deciding Officer did not address the fact that the appellant may have been given incorrect information by the LES. The appeal submission stated, “it was explained to the appellant that the LES was not the DSP and that an overpayment would be assessed”. No evidence was provided to show that the appellant was not so informed by the LES. 

Consideration: The Appeals Officer outlined that Section 302(b) of the Social Welfare Consolidation Act 2005 allows the decision maker, having regard to all the circumstances of the case to determine the effective date of the decision. Having considered all the evidence in this case, the Appeals Officer found that the appellant was not entitled to Jobseeker’s Allowance from 2 May 2017 to 23 May 2017 and relying on the provisions of Section302(b) of the 2005 Act decided that the decision should take effect from the date of the Department’s decision. The effect of the Appeals Officer decision was that no overpayment arose. 

Outcome: Appeal allowed. 

2018/40 Jobseeker’s Allowance  

Question at issue: Eligibility (means) 

Background: The appellant applied for Jobseeker’s Allowance which was disallowed on the basis of ‘means in excess’. The appellant’s means were found to be in excess, primarily due to his ownership of a property in the country in which the appellant was not living and which he had bought with the proceeds of an inheritance. The means were assessed primarily on the basis of his capital, which consisted of savings and a property not personally used at the time of application. The appellant had been living rent-free with a friend in Dublin while he looked for work. The property in the country was in need of renovation. The appellant appealed the decision on the basis that the local social welfare office did not give him any indication that his application was likely to be rejected as ‘means in excess’, which would have prompted him to live in the property in the country so it would not be assessable. 

Consideration: The appellant’s main contention, in effect, was that he was denied a social welfare payment because he was not given crucial information at the outset. He also contended that the delays in processing his claim (both at first instance and on appeal) caused him to dwindle his savings and take on debt. The Appeals Officer identified the applicable legislation as Section 142(2)(b) of the Social Welfare Consolidation Act 2005.The appellant’s evidence at appeal suggested that the property in the country could not have been rented out but was capable of being sold. The Appeals Officer noted that had the appellant not bought the property in the country and had instead placed the inheritance money in a savings account, this would also be assessable for means testing purposes. The appellant asked the question what would happen if a person’s home was flooded, and they could not live there for a time. The Appeals Officer stated that in such a scenario Article 141 of the Social Welfare (Consolidated Claims, Payments and Control) Regulations (S.I. No.142 of 2007) provides for an exemption of a person’s primary residence being treated as an investment property, but the provision also requires that the property had ordinarily been the person’s main residence before they vacated it. The Appeals Officer concluded that this exemption did not apply in the appellant’s case and was satisfied that the legislation was applied correctly by the Department to the facts of the appellant’s case. 

Outcome: Appeal disallowed. 

2018/41 Jobseeker’s Allowance  

Question at issue: Eligibility 

Background: The appellant declared that she was residing with a friend, who was in receipt of a disability payment. An investigation of the appellant’s means by a Social Welfare Inspector (SWI) took place and the Inspector applied the criteria for establishing if the couple were in a cohabiting relationship. The SWI’s report outlined that the appellant shared her home with her teenage son and a friend who had resided with her since the death of his mother three years before. The house had two bedrooms, and the appellant said that she and her friend shared a bedroom. The SWI’s report outlined that household chores were shared, and they had meals together. The SWI reported that the friend involved himself in the upbringing of appellant’s son and would discipline him if necessary and was named as a contact for the school. According to the SWI, the appellant accepted that they were a family unit. 

Oral Hearing: The appellant conceded that she and her friend had in the past had a committed and intimate relationship. The financial interdependence was evident by the admission that he was a named driver on the appellant’s car insurance. The appellant agreed that utilities were in her name but that her friend contributed towards those costs. She specified that he contributed towards rent and food, household chores were shared, the couple took meals together and he assisted with the upbringing of her teenage son. The appellant had admitted that they socialised together occasionally. 

The appellant denied that she and her friend existed as a family unit and suggested that a housemate would also assist in the rearing of her child. The appellant accepted that her friend had accompanied her to a parent/teacher meeting at her son’s school. The appellant contended that this was no more than what a flatmate would do but the Appeals Officer disagreed and regarded it as significant that the appellant’s friend participated in the upbringing of the appellant’s teenage son even to the point of disciplining him. The appellant confirmed that he was a contact for her son’s school. The appellant described her friend to the Social Welfare Inspector as a friend who had nowhere to go after the death of his mother and his moving out of her house. He now had resources which would enable him to move elsewhere but he remained in what would be a confined space for adults leading separate lives. The appellant and her friend lived in a two-bedroom dwelling and the appellant had told the SWI that while they used the same bedroom, he slept by day whereas she slept by night. The Appeals Officer considered that the appellant’s evidence that her friend stayed up gambling by night so that she could have the bedroom by night while he slept during the day was simply not credible. 

Consideration: Jobseeker’s Allowance is a means tested scheme, and means are calculated under the provisions of Rule 1(2), Part 2 of Schedule 3 of the Social Welfare Consolidation Act 2005. The appellant was advised that she had not shown that her means did not exceed the statutory limit. The question of the appellant’s means arose from her relationship with the person who lived in the house with her and whether, as a cohabiting couple, his means should be considered in the assessment of the appellant’s means. Where an entitlement might be disallowed, limited or withdrawn, the onus was on the Department to establish that cohabitation exists. The findings of the SWI report stated that the appellant and her friend had lived together since October 2013. The appellant had initially agreed that she was within a family unit and that she had looked after her friend during his illness. The appellant had initially agreed to provide details of his means. Subsequently the appellant told the SWI that she was unable to provide the information. The Appeals Officer found that there was sufficient evidence to conclude, on the balance of probabilities, that the appellant and her friend were a cohabitating couple and as such his means were relevant in a review of the appellant’s entitlement to Jobseeker’s Allowance. Due to lack of co-operation with the investigation it was not possible to complete the assessment of the appellant’s means to confirm entitlement in accordance with the provisions of Section 141 (1)(c) of the Social Welfare Consolidation Act 2005. 

Outcome: Appeal disallowed. 

2018/42 Jobseeker’s Allowance  

Question at issue: Eligibility (habitual residence condition) 

Background: The appellant applied for Jobseeker’s Allowance. The decision of the Department was that the appellant did not fulfil the ‘habitual residence condition’ attached to the payment of Jobseeker’s Allowance. She was a Spanish national with some work experience in Dublin and a high level of formal education and good English language skills. 

Consideration: The Appeals Officer at the outset outlined that the question for this appeal was in relation to the right to reside and the habitual residence condition only. Other qualifying criteria for the payment of Jobseeker’s Allowance were not under consideration as they were not part of the Department’s decision to refuse the application. Regulation 6 of S.I. No. 548 of 2015, the ‘European Communities (Free Movement of Persons) Regulations 2015’, which gives further effect to Directive 2004/38/EC, provides that EU/EEA nationals have an automatic and unqualified right of residence in Ireland for 3 months only. Thereafter, certain conditions apply, depending on the profile of the person. The appellant’s evidence in her application form and letter of appeal indicated that she came to Ireland in February 2015. She came looking for work and for opportunities to develop her career as the Irish economy was more favourable than the Spanish economy. She had a master’s degree in psychology and very good English language skills. She was not married and did not have children but had a partner in Dublin (who was employed and had resided here since 2014) and several close friends. She was in her 30s. Her parents lived in Spain. She described Dublin as ‘home’. Although she indicated on her application form that she might only stay in Ireland for 1-2 more years, she stated in her letter of appeal that her intention was to stay in Dublin long-term with her partner. She described efforts she made to make this possible, including registering this intention with the Spanish Embassy and applying for chartered membership to the PSI (Psychological Society of Ireland; the professional body for psychologists) and discussing a potential job with an established psychology clinic. An economically inactive person from the EU/EEA maintains a right to reside only for as long as they have both comprehensive sickness insurance cover and sufficient financial resources to maintain themselves so as not to become an unreasonable burden on the social assistance system of the State and persons who were previously an EU/EEA national worker or self-employed person for a period of less than one year retain the status of worker and the right to reside for a further six months. The appellant contended that since she came to Ireland in 2015, she worked as a childminder, was partly supported by her parents and partner, and then worked for 3 months in 2017 for a recruitment firm. This suggested that she had a legal right to reside at the time of her application for Jobseeker’s Allowance. The Appeals Officer outlined that it was important to note that having a right of residence is distinct from being ‘habitually resident’. Section 141(9) of the Social Welfare Consolidation Act 2005 provides that a person shall not be entitled to Jobseeker’s Allowance unless he or she is habitually resident in the State. In order to be habitually resident in Ireland, a person must be both legally residing in Ireland and have their ‘centre of interest’ in Ireland. 

The question for this appeal, therefore, was whether the appellant had moved her ‘centre of interest’ to Ireland. 

Section 246(4) of the 2005 Act provides that when determining whether a person is habitually resident in the State, a decision maker shall take into consideration all the circumstances of the case including, in particular, the following – 

(a) the length and continuity of residence in the State or in any other particular country, 

(b) the length and purpose of any absence from the State, 

(c) the nature and pattern of the person’s employment, 

(d) the person’s main centre of interest, and 

(e) the future intentions of the person concerned as they appear from all the circumstances. 

In that context, the information on file indicated that the appellant had lived in Ireland for over three years, was in a long-term relationship with an employed person, had good employment prospects here, but would have lesser prospects in Spain due to its level of unemployment, and had made efforts to establish a steadier career path here. The Appeals Officer assumed that the Department would conduct a financial means assessment and would look into any co-habiting arrangements. However, subject to those other conditions of the Jobseeker’s Allowance scheme being met, the appeal succeeded. 

Outcome: Appeal allowed. 

2018/43 Jobseeker’s Allowance  

Question at issue: Eligibility (habitual residence condition) 

Background: The appellant applied for Jobseeker’s Allowance in January 2018. The decision of the Department was that the appellant did not fulfil the ‘habitual residence condition’ attached to the payment of Jobseeker’s Allowance. He was a UK national with no previous connection to Ireland. 

Consideration: The file evidence indicated that the appellant was a 28 year old UK national. He came to Ireland in December 2016. He had no previous connection to Ireland. He secured work for a few months in 2017. All his close family members, including a young daughter, lived in England, but he stated on his letter of appeal that he had no contact with any of them. UK nationals enjoy an unqualified right of residence in Ireland. The Appeals Officer outlined that it was important to note that having a right of residence is distinct from being habitually resident. In order to be habitually resident in Ireland, a person must be both legally residing in Ireland and have their ‘centre of interest’ in Ireland. The question for this appeal, therefore, was whether the appellant had moved his ‘centre of interest’ to Ireland. The legislation requires, in accordance with Section 246(4) of the Social Welfare Consolidation Act 2005, that when determining whether a person is habitually resident in the State, a decision maker shall take into consideration all the circumstances of the case including, in particular, the following: 

(a) the length and continuity of residence in the State or in any other particular country, 

(b) the length and purpose of any absence from the State, 

(c) the nature and pattern of the person’s employment, 

(d) the person’s main centre of interest, and 

(e) the future intentions of the person concerned as they appear from all the circumstances. 

The appellant had never lived or worked in Ireland before and had no Irish family connections. He only worked for a few months in 2017, having first arrived in late 2016. While he stated he had no contact with family in England, he had no strong links in Ireland either. He had been residing with a friend in Ireland, but, as stated in his letter of appeal, the friend wanted him to move out if he could not pay the rent. His stated intention was to stay in Ireland into the future and to secure employment. The appellant was called to an oral hearing, but did not attend and did not provide any reason for same. The Appeals Officer considered that this was a missed opportunity to make a more convincing case that his centre of interest had indeed moved to Ireland for the purposes of meeting the habitual residence condition. Having considered the evidence, the Appeals Officer concluded that it appeared more likely than not that the appellant’s centre of interest remained in the UK and not Ireland, particularly in the context of his family ties, lack of previous connections to Ireland and the fact that a young man of his profile was likely to want to seek employment opportunities wherever in the world they may be. 

Outcome: Appeal disallowed. 

2018/44 Jobseekers Allowance  

Question at issue: Eligibility (failure to attend activation meetings) 

Background: The appellant was in receipt of Jobseeker’s Allowance and, as a person selected for activation, was invited to attend a number of activation meetings, which he failed to do. The Department applied a penalty rate, and the appellant was notified of the decision. There is a note on file stating that the Deciding Officer contacted the appellant by phone to check why he had not been attending his meetings. The appellant stated that he had not received any post. The evidence on file indicated that two notifications had issued to the appellant. Following the decision of the Department to apply a penalty rate the appellant contacted the Intreo Centre to say that he was getting no post. Another meeting was arranged but the appellant did not attend. The appellant stated that he had received no post. In his letter of appeal, the appellant stated he did not attend because he had not received any information regarding the meetings. He stated that the first notice he received was a letter informing him that he had been “fined” for not attending. He stated he was not satisfied with the manner in which he was treated in the Intreo Centre. 

Consideration: The Appeals Officer outlined that Section 141A of the Social Welfare Consolidation Act 2005 provides for the circumstances where a jobseeker refuses or fails to attend ‘activation meetings’ as follows: 

“(1) Notice may be given by or on behalf of the Minister to any person receiving jobseeker’s allowance requesting the person, at the time specified in the notice, to comply with the requirement specified in paragraph (a) or (b) of subsection (3). 

(2) Where a person refuses or fails, without good cause, to comply with the requirement specified in the notice under subsection (1) at the time specified in that notice, or at any time thereafter as may be determined by or on behalf of the Minister and notified to the person, the weekly rate of jobseeker’s allowance payable to that person in respect of any such period of refusal or failure shall, subject to this section, be as set out in section 142(1A), 142A(1A) or, as the case may be, section 142B(1A). 

(3) A notice under this section may require the person to whom it is given to do one of the following, at the time specified in the notice, or at any time thereafter as may be determined by or on behalf of the Minister and notified to the person— 

(a) attend at a meeting arranged by or on behalf of the Minister for the purpose of providing information to that person which is intended to improve his or her knowledge of the employment, 

work experience, education, training and development opportunities available to that person, or 

(b) attend for or submit to an assessment of that person’s education, training or development 

needs.” 

Section 142(1A) and 142A(1A) of the Act provides for specified penalty rates of payment where a person refuses or fails, without good cause, to comply with the requirements to attend activation meetings or take up suitable employment. 

The Appeals Officer outlined that it is not permitted under social welfare legislation for a person to not attend what are commonly referred to as ‘employment activation meetings. Section 141A, Section 142(1A) and Section 142A(1A) of the Social Welfare Consolidation Act 2005 set out a number of consequences and penalties when this occurs. These penalties will only apply where the person concerned failed to attend meetings or to engage with the activation process without good cause. In this particular case, the appellant stated he did not attend several scheduled meetings because he alleged, he had not received notification of these appointments. The Department stated it was satisfied that letters advising the appellant of the meetings had issued to the appellant’s address. The Appeals Officer outlined 

that the delivery or service by post of any document, which is authorised to be delivered or served by post, shall be deemed to have been served at the time at which it would be delivered in the ordinary course of post. The Appeals Officer was satisfied that the appellant had not demonstrated good cause for non-attendance at the meetings. 

Outcome: Appeal disallowed. 

2018/318/58 Jobseeker’s Allowance 

Question at issue: Assessment of means derived from seasonal employment 

Grounds for review: The Department in its request for a review of the Appeals Officer’s decision contended that the Appeals Officer erred in law in relying on Rule 1(2) of Part 2 of Schedule 3 of the 2005 Act in that, although reference is made in that Rule to ‘employment of a seasonal nature’, it specifically refers to insurable employment and there is no mention of self-employment. 

Background: The person concerned applied for Jobseeker’s Allowance which was disallowed by a Deciding Officer of the Department, relying on Section 142(2)(b) of the Social Welfare Consolidation Act 2005, on the basis that the person was not entitled to Jobseeker’s Allowance as his weekly means were in excess of the weekly amount of Jobseeker’s Allowance that would be payable based on his family circumstances. 

The Appeals Officer allowed the appeal and gave the following reasons for the decision: 

“Where an income varies throughout the year the legislation allows the Department to assess income based on previous earnings to give an estimate of what the person may reasonably be expected to earn in the following year. In this case the appellant engages in seasonal employment which is not undertaken during the winter months. Where the self-employment continues throughout the year it is reasonable to assess income over the 52 weeks. However, where there is a definite end to the seasonal work which the appellant engages in, I am satisfied that in these periods he has nil means.” 

Review: Part 2 of the Act contains the applicable rules for the purposes of calculating means for various means tested payments including Jobseeker’s Allowance. Rule 1 provides that: 

“1. In the calculation of the means of a person for the purposes of Chapters 2 …..of Part 3, account shall be taken of the following— 

(2) all income in cash and any non-cash benefits that may be prescribed which the person or his or her spouse, civil partner or cohabitant may reasonably expect to receive during the succeeding year, whether as contributions to the expenses of the household or otherwise, but— 

(a) excluding the amounts at references 1 to 19 in Table 2 to this Schedule, and 

(b) excluding— 

………… 

(v) in the case of jobseeker’s allowance, pre-retirement allowance and farm assist and subject to paragraphs (6), (7) and (8), any moneys earned by the person or his or her spouse, civil partner or cohabitant from insurable employment of a seasonal nature…” 

From my review of the Appeals Officer’s decision, it was clear that the Appeals Officer relied on Rule 1(2)(b) (v) as the basis for the decision. However, as outlined above, that Rule relates to insurable employment, and does not apply to self-employment. 

In this respect the Appeals Officer had erred in law and in the circumstances the decision of the Appeals Officer was revised as requested by the Department. 

Outcome: Decision revised and appeal disallowed. 

2018/318/60 Jobseeker’s Allowance 

Question at issue: Information to be given when making a claim 

Grounds for Review: The person concerned sought a review of the Appeals Officer’s decision on the basis of error of fact and/or law and contended that all necessary information was provided to the Department and that attendance at an office of the Department was unnecessary. 

Background: The person concerned made a claim for Jobseeker’s Allowance and was asked by the investigating officer in the Department to provide certain information and attend at an office of the Department for the purposes of establishing means. The person concerned failed to provide all of the information requested and declined to attend at an office of the Department as requested. In those circumstances his claim for Jobseeker’s Allowance was declined as his means could not be assessed. The Appeals Officer disallowed the appeal on the same grounds as the Deciding Officer of the Department. 

Review: Having reviewed the Appeals Officer’s decision I noted that the Appeals Officer identified that the question before her was whether the person concerned met the means test for the purposes of a Jobseeker’s Allowance claim. The Appeals Officer correctly identified that pursuant to Section 141 (1) of the Social Welfare Consolidation Act 2005 a person shall be entitled to Jobseeker’s Allowance in respect of any week of unemployment where – including other conditions: 

“(c) the person’s weekly means, subject to subsection (2)(d), do not exceed the amount of jobseeker’s allowance (including any increases of jobseeker’s allowance) that would be payable to the person under this Chapter if that person had no means.” 

The Appeals Officer also outlined that in accordance with Article 181 of the Social Welfare (Consolidated Claims, Payments and Control) Regulations 2007, (S.I. No. 142 of 2007), 

(1) “Every claimant shall furnish such certificates, documents, information and evidence as may be required by an officer of the Minister, for the purposes of deciding the claim and in any particular class of case, shall, for the purposes of making any such claim, attend at such office or place as an officer of the Minister may direct”. 

The Appeals Officer concluded that as the person concerned had not provided all of the evidence and/or attended for a meeting with an officer of the Minister as required, the Department were unable to complete a means assessment to establish if the person’s means came within the statutory limits provided for in the governing legislation. 

On review of that decision, I was satisfied that the Appeals Officer had not erred in fact or law as it is clear that the legislation places an onus on the claimant to furnish such information and evidence as may be required for purposes of the deciding a claim. In the absence of the claimant providing what was required or requested it was not possible for the decision maker to make a decision in accordance with the legislative provisions. 

Outcome: Decision not revised. 

2018/318/64 Jobseeker’s Allowance 

Question at issue: Attending a course of study 

Grounds for review: It was contended that the Appeals Officer erred in law and fact and did not adequately consider the exemption for mature students contained in Article 121 (1) (b) of S.I. 327 of 2016 – the Social Welfare (Consolidated Claims, Payments and Control) (Amendment) (No.1) (Exemption from Disqualification for Course of Study) Regulations 2016. It was also contended that there is no requirement under Article 121 to notify the Department of a change in circumstances and the Appeals Officer erred in stating that 

‘A condition for receipt of Jobseeker’s Allowance is that the claimant is obliged to inform the Department of a change of circumstances’

Background: The appellant submitted an application for Jobseeker’s Allowance in March 2017 on claim form UP 1. It came to the attention of the Department that the appellant commenced a full-time course of study in September 2017 and was registered and attending as a full-time student with a named educational institute for the 2017/2018 academic year. 

A Deciding Officer of the Department of Employment Affairs and Social Protection, relying on Section 148(1) of the Social Welfare Consolidation Act 2005, advised the appellant that he was disqualified from receiving Jobseeker’s Allowance on the grounds that he was attending a full-time course of study. The Deciding Officer revised the decision with effect from 18th September 2017 in accordance with Section 302 (a) of the Social Welfare Consolidation Act 2005. 

An Appeals Officer disallowed the appeal and outlined that it is a condition for receipt of Jobseeker’s Allowance that a claimant is obliged to inform the Department of a change in circumstances and that the appellant in this case had failed to do so. 

Review: The provisions governing entitlement to Jobseeker’s Allowance are contained in Chapter 2 of Part 3 of the Social Welfare Consolidation Act 2005 and Chapter 1 of Part 3 of the Social Welfare (Consolidated Claims, Payments and Control) Regulations 2007 S.I. No 142 of 2007 (as amended). In accordance with these provisions a person must satisfy the conditions of being available for and genuinely seeking work in order to be entitled to payment of Jobseeker’s Allowance. 

Section 148(1) of the 2005 Act makes provision for disqualifications where a person is attending a course of study and provides that ‘a person shall not be entitled to receive jobseeker’s allowance while attending a course of study, other than in the circumstances and subject to the conditions and for the periods that may be prescribed.’ 

Article 121 of the Social Welfare (Consolidated Claims, Payments and Control) Regulations 2007 (S.I. No. 142 of 2007) makes provision for certain exemptions from the disqualification while attending a course of study and provides as follows: 

‘Exemption from disqualification for course of study 

121. (1) A person shall not be disqualified for receiving jobseeker’s allowance— 

(a) in accordance with section 148(3)(a) while participating in a course provided or approved 

by an education and training board specified in Schedule 2 to the Education and Training 

             Boards Act 2013 (No. 11 of 2013) and known as Youthreach, 

(b) in accordance with section 148(3)(c) while attending a course of study, where that person 

is a mature student, 

or 

(c) in accordance with section 148, where that person is participating in an activity within the 

meaning of article 120 and article 120(4) applies to that person. 

(2) In this article— 

“approved course”, “approved higher education course” and “approved post-leaving certificate 

course” shall be construed in accordance with section 8 of the Student Support Act 2011 (No. 

4 of 2011) and Regulation 4 of the Student Support Regulations 2015 (S.I. No. 154 of 2015); “course of study” has the meaning given to it in section 148; 

“mature student” means a student who on 1 January— 

(a) in the year of entry for the first time to an approved post leaving certificate course, 

(b) in the year of entry for the first time to an approved higher education course (other than a course known for the time being as a post-leaving certificate course), or 

(c) in the year of re-entry to an approved course, is at least 23 years old.’ 

I concluded that the exemption from disqualification that applied to the appellant is that contained in Article 121 (1)(b) which provides that a person shall not be disqualified for receiving Jobseeker’s Allowance in accordance with Section 148(3)(c) while attending a course of study, where that person is a mature student. 

It was not disputed that the appellant met the age threshold in order to be considered to be a mature student. However, Section 148 (3) (c) of the 2005 Act provides that a person shall be regarded as attending a course of study……. 

‘(c) for the period immediately following the completion of one academic year, other than the final academic year of a course of study, up to the beginning of the following academic year.’ 

In summary, I found that a combination of the provisions provided for in Article 121(1)(b) of the 2007 Regulations and Section 148 (3)(c) of the 2005 Act meant that the appellant was not eligible to receive Jobseeker’s Allowance while attending a full-time course of study but he may be eligible to apply for/receive Jobseeker’s Allowance for periods between academic years. 

In those circumstances, I did not consider that the Appeals Officer had erred in fact or in law. 

I also noted that it is a general requirement that recipients of social welfare payments notify the Department of any change in their circumstances which may impact on their entitlement or continued entitlement to a payment. When the appellant applied for Jobseeker’s Allowance, he signed a declaration which included an undertaking to advise the Department of any change in his circumstances which may affect his continued entitlement to Jobseeker’s Allowance. Having failed to comply with that undertaking, I did not consider that the Appeals Officer had erred in this respect. 

Outcome: Decision not revised. 

2019: 

2019/38 Jobseeker’s Allowance  

Question at issue: Eligibility (failure to attend activation meetings) 

Background: The appellant was in receipt of Jobseeker’s Allowance and in connection with that claim was referred to a Job-Path service provider. The appellant failed to attend two separate appointments with the service provider. An officer of the Department met the appellant and explained to him the penalty rate guidelines and the possibility of a reduction in his payment if he did not engage with the service provider. The appellant agreed to attend future appointments but failed to attend a further scheduled meeting and a penalty rate was applied. 

Two further appointments were scheduled and the appellant failed to attend both. The appellant contacted his local Intreo Centre and said that he kept forgetting to attend the appointments. The officer agreed to reinstate his payment on the strict understanding that the appellant would attend his next meeting. The appellant did not attend this meeting. 

The Department wrote to the appellant advising him that a penalty rate would be applied, and his payment would be reduced/ The appellant was also advised that a further appointment with the service provider would be scheduled and that if after 21 days on the reduced payment he continued, without good cause, to fail to comply that he would be disqualified from receiving Jobseeker’s Allowance for a period of 9 weeks. The appellant failed to attend 2 further meetings with the service provider. The Department wrote to the appellant advising him that he was disqualified from payment for a period of 9 weeks on the grounds that he was on a penalty rate for 21 days or more for failure or refusal, without good cause, to attend activation meetings. 

Consideration: The question under appeal was whether the appellant failed, without good cause, to attend activation meetings which led initially to a penalty rate being applied followed by a 9-week disqualification. Sections 141A and 141B of the 2005 Act allow for the imposition of a penalty rate to a person’s Jobseeker’s Allowance when that person fails, without good cause, to attend activation meetings, or other prescribed schemes, programmes or courses relating to Jobseeker’s Allowance. 

The penalty rate is applied for 21 days. If, after 21 days, a person still fails, without good cause, to attend activation meetings or other prescribed schemes, programmes or courses, they shall then be disqualified from Jobseeker’s Allowance for up to 9 weeks. From the appellant’s letter of appeal, the Appeals Officer noted that he offered no reason as to why he failed to attend 9 activation meetings. 

The appellant stated he was suffering from depression, but this had never been disclosed to the Department and there was no supporting medical evidence made available. 

Having considered the details of the case the Appeals Officer was satisfied that the penalty rate and the subsequent disqualification were applied correctly and in line with the relevant legislation. The appellant did not establish good cause for his failure to attend the activation meetings. 

Outcome: Appeal disallowed 

2019/39 Jobseeker’s Allowance  

Question at issue: Eligibility (means) 

Background: The appellant applied for and was refused Jobseeker’s Allowance in 2018. The Department advised the appellant that he was not entitled to Jobseeker’s Allowance on the grounds that his means were in excess of the rate of Jobseeker’s Allowance that would be payable based on the appellant’s family circumstances. 

Consideration: In his letter of appeal, the appellant listed factors which he felt should have been taken into account in deciding his claim. The appellant disputed the method used in calculating his means with regard to his wife’s income from insurable employment. 

He requested that deductions be allowed in respect of mortgage payments and household expenses, and that consideration should have been given to the fact that his wife was 31 weeks pregnant at the time of his application and had two pregnancy related medical conditions. The appellant stated that he was not entitled to a medical card or GP visit card. He stated that as he had previously worked in Canada, he felt that the social insurance contributions he made in Canada should be reckonable when calculating his entitlement in Ireland. 

The legislative provisions governing the assessment of means are contained in Part 1 & 2 of Schedule 3 of the 2005 Act, and Articles 141 to 158 of S.I. 142 of 2007. Article 153(2) of the 2007 Regulations states that when calculating the means derived from the insurable employment of a spouse, civil partner, or cohabitant, it shall be taken as 60% of the average weekly earnings from that employment. 

Article 153(4) states that average weekly earnings are calculated by deducting PRSI, pension contributions, union fees, and €20 in respect of each day of insurable employment, subject to a maximum of €60 per week. 

The appellant disputed the figures used in calculating means and stated that his wife’s gross salary as taken into account was not a true reflection of the family income. 

Having examined the Deciding Officer’s calculations, the Appeals Officer was satisfied that they were calculated in line with the relevant legislation and had allowed for all permissible deductions to be made. The appellant’s means as assessed were in excess of the maximum rate of Jobseeker’s Allowance payable based on his family circumstances. The legislation regarding payment of Jobseeker’s Allowance does not allow for specific individual deductions as described in the letter of appeal. 

The Appeals Officer noted that while the governments of Ireland and Canada have a bilateral agreement on social security the main purpose of the agreement is to protect the pension rights of persons who have paid social insurance contributions in Ireland and have reckonable periods in the other country. Jobseekers Benefit is not one of the schemes covered by this agreement. 

Outcome: Appeal disallowed 

2019/40 Jobseeker’s Allowance  

Question at issue: Eligibility (failure to attend activation meetings) 

Background:  The appellant had been in receipt of Jobseeker’s Allowance from 2016. He failed to attend a number of activation appointments in 2018 and was aware that further non- engagement would result in a penalty rate being applied. Subsequently, he did not attend activation meetings on three occasions between 2018 and 2019 and a penalty rate was applied to his Jobseeker’s Allowance claim. The appellant was advised by letter that his Jobseeker’s Allowance was reduced by €44.00 per week for a three-week period as he had failed to attend activation appointments. Under section 195 of the 2005 Act recourse to 

Supplementary Welfare Allowance is precluded in respect of any Jobseeker’s Allowance claim that is subject to a penalty rate. 

When the appellant received notification from the Department of the application of the penalty rate, he attended at the Department offices and was advised that the penalty rate would be lifted if he attended a re-engagement meeting. However, he failed to attend this meeting and a further re-engagement meeting that was scheduled. 

His claim was then suspended for a period of 9 weeks as he had been on a penalty rate for over 21 days and had not re-engaged with the activation process as advised in writing by the Department. During the 9-week period three further activation appointments were arranged for the appellant. The appellant did not avail of the opportunity to attend these meetings and did not provide any good cause for his non-attendance. 

The appellant was advised by letter from the Department that his Jobseeker’s Allowance claim was being disqualified and payment of the claim suspended. He did not subsequently seek to re-engage with the activation process. It was noted that the Department instituted a review of his claim in 2019 and the appellant also failed to attend these meetings. 

Consideration: Section 141 of the 2005 Act allows for the imposition of a penalty rate to a person’s Jobseeker’s Allowance claim when that person fails, without good cause, to attend at activation meetings, or other prescribed schemes, programmes or courses relating to Jobseeker’s Allowance. The penalty rate is applied for 21 days. If, after 21 days, a person still fails, without good cause, to attend activation meetings or other prescribed schemes, programmes or courses, the person can be disqualified from Jobseeker’s Allowance for up to 9 weeks. The Appeals Officer in this case was satisfied that the appellant repeatedly failed to engage with the activation process as required under the relevant legislation and good cause for failure to attend scheduled meetings had not been demonstrated. 

Outcome: Appeal disallowed 

2019/44 Jobseeker’s Allowance  

Question at issue: Eligibility (full-time education) 

Background: The appellant was in receipt of Jobseeker’s Allowance as a casual worker from September 2017. Following a review of her claim by the Department it emerged that the appellant was registered as a full-time student on a course in an ETB college for the academic year 2017/2018 which covered the period September 2017 to May 2018. 

A revised decision was made by the Department in April 2018 disqualifying the appellant from receiving Jobseeker’s Allowance for the period from September 2017 to March 2018 on the grounds that she was attending a full-time day course of study. The decision was made in accordance with Sections 148(1) and 302(a) of the 2005 Act. The decision resulted in an overpayment being assessed against the appellant. 

Consideration: Section 148(1) of the 2005 Act states that a person shall not be entitled to receive Jobseeker’s Allowance while attending a course of study, other than in the circumstances and subject to the conditions and for the periods that may be prescribed. A course of study is further defined as “a full-time day course of study, instruction or training which may take place over more than one academic year at an institution of education”. 

The Appeals Officer noted that the appellant did not dispute that she was attending a full- time course and there was evidence from the college confirming this. 

The decision to disallow the appellant’s Jobseeker’s Allowance was made under Section 302(a) of the Act which provides for a revised decision to be made due to the person wilfully concealing relevant information or providing false or misleading information. In her application form for Jobseeker’s Allowance, the appellant indicated that the course was part- time, 8 hours per week. 

The Appeals Officer concluded that as the appellant was in full-time education she was not entitled to Jobseeker’s Allowance from the date of claim and that she had provided misleading information to the Department. 

Outcome: Appeal disallowed 

2019/318/64 Jobseeker’s Allowance 

Question at issue: Entitlement (Penalty Rate) 

Grounds for review: The appellant submitted in his request for a review of the Appeals Officer’s decision that the Job Path scheme is administered in contravention of national data protection legislation (citing the DPA 2003) and a European Union Directive on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of person data (citing Directive 95/46/ EC). The appellant contended that his personal data had been unlawfully shared by the Department with a named provider and used illegitimately by that provider. He expressed the view that the Appeals Officer erred in his assertion that ‘the Department made every effort to assure’ him regarding the security of his personal data. The appellant also asserted that the decision of the Deciding Officer was not made in accordance with natural justice and that before such decisions are taken a designated person in the Department should meet with the claimant concerned. 

Background: The appellant was in receipt of Jobseeker’s Allowance and in connection with that claim was invited to attend meetings arranged by the Department for the purpose of providing information intended to improve his knowledge of the employment, work experience and other opportunities available to him. He failed to attend a number of scheduled meetings, and a Deciding Officer applied a penalty rate to his claim resulting in a reduction of €44 to his weekly payment. 

While the appellant was ultimately disqualified for receiving Jobseeker’s Allowance, the question before the Appeals Officer at that point in time was whether the appellant had without good cause failed to attend the scheduled meetings. As the Appeals Officer considered that the appellant had not demonstrated good cause for his failure to attend the meetings the appeal was disallowed. 

Review: As the appellant’s grounds for review included issues relating to the administration of the Job Path Programme, I highlighted that the role of the Social Welfare Appeals Office is to determine appeals against decisions of Deciding Officers and/or Designated Persons of the Department. Section 300(2) of the 2005 Act gives statutory power to Deciding Officers of the Department to determine questions relating to social assistance. All such decisions can be appealed under the provisions of Section 311 of the 2005 Act to an Appeals Officer. 

I outlined that, in accordance with these statutory provisions, Appeals Officer have no role in relation to the administration of Job Path. The Appeals Officer’s role therefore was confined to the decision of the Deciding Officer which resulted in the reduction in the appellant’s weekly payment. 

The provisions governing entitlement to Jobseeker’s Allowance are contained in Chapter 2 of Part 3 of the 2005 Act and Chapter 1 of Part 3 of the Social Welfare (Consolidated Claims, Payments and Control) Regulations, 2007 (S.I. No 142 of 2007). 

Section 141A of the 2005 Act provides that a person receiving Jobseeker’s Allowance may be requested to attend meetings for the purpose of assisting the person in their search for employment or for the assessment of the person’s education, training or development needs – generally referred to as activation meetings. Section 141A also sets out the penalties that may be applied where the person refuses or fails to attend activation meetings and in this respect subsection (2) provides: 

Where a person refuses or fails, without good cause, to comply with the requirement specified in the notice under subsection (1) at the time specified in that notice, or at any time thereafter as may be determined by or on behalf of the Minister and notified to the person the weekly rate of jobseeker’s allowance payable to that person in respect of any such period of refusal or failure shall, subject to this section, be as set out in section 142(1A), 142A(1A) or, as the case may be, section 142B(1A). 

Insofar as the appellant’s assertion that the decision [of the Deciding Officer] was not made in accordance with natural justice, while noting that all decisions must be made in accordance with natural justice, I outlined that the legislation does not provide for meetings and/or that any such meetings must be presided over by a designated person. From my review of the file that was before the Appeals Officer, I noted that prior to the Deciding Officer making her decision there was correspondence on file from the Department’s Offices outlining the obligations on jobseekers to attend activation meetings and the consequences of failure to attend was also outlined. 

The appellant had also acknowledged that he had read the material and was aware that if he failed to attend interviews his payment may be reduced. In those circumstances I did not find that the decision of the Appeals Officer was erroneous. Insofar as it was asserted that the Appeals Officer erred in his assertion that ‘the Department made every effort to assure the appellant regarding the security of his personal data,’ I did not find that the Appeals Officer had erred in fact or law in this respect. From my review of the file, there was correspondence on file which showed that the Department made considerable efforts to provide information and assurances to the appellant as regards his personal data and the sharing of that data with the Job Path companies. While I concluded that it was reasonable that the appellant would seek assurances as to the protocols which apply and the safeguards put in place with reference to the provisions of the Data Protection Acts, I considered that the evidence indicated that the requirement to attend scheduled meetings as requested by the Department had not been fulfilled by the appellant and, in light of the assurances given to him by the Department, his concerns as regards data protection did not constitute “good cause” for failure to attend scheduled meetings. 

Outcome: Decision not revised 

2020: 

2020/34 Jobseeker’s Allowance  

Question at issue: Eligibility (available for and genuinely seeking work) 

Background: The appellant’s claim for Jobseeker’s Allowance was disallowed by the Department on the grounds that he was not available for or looking for full-time work. In his application he stated that he had left his employment for medical reasons. He also stated in his application that he was not available for or seeking full-time work. The appellant submitted a letter explaining that he was not available for or looking for full-time work as he had not worked since early 2016 due to medical reasons and was trying to ease back into the workplace. He also outlined that he had to provide assistance to his ill parent. The appellant appealed the Department’s decision and stated that he wished to retract the original answer on his application form and change it to that he was looking for and available for full-time work. He stated that his parent only needed help sometimes during the week and he would be available to provide help outside of work hours. The Department did not accept this submission, and the decision remained unchanged. 

Consideration: The Appeals Officer identified the relevant legislation in this case as Section 141(1)(b) of the 2005 Act and Articles 15 and 16 of the 2007 Regulations. It is a condition of entitlement to Jobseeker’s Allowance that a person is genuinely seeking work and is available for full-time work. 

The Appeals Officer noted the evidence submitted by the appellant at application stage that he was neither available for nor seeking full-time work. While the appellant later stated that he would be available for full-time work the Appeals Officer noted that this statement of availability only came about when his Jobseeker’s Allowance application was disallowed. The Appeals Officer concluded that the weighting to be afforded to this evidence was significantly reduced and concluded that the appellant had not shown that he was willing and able to take up, at once, an offer of suitable employment and had not shown that he could be regarded as genuinely seeking employment as required by the governing legislation. 

Outcome: Appeal disallowed 

2020/35 Jobseeker’s Allowance  

Question at issue: Eligibility (habitual residence condition) 

Background: The appellant’s application for Jobseeker’s Allowance submitted in December 2019 was disallowed by the Department on the grounds that the appellant was not habitually resident in the State. In its decision, the Department outlined that since his arrival in the State in December 2018 the appellant had two brief periods of employment in 2019 and that he previously resided in another country for ten years. 

Consideration: The evidence before the Appeals Officer was that the appellant, in his early 40s, was born outside of Ireland in the late 1970s, had a difficult childhood and was fostered by a family in Ireland in the early 1990s and resided in Ireland for some 20 years up to the end of 2010. The evidence showed that the appellant left Ireland in 2010 to spend some time with his birthmother who died in 2018. On his return to Ireland in 2018 the appellant was supported by his foster family and also accessed services for mental health issues. The appellant submitted that he was returning to Ireland as a place where he had history and current supports. 

In his consideration of the appeal the Appeals Officer outlined that in accordance with Section 246 (4) of the 2005 Act in determining whether a person is habitually resident in the State account shall be taken of all the circumstances of the case, including the five factors outlined in that provision. 

Having regard to the circumstances in this case and in particular the reason for the appellant’s absence from the State and his strong connection to Ireland over a substantial period of his life the Appeals Officer was satisfied based on the totality of the evidence that the appellant was habitually resident in the State for the purposes of his claim for Jobseeker’s Allowance. 

Outcome: Appeal allowed 

2020/36 Jobseeker’s Allowance  

Question at issue: Eligibility (means) 

Background: The appellant’s application for Jobseeker’s Allowance was refused on the grounds that his means were in excess of the rate of Jobseeker’s Allowance that would be payable based on the appellant’s family circumstances. His means were derived from self-employment. 

Consideration: Jobseeker’s Allowance is a means tested payment calculated in accordance with the Rules contained in Part 2 of Schedule 3 of the 2005 Act. 

In his letter of appeal, the appellant indicated that he found the calculation of his means puzzling and that he would like a further breakdown. He also indicated that he had lost his biggest client in 2019, had paid tax on some of his income in another State and he also outlined his family circumstances. The Department subsequently provided a detailed breakdown of the means assessment, and the appellant was afforded the opportunity to comment. No reply was received from the appellant. 

In its reply to the appellant, the Department outlined that the gross income was taken from the 2019 accounts which the appellant had submitted and that income from the lost client was disregarded in the calculation of means. The Department also provided a breakdown of the expenses allowed. 

The Appeals Officer, having examined the calculations, was satisfied that the expenses allowed by the Department in respect of landline/broadband, heating and other utility expenses, car insurance, fuel, An Post, travel and car repairs were reasonable. The Appeals Officer also noted that while it was accepted that the appellant had expenditure on other outgoings, the legislation did not provide for the exclusion of domestic or personal expenses. 

The Appeals Officer found that the appellant’s means from self-employment were correctly calculated by the Department in accordance with the governing legislation 

Outcome: Appeal disallowed 

2020/37 Jobseeker’s Allowance  

Question at issue: Eligibility (means) 

Background: The appellant’s application for Jobseeker’s Allowance was refused by the Department on the grounds that her means were in excess of the rate of Jobseeker’s Allowance that would be payable based on her family circumstances. 

Consideration: The Appeals Officer outlined that the appellant was aged 20 and where a person under 25 years of age is living with parents in the family home, an assessment is made of the yearly value of any benefit and privilege enjoyed by that person by virtue of residing with parents. The value of the benefit and privilege assessed is based on the level of the parents’ income. 

The Department assessed the appellant’s benefit and privilege on the basis of her father’s income from employment. The information was taken from a copy of a payslip provided by the appellant. The payslip showed gross income for 24 insurable weeks. 

The Appeals Officer determined that the Deciding Officer took the incorrect figure as gross income from the payslip. The figure taken was the tax cut-off point instead of the year-to-date gross income. The tax cut-off point figure was approximately 2½ times more than the year-to-date gross income and resulted in a means assessment of €332 per week. 

When the correct gross income figure was used, and all relevant disregards applied the benefit and privilege enjoyed by the appellant by virtue of residing with her parents amounted to nil when calculated in accordance with the Department’s guidelines. As the appellant had no other source of means she was entitled to Jobseeker’s Allowance at maximum rate applicable to her age. 

Outcome: Appeal allowed 

2020/318/65 Jobseeker’s Allowance 

Question at issue: Entitlement (penalty rate) 

Grounds for Review: The appellant submitted a number of grounds, including some which were outside the remit of the appeals process, in support of her request for a review of the Appeals Officer’s decision but the substantive issue was whether the appellant’s refusal to engage with a provider under the JobPath Employment Activation Programme constituted good cause for her failure to attend activation meetings. In this respect the appellant also asserted that the governing legislation was unconstitutional. 

Background: The appellant was in receipt of Jobseeker’s Allowance and in connection with that claim was invited to attend meetings arranged by the Department for the purpose of providing employment support. A penalty rate was applied to her claim on the grounds that she had failed without good cause to attend activation meetings resulting in a reduction of €44 to her weekly payment. The appellant was subsequently disqualified from receiving Jobseeker’s Allowance as she failed to avail of a further opportunity to comply with the activation process. The appellant refused to engage with the JobPath programme as she believed that this would entail entering into a contract with a third-party agency. Maintaining a position that her contract was directly with the Department, the appellant stated that the correspondence she received from the provider under the JobPath programme was unsolicited and she didn’t engage with any such correspondence received. 

Review: As the appellant’s grounds for review included issues outside the remit of the appeal process, I outlined in the first instance that the role of the Social Welfare Appeals Office is to determine appeals against decisions of Deciding Officers and/or Designated Persons of the Department. Section 300(2) of the 2005 Act gives statutory power to Deciding Officers of the Department to determine questions relating to social assistance. All such decisions can be appealed under the provisions of Section 311 of the 2005 Act to an Appeals Officer. The Appeals Officer’s role in this case was confined to the decision of the Deciding Officer which resulted in the reduction in the appellant’s weekly payment. 

The provisions governing entitlement to Jobseeker’s Allowance are contained in Chapter 2 of Part 3 of the 2005 Act and Chapter 1 of Part 3 of the 2007 Regulations. 

Section 141A of the 2005 Act provides that a person receiving Jobseeker’s Allowance may be requested to attend meetings for the purpose of assisting the person in their search for employment or for the assessment of the person’s education, training or development needs – generally referred to as activation meetings. 

Section 141A also references the penalties that may be applied where the person refuses or fails to attend activation meetings and in this respect subsection (2) provides: 

Where a person refuses or fails, without good cause, to comply with the requirement specified in the notice under subsection (1) at the time specified in that notice, or at any time thereafter as may be determined by or on behalf of the Minister and notified to the person, the weekly rate of jobseeker’s allowance payable to that person in respect of any such period of refusal or failure shall, subject to this section, be as set out in section 142(1A), or, as the case may be, section 142A(1A). 

It was clear that the appellant was of the view that her engagement in relation to activation should be directly with the Department and she refused to engage with the JobPath provider. It was also clear that the governing legislation provides that a person may be required to attend activation meetings and that for this purpose notice may be given by or behalf of the Minister to any person receiving Jobseeker’s Allowance requesting the person to comply with the requirement to (a) attend a meeting arranged by or on behalf of the Minister, or (b) attend for or submit to an assessment of that person’s education, training or development needs. It is also clear that where a person refuses or fails, without good cause, to comply with this requirement a penalty may be applied. I was satisfied that the words by or behalf of the Minister’ included providers under the JobPath programme. 

The central issue before the Appeals Officer was whether, in accordance with the legislation governing Jobseeker’s Allowance, the appellant had demonstrated ‘good cause’ for the failure or refusal to engage with the activation measures put in place to assist her in her job search. 

I was satisfied that the Appeals Officer had not erred in fact or law in concluding that the appellant had not demonstrated ‘good cause’ for her failure to attend meetings arranged by or on behalf of the Minister for the purpose of providing information intended to improve her knowledge of the employment, work experience and other opportunities available to her as provided for in governing legislation. 

In relation to the constitutionality of the law applied, I outlined that a law passed by the Oireachtas is presumed to be constitutional until it is proven not to be and in applying the legislation in the appellant’s appeal the Appeals Officer was obliged to act on the presumption that the legislation was constitutional. 

Outcome: Decision not revised 

2020/318/66 Jobseeker’s Allowance 

Question at issue: Entitlement (penalty rate) 

Grounds for Review: The appellant submitted a number of grounds, some of which related to the administration of the JobPath Employment Activation Programme and his engagement with the Department under its complaint’s procedure. As these issues do not come within the remit of the appeal process as provided for in the governing legislation they were not addressed in this review. The appellant asserted that the Appeals Officer by relying on the 2005 Act had erred in law and should instead have relied on the Social Welfare and Pensions Act 2013. The appellant outlined concerns in relation to the impartiality of findings of the Appeals Officer and asserted that the non-attendance of the case officer of the Department at the oral hearing of his appeal was not in keeping with a fair process. In addition, the appellant asserted that selection for participation in the JobPath programme was random and as such constituted ‘good grounds’ for not attending activation meetings. 

Background: The appellant was in receipt of Jobseeker’s Allowance and in connection with that claim was invited to attend meetings arranged by the Department for the purpose of providing complete that session. The appellant failed to attend four subsequent sessions arranged by the Department. The evidence before the Appeals Officer also showed that the Intreo Centre concerned had contacted the appellant who was advised of the requirement to attend meetings and of the potential outcomes for failure to engage, including the application of a penalty rate. A penalty rate was ultimately applied on the grounds that the appellant had failed without good cause to attend activation meetings resulting in a reduction of €44 to his weekly payment. 

The subsequent appeal was disallowed as the Appeals Officer considered that the appellant had not shown good cause for his failure to attend the scheduled meetings. 

Review: Insofar as it was contended that the Appeals Officer erred in law by relying on the incorrect legislative provisions, I outlined that the legislation governing social welfare payments and related matters is contained in the 2005 Act – generally referred to as the Principal Act. That Act has been amended since its enactment in 2005 and one such amendment was made by Section 13 of the Social Welfare and Pensions (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2013. Section 13(2) of the 2013 Act provides, inter alia, for an amendment to the Principal Act by the substitution for Section 141A of Section 141A, 141B and 141C. Consequently the 2005 Act must be read as including the amendments introduced by the 2013 Act. I found no error of law in the Appeals Officer’s decision or reliance on the provisions of the 2005 Act as set out in the decision. 

Insofar as it was asserted that the non-attendance of the case officer at the oral hearing of the appellant’s appeal resulted in a lack of fair process, I outlined that Article 15 of the Social Welfare (Appeals) Regulations, 1998 (S.I. No. 108 of 1998) provides that in circumstances where an appeal is being determined by means of an oral hearing the Deciding Officer or the Designated Person, as the case may be, may appear at the hearing in person or be represented by another officer of the Minister. It is also open to the Appeals Officer to ask any other person to attend at the hearing. However, these provisions are not mandatory, and it is a matter for the Appeals Officer to determine whose attendance is required in order to determine the appeal. 

From my review of the material that was before the Appeals Officer I was satisfied that the attendance of the case officer was not necessary in order to ensure fair process. 

I outlined that the role of the Appeals Officer was confined to the decision of the Deciding Officer which advised the appellant that his rate of Jobseeker’s Allowance would be reduced by €44 per week. The decision of the Deciding Officer outlined that the appellant had, without good cause, failed to attend meetings arranged by or on behalf of the Minister for the purpose of providing information which was intended to improve knowledge of the employment, work experience, education, training or development opportunities available to him. 

The provisions governing entitlement to Jobseeker’s Allowance are contained in Chapter 2 of Part 3 of the 2005 Act and Chapter 1 of Part 3 of the 2007 Regulations. 

Section 141A of the 2005 Act provides that a person receiving Jobseeker’s Allowance may be requested to attend meetings for the purpose of assisting the person in their search for employment or for the assessment of the person’s education, training or development needs – generally referred to as activation meetings. Section 141A also contains the penalties that may be applied where the person refuses or fails to attend activation meetings and in this respect subsection (2) provides: 

Where a person refuses or fails, without good cause, to comply with the requirement specified in the notice under subsection (1) at the time specified in that notice, or at any time thereafter as may be determined by or on behalf of the Minister and notified to the person, the weekly rate of jobseeker’s allowance payable to that person in respect of any such period of refusal or failure shall, subject to this section, be as set out in section 142(1A), or, as the case may be, section 142A(1A). 

It was clear that the appellant was requested to attend meetings for the purpose of assisting him in his search for employment. Once invoked and in circumstances where the appellant refused/failed without good cause to comply with these requirements he could not be regarded as being compliant with the provisions of Section 141A. The central question therefore before the Appeals Officer was whether the appellant had demonstrated good cause for his failure to engage and/or comply with the requirements of Section 141A. 

The appellant’s reasons for not attending scheduled meetings were to the effect that he saw no value in attending the programme and considered that the Job Path programme was a waste of money and considered it more useful if he conducted his own job search. In this respect I outlined that the requirement to attend such meetings is not optional and once a person is notified to attend s/he must engage, unless there is ‘good cause’ for non-engagement. 

I considered that the evidence indicated that the requirement to attend scheduled meetings as requested by the Department had not been fulfilled by the appellant and the reasons advanced by the appellant did not, in my view, constitute good cause for failure to attend such meetings. 

Outcome: Decision not revised 

2020/318/67 Jobseeker’s Allowance 

Question at issue: Eligibility (right to reside in the State) 

Grounds for Review: The Department in its request for a review of the Appeals Officer’s decision submitted that the Appeals Officer erred in law in that the appellant’s status in the State was that of an asylum seeker who has applied to the International Protection Office for recognition as a refugee in accordance with the Refugee Act 1996 or the International Protection Act 2015 and whose application had yet to be determined. 

The Department, while acknowledging that the Deciding Officer erred in carrying out a full habitual residence test rather than finding the appellant did not satisfy the habitual residence condition under Section 246(7) of the 2005 Act, submitted that under Section 311 (3) of the 2005 Act the Appeals Officer was obliged to use the correct legislation in making his decision. In those circumstances it was submitted that the Appeals Officer erred in law in arriving at his decision as it was contrary to Section 246 (7) of the 2005 Act which provides that such a person cannot be regarded as habitually resident and as such may not access standard social assistance payments. 

Background: The appellant resided in Ireland and was the holder of an international protection card which was valid for six months. Her claim for Jobseeker’s Allowance was disallowed by a Deciding Officer on the grounds that the appellant did not meet the habitual residence conditions set out in Section 246(4) of the 2005 Act i.e. the five factors. The appellant submitted that she resided in the State under the protection of the Minister for Justice and had a right to access the same social welfare benefits under the same conditions as applied to Irish citizens. Relying solely on Section 246(4) of the 2005 Act the Appeals Officer found that the habitual residence condition was satisfied and allowed the appeal. 

Review: In accordance with Section 246 of the 2005 Act establishing habitual residence is a two-stage process which firstly requires that the person has a right to reside in the State. If it is established that the person has a right to reside, an assessment of their situation under 5 factors applies to determine their centre of interest and future intentions. 

From my review of the material that was before the Appeals Officer it was clear that the appellant resided in the State as the holder of an international protection card. The reverse side of that card outlined, inter alia, that this temporary card indicates that an individual claiming to be the person named on the card has applied for international protection in the State. 

I was satisfied that the Appeals Officer accepted at face value an extract from a Department of Justice document which was submitted by the appellant in support of her appeal, and which outlined a person’s rights if granted international protection. The relevant section which was submitted outlined that when a person receives a refugee declaration or a subsidiary protection declaration under the provisions of the International Protection Act, 2015 various entitlements arise, including access to medical care and social welfare benefits subject to the same conditions applicable to Irish citizens. 

However, the appellant had not received a refugee declaration or a subsidiary protection from the Minister for Justice and her status in the State was that of an asylum seeker who had applied for recognition as a refugee in accordance with the Refugee Act 1996 or the International Protection Act 2015. In those circumstances and in accordance with the provisions of Section 246(7) of the 2005 Act she could not be regarded as being habitually resident in the State. 

In those circumstances I considered that the Appeals Officer had erred in law. 

Outcome: Decision revised 

2021: 

2021/49: Jobseeker’s Allowance  

Question under Appeal: Right to reside and habitual residence. 

Background: The appellant, an EU national, applied for Jobseeker’s Allowance in December 2020. The application was disallowed by the Department on the grounds that the appellant did not have a right to reside and could not therefore be considered to be habitually resident in the State. The appellant informed that she arrived in Ireland in October 2020 but did not provide evidence of travel to verify entry. Three months had not elapsed between the date of entry to the State and the date of application for Jobseeker’s Allowance. In her appeal notification, the appellant contended that she was an EU citizen who came to Ireland looking for a job, intending to stay as long as possible. She advised that she lived in Ireland from 2013 until 2014 and had some employment in that period after which she returned to her country of origin. She returned to Ireland in 2020 and was trying to find work. 

Consideration: Under the Act it is a requirement for entitlement to most social assistance payments that the person is habitually resident in the State. Section 246 of the Act contains the provisions with respect to habitual residence and deciding if a person is habitually resident is a two-stage process involving establishing, in the first instance, a right of residence and secondly determining whether a person is habitually resident. Section 246 (5) of the Act provides that a person who does not have a right to reside in the State cannot be regarded as being habitually resident in the State. 

Right of residence for EU nationals and their family members is governed by Directive 2004/38/EC and the European Communities (Free Movement of Persons) Regulations, 2015 (S.I. No. 548 of 2015). 

Article 6 (1) of the 2015 Regulations provides that EU citizens and certain family members have a right of residence for a period of three months without any conditions or any formalities other than the requirement to hold a valid identity card or passport. Article 17(2) of the 2015 Regulations provides that a person to whom Article 6(1) applies is not entitled to receive social assistance under the Social Welfare Acts. 

The evidence in this case was that the appellant had applied for an assistance payment within three months of her arrival in the State. In the circumstances the Appeals Officer concluded that the appellant had was not entitled to receive Jobseeker’s Allowance. 

Outcome: Appeal disallowed. 

2021/50: Jobseeker’s Allowance  

Question at issue: Means – partner’s income. 

Background: The appellant’s claim for Jobseeker’s Allowance was awarded by the Department at a reduced weekly rate, consisting of a personal rate and an increase in respect of one dependent child at half-rate less means assessed. The appellant queried the assessment of means in view of overall household costs including education expenses. 

Consideration: 

Section 141(1)(c) of the Act provides that entitlement to Jobseeker’s Allowance is subject to a means assessment calculated in accordance with the rules contained in Part 2 of Schedule 3 of the Act. 

Assessable means refers to all household income and, in the appellant’s case, his partner’s earnings from insurable employment fell to be assessed. The Appeals Officer outlined that the governing legislation provides for the assessment of means with reference to household income, and this is based on gross rather than net income, with a limited number of allowable deductions. 

Having considered the available evidence, the Appeals Officer determined that the rate of entitlement to Jobseeker’s Allowance as calculated by the Department was correct and that means including the appellant’s partner’s reckonable income from insurable employment had been assessed correctly in line with the provisions set out in governing legislation. 

Outcome: Appeal disallowed. 

2021/51: Jobseeker’s Allowance 

Question at issue: Means- assessment of capital. 

Background: The appellant, in her mid-50s, applied for Jobseeker’s Allowance which was disallowed by the Department on the grounds that her means were in excess of the rate of Jobseeker’s Allowance that would otherwise be payable. The appellant’s means derived from an assessment of capital held by the appellant and income from a private pension. 

The assessment of capital included money held in a number of financial institutions and money held in an Irish State Savings Solidarity Bond. The appellant outlined her intention to work up to pension age and to having invested part of a redundancy payment from a previous employment with a view to retirement at that time. She queried the inclusion of the amount invested for this purpose in the assessment of means. 

Consideration: 

Section 141(1)(c) of the Act provides that entitlement to Jobseeker’s Allowance is subject to a means assessment calculated in accordance with the rules contained in Part 2 of Schedule 3 of the Act. 

Assessable means refers to any form of income that is available to a person claiming a means-tested payment and in this instance, included the amount held in a savings bond. 

The Appeals Officer determined that the appellant’s means had been assessed correctly in line with the provisions set out in governing legislation and that an entitlement to Jobseeker’s Allowance did not accrue. 

Outcome: Appeal disallowed. 

2021/75 Jobseeker’s Allowance 

Question at issue: Jobseeker’s Allowance means assessment and provision of information 

Grounds for Review: The appellant sought a review of the Appeals Officer’s decision stating that she had provided all the information requested by the Department in connection with a review of her entitlement to Jobseeker’s Allowance. 

Background: The appellant had been in receipt of Jobseeker’s Allowance and her claim was disallowed by the Department on the grounds that she had not shown that her means were less than the weekly rate of Jobseeker’s Allowance appropriate to her family circumstances. The Department stated that the appellant had failed to provide evidence to a Social Welfare Inspector in relation to capital and property when requested to do so. The information requested related to a compensation award of a substantial amount of money awarded to the appellant’s spouse, details of named bank accounts and the current market value of a site owned by her spouse or evidence of sale if the property had been sold. The Inspector reported that the appellant has failed to provide the information, and it had not been possible to determine her continued entitlement to Jobseeker’s Allowance at the rate initially approved. 

Consideration: 

The legislation governing entitlement to Jobseeker’s Allowance is contained in Chapter 2 of Part 3 of the Act and certain provisions of the 2007 Regulations also apply. 

Section 141 of the Act provides that entitlement to Jobseeker’s Allowance is subject to an assessment of means. In accordance with Article 181 of the 2007 Regulations it is a requirement that every claimant furnish such certificates, documents, information and evidence as may be required by an officer of the Minister for the purposes of deciding a claim. 

While the appellant stated that she had provided all the information requested by the Social Welfare Inspector, the Appeals Officer and I, on reviewing that decision, were satisfied that the appellant had failed to provide any of the information requested and in those circumstances, it was not possible to carry out a means assessment for the purposes of establishing entitlement to Jobseeker’s Allowance. 

Outcome: Decision not revised. 

2022: 

2022/46 Jobseeker’s Allowance 

Question at issue: Eligibility –available for and genuinely seeking work 

Background: The Department disallowed the appellant’s application for Jobseeker’s Allowance on the basis that she was not available for or seeking full-time work. 

She indicated on her application form that she was not available for or looking for full-time work She stated that she was looking for part-time work but only after her husband came home from his work as otherwise, there was no one to collect her son from preschool. 

In her appeal the appellant stated that she was searching for full-time jobs around her location and had applied for jobs online, by phone and by WhatsApp. She outlined the various jobs and areas she can work in and listed three recent applications. 

In the appeal submission the Deciding Officer stated the appellant had been disallowed based on the direct evidence that she was not looking for or available for full-time work. He stated that she had not provided any documentary evidence to substantiate her claim that she had applied for jobs, and she also had not made any reference to her child-minding issue. 

Consideration: The eligibility conditions for the payment of Jobseekers Allowance are laid down in social welfare legislation and must be satisfied before payment can be made. It is a condition of entitlement that a person must show that they are genuinely seeking and are available for full time work. There is no discretion to work outside the legislation. 

At the time of application, the burden of proof is on the appellant to prove that they have an entitlement to payment. Having carefully considered the evidence in this case the Appeals Officer concluded that the appellant at the time of the Department’s decision had not established that she met the conditions of genuinely seeking work or being available for full time work. 

Whilst her contentions on appeal were noted, she did not provide any evidence to indicate that she was genuinely seeking full-time work neither did she provide any evidence that she was available for full-time work. 

Outcome: Appeal disallowed 

2022/47 Jobseekers Allowance 

Question at Issue: Eligibility (means) 

Background: The appellant was awarded Jobseeker’s Allowance (JA) at a weekly rate of €91.00 having been assessed with weekly means of €157 based on his spouse’s earnings from insurable employment. The appellant appealed the rate of payment as it was insufficient to meet their financial commitments. 

Consideration: The question before the Appeals Officer was whether the appellant’s means and rate of payment have been assessed in accordance with the governing legislation for Jobseekers Allowance? 

The appellant’s means assessment and rate of payment resulted from a number of calculations, the first being to determine the maximum rate payable for the Appellant’s family circumstances. The appellant’s maximum rate of Jobseekers Allowance was determined as €248 weekly. This rate comprised the maximum personal rate of €208 with increases of €20 for each of the Appellant’s two children. There was no qualified adult increase payable. Next, the spouse’ average weekly earnings from insurable employment were established from payslips. The spouse was also in receipt of a social welfare payment therefore their means were halved to €157. The appellant did not dispute the spousal means on appeal. The appellant was liable to be assessed on spousal means as per the governing legislation. 

The Appeals Officer reviewed the Department’s calculations and determined they were in accordance with the relevant legislative provisions. The appellant’s rate of €91 represented the net figure when assessed means of €157 were deducted from the maximum rate payable of €248.00. 

Outcome: Appeal disallowed 

2022/48 Jobseeker’s Allowance 

Question at Issue: Right to reside and habitual residence 

Background: The appellant, a 27-year-old EU national, was deemed not to meet the habitual residence condition as he was deemed not to have a right to reside for the purposes of satisfying the condition, nor did he satisfy the five factors which prove Ireland is the appellant’s main centre of interest. 

The appellant states he came to Ireland in 2019 to work. There was no evidence that he is in employment. He states he wishes to remain in Ireland for as long as possible for work and a better social life and status. He lives with his parents who came to Ireland in 2020. 

Consideration: The Habitual Residence Condition is a two-part process: firstly, a person must establish a right of residence. Only if a right to reside is established, the Appellant’s circumstances must then be considered in the context of the 5 factors set out in Section 246(4) of the 2005 Act. 

Under Article 6 of SI 548/2015 (European Communities (Free Movement of Persons) Regulations 2015), all EU citizens have an unqualified right of residence for up to 3 months. Thereafter the right of residence (and associated entitlements) is qualified – they have the right to reside if they are (i) in employment/self-employment in the State, have sufficient resources for themselves and their family not to become an unreasonable burden on the social assistance system of the State, …(ii) or is enrolled in an accredited educational establishment to study…. and, by means of a declaration or otherwise, satisfies the Minister that they have sufficient resources for themselves and their family members not to become an unreasonable burden on the social assistance system of the State, or (iii) is a family member of a Union citizen who satisfies one or more of the conditions referred to above. 

The evidence showed that none of these appear to apply to the appellant. As he did not establish a right to reside in Ireland, under Section 246(5) of the 2005 Act, he cannot be considered habitually resident and does not qualify for Jobseekers Allowance. In these circumstances, the five factors listed in Section 246(4) of the Act were not considered. 

Outcome: Appeal disallowed 

2022/49 Jobseeker’s Allowance 

Question at Issue: Eligibility – registered as full-time student 

Background: The appellant applied for Jobseeker’s Allowance while undertaking a course of study in a third level institution in the evenings. His application was refused on grounds that he was excluded under Section 148 (1) of the 2005 Act while attending a course of study. In his grounds of appeal, the appellant contended that he was not a full- time student as he attended College in the evening. 

Consideration: The Appeals Officer considered whether the appellant was regarded as a full-time student for the purposes of Jobseeker’s Allowance as set out in section 148 of the 2005 Act. Section 148(1) which generally excludes persons attending a course of study from receipt of Jobseeker’s Allowance must be read in conjunction with Section 148(2) which defines a course of study as a full-time day course of study. The appellant had submitted a letter from the third level college confirming that he was ‘a registered student of the college on the Higher Diploma in Science and Computing, Full-Time evening programme’. 

As the appellant had clearly demonstrated that his course was an evening programme, he was not excluded under the legislation. 

Outcome: Appeal allowed 

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Thematic Note G0143: Cohabitation

Theme: Cohabitation

Period of Analysis: SWAO Annual Reports 2009-2022

Keywords: Cohabitation; Cohabitant; Intimate relationship; Operational Guidelines; Evidence; Burden of Proof

Casebase No. Case G0143

Summary of the relevant law:

The status of an individual as a cohabitant may affect whether or not they qualify for certain social welfare payments, as well as what level of payments an individual could be awarded.

For the purposes of the social welfare code, the term “cohabitant” is defined in Section 172(1) of the Civil Partnership and Certain Rights and Obligations of Cohabitants Act 2010 (the “2010 Act”)as one of 2 adults (of the same or opposite sex) living together as a couple in an intimate and committed relationship, who are not related to each other within the prohibited degrees of relationship or married to each other or civil partners of each other.

Under the 2010 Act, the following factors will be considered when determining whether 2 adults are cohabitants:

  1. the duration of the relationship;
  2. the reason for the couple living together;
  3. the degree of financial dependence of either adult on the other and any agreements regarding their finances;
  4. the degree and nature of financial arrangements between the adults, including any joint purchase of land/property or joint acquisition of personal property;
  5. whether there are any dependent children of either adult;
  6. whether one of the adults cares for and supports the children of the other adult; and
  7. the degree to which the adults present themselves as a couple.

According to operational guidelines on cohabitation (the “Operational Guidelines”), there are two central aspects that are examined when considering whether a couple are cohabiting:

  1. Are the couple in a relationship?
  2. Are the couple living together?

The Operational Guidelines provides helpful detail as to the way in which each of the criteria listed at a) to g) above are assessed. For example, it notes that in relation to the duration of the relationship, regard should be had to the stability of the relationship which may be reflected either in simply duration but also the level of commitment to one another.

For further information, the Operational Guidelines can be accessed at the following link: gov – Cohabitation (www.gov.ie)

B. Key grounds of appeals by appellants:

Below we look at the appeals brought together in the SWAO Annual Reports of 2009 to 2022.

  • Lack of intimate relationship

Two appeals were brought on the basis of a lack of an intimate relationship. In Case 2012/12 the appeal was brought on the basis that the individuals were cousins as opposed to being in an intimate relationship, and this appeal was allowed. Cases 2015/22 and 2015/23 concerned two appellants who were suspected of cohabitating with each other, however the appeal was allowed on the basis that there was no intimate sexual relationship between them, with such intimacy being prevented by medical circumstances.

  • Not living together

There were four appeals relating to whether the appellant was in fact living together with the person suspected to be their cohabitant. For example, in Case 2010/16, it was held that the appellant was cohabiting with her partner as they had converted adjoining houses into one property. Cases 2015/06, involved appeals in which the appellant produced documentation, including utility bills and bank statements, to attempt to prove that they weren’t living together.

  • Lack of financial links

In Case 2015/06 the appellant sought to show through the presentation of utility bills, bank statements, P60 forms and other such documentation that there were no financial links with their suspected partner, and the appeal was allowed on the strength of such evidence, among other factors.

  • Incorrect interpretation of evidence/circumstances

In two cases, the appellants claimed that inspectors had incorrectly interpreted evidence or circumstances when making their assessment regarding cohabitation. In Case 2016/08 the appellant argued that there was no concrete proof of cohabitation, and it was held that the evidence presented did not establish a basis for determining that the couple were living in a ‘committed and intimate’ relationship. In Case 2016/318/36 the appellant similarly alleged errors of fact by inspectors and claimed that there was either no evidence of the inspector’s assertions, or merely circumstantial evidence and this was upheld and the appeal allowed.

C. Observations on appeal outcomes:

The appeals decisions indicate that Appeals Officers routinely look to the application of the assessment criteria laid down in the Operational Guidelines to inform their examination of a case. In Cases 2016/318/36, 2016/08 and 2010/16 the decision referenced these guidelines explicitly and stepped through the criteria as they apply to the facts of the relevant case. It is clear that regard to Operational Guidelines is considered an important factor in such determinations and it is therefore key that potential appellants review the Operational Guidelines in detail as they relate to their particular circumstances. The joint decision on Cases 2015/22 and 2015/23 notes additionally that the Operational Guidelines indicate that “no single criterion can necessarily support a decision”.

The burden of proof as between the appellant and inspectors/appeals officers regarding cohabitation is considered in multiple appeal decisions. It is noted in Case 2016/318/36 that the Operational Guidelines provide that ‘where an entitlement may be disallowed, limited or withdrawn, the onus is on the Department to establish that cohabitation exists’.  The decision in this case notes that the Appeals Officer had placed an unreasonable burden of proof on the appellant and by not giving sufficient weight to the appellant’s evidence, the Appeals Officer had erred in law.

Another useful observation from the outcome of the appeals is the clarification of what is meant by “intimate” relationship provided in Cases 2015/22 and 2015/23. In these cases the appellants claimed that they were not cohabiting with each other due to a lack of an intimate relationship, and, in particular, that they had not been engaged in a sexual relationship at any time. The decision makes reference to the High Court ruling of In the matter of Section 194 of the Civil Partnership and Certain Rights and Obligations Cohabitants Act 2010 [2015] IEHC 309 in which Baker J found that in order to be a cohabitant, the relationship must be more than merely friendship and must be or must have been at some point sexually intimate.

Relevant Case Studies of the SWAO Annual Reports 2009-2022

A.2009 
N/A 
2010 
1.2010/16 One-Parent Family PaymentQuestion at issue: One-parent family payment (co-habitation)
2011 
N/A 
2012 
1.2012/12 Jobseeker’s Allowance & Co-habitationQuestion at issue: Means & Co-habitation
2.2012/22 Survivor’s (Contributory) Pension & Co-habitationQuestion at issue: Non-disclosure of co-habitation
2013 
N/A 
2014 
N/A 
2015 
1.2015/06 One Parent Family PaymentQuestion at issue: Co-habitation
2.2015/22 Unspecified PaymentQuestion at issue: Co-habitation
3.2015/23 Unspecified PaymentQuestion at issue: Co-habitation
2016 
1.2016/08 One-Parent Family PaymentQuestion at issue: Co-habitation
2.2016/318/36 One-Parent Family PaymentQuestion at issue: Means and Co-habitation
 2017 
1.2017/09 One-Parent Family PaymentQuestion at issue: Means and Co-habitation
 2018 
 N/A 
 2019 
 N/A 
 2020 
1.2020/06 One-Parent Family PaymentQuestion at issue: Co-habitation
 2021 
 N/A 
 2022 
 N/A 
   
   

2010:

2010/16 One Parent Family

Question at issue: co-habitation – whether the decision to disqualify the appellant for receipt of One Parent Family Payment, with effect from a specified date in 2008, was correct.

Background: The appellant was awarded One Parent Family Payment (formerly One Parent Family Allowance) in 1991. It came to light that she may have married in 1999. Following several investigations by the Department of Social Protection, it had been concluded that while the marriage had taken place, it had only lasted a month and the parties were estranged by June 2000.

The appellant participated in a Community Employment Scheme and was paid in respect of four qualified children, whereas her One Parent Family Payment included only two. The case was referred to a Social Welfare Inspector for investigation and it was confirmed that the appellant had four children. It emerged that her husband (J) had an address next door to the appellant’s home.

Oral hearing: The appellant was accompanied by a Family Support project leader. The Social Welfare Inspector attended at the request of the Appeals Officer.

The Inspector outlined the details of his investigation in the case. He reported that when he had interviewed the appellant initially, she told him that she did not know the identity of the father of her two youngest children. However, when he put it to her that their father was her husband, J, she acknowledged that this was the case. She told him that her husband had stayed over the odd night after family funerals and a chance meeting; she denied that he was living with her. She advised that he resided with his mother. After a number of failed attempts to contact him there, however, his mother had advised the Inspector that he lived at the address adjacent to the appellant’s. The owner of that property had advised that she had allowed J and the appellant to have the tenancy for €4,000 as she was going away. On her return, however, she reported that she found that both houses had been converted into one unit. She asserted that the appellant and J had resisted her attempts to regain possession of the property. The Inspector established that a car was registered to J at the appellant’s address and he reported that he had observed the car there on a number of occasions.

The Inspector referred to the appellant’s failure to notify the Department of Social Protection of significant changes in her circumstances: her marriage in 1999 and the birth of her third and fourth children for whom she did not claim an increase in payment. He referred also to her statement to an Inspector in 2003 that she had had no contact with J since their short and failed marriage, despite being pregnant at that time. He stated also that the fourth child’s birth certificate indicated that the father was J, and the appellant’s address had been stated as his address also. In response, the appellant referred to each aspect of the evidence outlined by the Inspector. She said that her marriage in 1999 to J did not last a week; she was embarrassed about this and did not mention it initially when approached by the Inspector. She said, however, that she later accompanied J to the Inspector’s office and handed in a marriage certificate. She said that in 2003 she had been unaware of her pregnancy at the time when she was interviewed by the Inspector; it was a difficult pregnancy, during which she had been in hospital for an extended period, and she acknowledged that J took care of the children during that time. She said that when the child’s birth was registered, J’s mother had moved address and she did not know the new address and so she gave the father’s address as her own. She denied any knowledge of a car registered to J at her address. She asserted that a lot of cars parked on the corner near her house but said that this did not indicate that the owners were resident in the house.

The appellant presented a motor vehicle registration certificate in the name of J, using the address adjacent to hers, and a letter from the local authority indicating that he had applied to be placed on the housing list.

The Family Support project worker said she was aware of the appellant’s domestic situation and the ups and downs she had experienced over the years. She said that she considered the couple to be very responsible and good parents and had observed that J was always good to the children. She asked if he should be present at the hearing to give evidence. The Appeals Officer advised that he did not consider it necessary to summon J to the hearing but said that if the appellant required his presence, she could invite him to attend.

Further evidence: Following the hearing, the appellant submitted a letter from the local authority stating that J had been found eligible for social housing (medical category).

Consideration of the Appeals Officer: The Appeals Officer noted the history of the case and the appellant’s apparent reluctance to be open and candid with Social Welfare Inspectors in relation to her marriage to J, his address, and their children. She had indicated that their marriage was very brief. He observed that this would appear to indicate that an obvious and significant incompatibility had quickly emerged. He considered that such a scenario was difficult to reconcile with the evidence of an ongoing close relationship between the parties in subsequent years.

The Appeals Officer referred to the Guidelines of the Department of Social Protection in relation to co-habitation, including the five factors which are taken to point to a couple residing together as husband and wife, and he noted as follows:

• Co- residence: The evidence indicates that adjoining houses were converted so as to make one unit where the couple resides with their children. The assessment of housing need relates to J’s future needs and cannot be taken as evidence that he is not now resident with the appellant. In addition, he was recorded as living at the appellant’s address on his child’s birth certificate and for vehicle registration purposes.

• Household Relationship Finances or Duties shared: There is evidence of sharing of duties in relation to their children. There is no evidence in relation to financial arrangements.

• Stability: The history of the case points to a long-standing relationship.

• Social: There is no evidence in relation to the couple being regarded as a couple locally or of sharing a social life.

• Sexual: The couple had children in 2001 and 2003 at a time when the appellant presented herself to the Department of Social Protection as a single parent.

Taking account of all the evidence in the case, the Appeals Officer concluded that the appellant and J were in a relationship which had all the appearances of a couple living together as husband and wife.

Outcome: Appeal disallowed

2012:

2012/12 Jobseeker’s Allowance & Co-habitation

Decision under appeal: claim awarded at reduced rate – reason(s) stated:-

You are entitled to Jobseeker’s Allowance from [specified date] at the rate shown – half the rate for a couple less means of €41.00 per week. As your spouse/civil partner/cohabitant is also getting a social welfare payment, your weekly rate of payment is limited to this amount.

Issue: Co-habitation.

Background: The appellant was assessed with means of €41.00 based on his partner’s income from part-time employment. The Deciding Officer concluded that he was co-habiting with a person [named] who, having made a claim for Jobseeker’s Allowance in her own right, had named the appellant as her partner. The appellant denied that they were partners and said she had made a mistake. He said they were cousins.

At oral hearing: the Appeals Officer explained to the appellant how his rate of payment of €115 had been calculated. He advised him that the Deciding Officer considered that the person [named] was his partner as she had completed a form stating this to be the case. The Appeals Officer had called the person [named] to the oral hearing but she had failed to attend.

The appellant said that when the claim form was being completed, the person named had been asked who was living in the house with her and she said the appellant. When the Appeals Officer asked how she had known his PPS number, he said that she had phoned him and asked for it. He was adamant that the person named was not his partner. He said he had moved out of his parent’s house as it was too crowded. He advised that his brother had a disability and needed a room of his own, and he had medical evidence confirming his brother’s disability. The appellant said that he paid his rent separately and he had a letter from the Private Residential Tenancies Board (PRTB), addressed to him only, stating that he had been registered as a tenant. He said that if he lost the appeal he would move back home and his sister would move into the house with the person named. He went on to say that he owed his mother about €2,500.

Comment/Conclusion: In this case, the appellant had been awarded Jobseeker’s Allowance from a date [specified] in 2012 at half the rate for a couple less means of €41.00 per week. The Deciding Officer concluded that he was co-habiting with a person named as she had earlier signed a Jobseeker’s Allowance repeat claim form stating that the appellant was her partner. The file was sent subsequently to the Social Welfare Inspector to review his means. The Appeals Officer noted that the Inspector did not proceed with the means review as the decision was under appeal. However, she had interviewed the appellant twice and on both occasions he had denied being in a relationship. The Inspector had taken the view that he was in a relationship based on the form signed by the person named.

The Appeals Officer noted the appellant’s statement that when the person named was making her claim, she had been asked who was living in the house with her and she had said the appellant and phoned him for his PPS number. He observed that this may or may not have been the case but in the circumstances that it was a somewhat plausible explanation. He examined the claim form at issue and noted that it had been completed by the local social welfare Branch Office Manager, and then signed by the person named. He observed that she may or may not have realized what she was signing as her signature was not on the same page as that on which the appellant had been listed as her partner. The Appeals Officer noted that there was no other evidence of co-habitation, nor was co-habitation investigated as set out in Operational Guidelines issued by the Department of Social Protection to its staff (www.welfare.ie/en/Pages/Cohabitation.aspx). In the absence of such an investigation, he concluded that the evidence of co-habitation was very limited and open to question. In the circumstances, he considered that he had no option but to conclude that co-habitation had not been proved.

Decision of the Appeals Officer: The appeal is allowed

2012/22 Survivor’s (Contributory) Pension & Co-habitation

Decision under appeal: revised entitlement with overpayment assessed – reason(s) stated:- My decision is based on the report received from the local Social Welfare Inspector, in which he stated that [person named], was cohabiting with you for the past 20 years, and prior to your application for a Widow’s Pension. Accordingly, I have decided that you had no entitlement to Widow’s Contributory and I am terminating your payment immediately from your date of award.

This decision has been made in accordance with Section 302 (a) of the Social Welfare (Consolidation) Act, 2005, on the grounds that you wilfully concealed a material fact from the Department. As a result of this decision, you have been assessed with an overpayment. In the circumstances of this case, it is the intention of the Department to recover the overpayment in full. Our Debt Management Section will be in contact with you shortly regarding repayment of this overpayment.

Overpayment assessed: €73,300.

Background: The appellant applied for a Widow’s (Non-Contributory) Pension in 2001, following the death of her husband. The case was investigated by a Social Welfare Inspector and, shortly afterwards, the appellant withdrew her claim and signed a statement to this effect as recorded by the Inspector at the time. No formal reason was given for the withdrawal. The appellant was issued with a letter which advised her that no further action would be taken as a result of her wish not to continue with the claim. Later in that same month, however, a Deciding Officer concluded that she had an entitlement to a Widow’s (Contributory) Pension based on her late husband’s PRSI contributions and a letter was issued to the appellant advising as to the date of award .

The appellant, at the time of her initial application, was in receipt of Unemployment Assistance from a [specified] Social Welfare Local Office. In 2009, the person named in the overpayment decision applied for Jobseeker’s Allowance at that office and advised that the appellant was his partner and that she was in receipt of a Widow’s Pension. He stated that he had been cohabiting with her for the previous 20 years. The Department of Social Protection commenced an investigation into the appellant’s circumstances. Ultimately, it was decided that she was not entitled to the Widow’s Contributory Pension with effect from a date in 2000. As a consequence of this decision, an overpayment of €73,300 was assessed.

The revised decision was made under Section 302 (a) of the Social Welfare (Consolidation) Act, 2005, which refers to wilful concealment of a material fact – taken to mean cohabitation with the person named for some 20 years without advising the Department.

At oral hearing: the appellant was accompanied by a constituency worker from the office of her local T.D. The Deciding Officer attended at the request of the Appeals Officer. She read the decision and outlined details of the case history, referring to the Social Welfare Inspector’s report and letters of natural justice which had been issued to the appellant inviting her to comment before a decision was made. On the issue of the overpayment, she advised that the appellant had been awarded a State (Non-Contributory) Pension with effect from her 66th birthday and that this had the effect of reducing the overpayment amount to €50,500. She confirmed that the person named had been deemed to be an adult dependent on the appellant’s pension.

The appellant outlined the background to her relationship with the person named. She accepted that they had been living together in the period at issue. She advised that when she was interviewed by the Social Welfare Inspector in 2001, in connection with her Widow’s (Non- Contributory) Pension claim, she told the Inspector that she was co-habiting and that this was the reason for her withdrawing the claim subsequently. She said that at the time of her application she was in receipt of Unemployment Assistance and when she got the pension book from the Department, she stopped that claim. She went on to say that she had accepted the payment in good faith on the basis that she had withdrawn her non-contributory claim and had not applied for a contributory pension.

On behalf of the appellant, her advocate asked if an application for a contributory pension had ever been made and if so, was there an application form. She stated that the appellant was distraught at the prospect of having to repay such a large overpayment, and went on to say that the appellant genuinely did not understand that she not was entitled to Widow’s (Contributory) Pension. The appellant stated that she did not deliberately set out to defraud the State.

Following a general discussion about the application, the Deciding Officer accepted that there had been no claim for a Widow’s (Contributory) Pension but she made the point that it was unclear as to why the Widow’s (Non-Contributory) Pension claim had been withdrawn. She said that, in any event, when the appellant got the award letter for the contributory pension she would have received a leaflet about the conditions for receipt of the payment. She accepted that no review had taken place after the pension was awarded and acknowledged that the only contact the Department had with the appellant was when she changed her address.

Comment/Conclusion: In reviewing the documentary evidence, the Appeals Officer noted that on her Widow’s Pension application form, the appellant had declared her Unemployment Assistance payment and had indicated that she had been separated from her husband for some years prior to his death. He noted also that while an exact reason was not given by the Social Welfare Inspector at the time in relation to withdrawal of the claim, there was a notation on the file which stated the name and age of the person named as cohabiting with the appellant.

The Appeals Officer noted that the appellant had claimed a Widow’s (Non-Contributory) Pension and, following an interview with the Social Welfare Inspector, she withdrew that claim on the basis of cohabitation with the person named. While this was not specifically mentioned in the notice of withdrawal which had been written by the Inspector and signed by the appellant, he was satisfied nonetheless from her testimony at the oral hearing and the notation on the file as written by the Inspector that this is the case. He noted also that it was clear that the appellant had never applied for a Widow’s (Contributory) Pension and that there is no option to do so on the Widow’s (Non-Contributory) Pension claim form.

While he accepted that, in the circumstances, the appellant had no entitlement to a Widow’s (Contributory) Pension based on cohabitation with the person named, he considered that the decision to revise the original decision by using Section 302 (a) of the Social Welfare Consolidation Act, 2005 – in effect wilful concealment of a material fact – was unsafe given that she had never applied for the payment in the first place and that it would not stand up under scrutiny. He made a decision with reference to Section 302 (c) of the Act, determining that the decision to disallow the Widow’s Contributory Pension should take effect from a different [specified] date, which was the date of the appellant’s 66th birthday as after that date she had been awarded a State (Non- contributory Pension).

Decision of the Appeals Officer: The appeal is allowed.

Note on reason(s) for decision: Having considered all of the evidence on file and that adduced at the oral hearing I am satisfied that no wilful concealment of the facts has occurred in this case. In the circumstances I am allowing the appeal under Section 302 (c) of the Social Welfare Consolidation Act, 2005 and that the decision to disallow the payment of her Widow’s Contributory Pension should take effect from [specified date] which is the date of her 66th birthday as after this date she has now been awarded a State Non-Contributory Pension. The appeal therefore succeeds.

2015:

2015/06 One Parent Family Payment

Question at issue: Cohabitation in relation to a claim in payment

Background: The appellant had been in receipt of One Parent Family Payment since 2010 and in 2014, her claim was reviewed. A Social Welfare Inspector’s report noted that a car which was registered to a (named) person had been observed outside her home, along with a pair of men’s work boots. She interviewed the appellant, who denied that the person concerned lived there. She acknowledged that she had been on holiday with her children and partner (the person named) but said that he did not live with her. Details of the appellant’s means were reviewed also. The Inspector confirmed subsequently that the appellant’s partner owned another house which had been let. She contacted him and he confirmed that he owned the house and said that he lived there occasionally, while also living with his elderly parents. Images taken from the social media website, Facebook, showing the appellant and her children with the person named, on a date in 2012, were included in the Inspector’s report. The Deciding Officer wrote to the appellant, informing her of the Inspector’s report and inviting her comments prior to making a decision, in line with the requirements of natural justice. In her reply, the appellant stated that when she attended an interview with the Inspector, she panicked on learning that her claim was being investigated and gave incorrect information regarding the duration of her relationship. She said that her partner stayed at her house on occasion but that they had only recently come to view their relationship as more permanent. She stated that he had not contributed in any way to her mortgage or the upkeep of her home, and that she had to rely on an insurance protection policy to help pay her mortgage when she lost her job. She stated that her G.P. could confirm that she and her children attended as a family unit. Ultimately, the claim was terminated on grounds that she was cohabiting and therefore disqualified for receipt of One Parent Family Payment.

In a letter of appeal, the appellant stated that she lives at a specified address, while her partner owns and lives in his own home at another address. She said that she was finding it very difficult to cope since her payments ceased. In support of her appeal she submitted: copies of her partner’s P60 forms, his insurance, motor tax, and NCT details, bank statements and documents from Irish Water, the Revenue Commissioners and the local sports club – all indicating his stated address. In addition, she submitted bank statements, phone and electricity bills, as well as other correspondence in her own name, at her home address.

Oral hearing: The appellant was accompanied by a family member. The Inspector attended at the Appeals Officer’s request, and outlined the details of her report. She stated that while her investigation confirmed that his car was registered at his stated address, she was of the opinion that the appellant’s partner did not reside there and that this had been confirmed by the tenant who was currently renting the property. She said that the appellant had misinformed her as to the duration of the relationship and she noted that when she called the person named on the phone, he told her that he was at home, in the appellant’s house.

The appellant stated that she and her partner did not live together as a couple, and never had. She acknowledged that she may have been untruthful regarding the duration of their relationship, saying that they had been dating since 2012, but that it was only in recent months that they realised it was serious and only then that she introduced him to her children as her partner. She added that he had stayed overnight on occasions when her children were away and, referring to the nature of his work, said that he was away from home quite a lot. She said that he does not provide any care/maintenance for her children and that her siblings do so when required. She reiterated that the mortgage on her home and all utility and household bills are met solely by her. She added that while they were on holiday, he had parked his car at her house for security reasons.

The Inspector stated that, based on her investigation, she considered that it had been established that the appellant was cohabiting with the person named although she acknowledged that she had seen his car only once parked at the appellant’s home.

Conclusions: The Appeals Officer noted that when a person applies for a social welfare payment, the burden of proof lies with them to show that they meet the conditions of entitlement. However, once a claim is in payment, if consideration is to be given to withdrawing the payment, the burden of proof shifts and rests with the Department to establish that a change/withdrawal is appropriate.

He noted the provisions of the governing legislation, as follows: Section 175 of the Social Welfare (Consolidation) Act, 2005 prescribes that a ‘qualified parent shall not, if and so long as that parent and any person are cohabiting as husband wife, be entitled to and shall be disqualified for receiving payment of one-parent family payment. Section 15 of the Social Welfare and Pensions Act, 2010 inserted the following definition into Section 2 (1) of the Act of 2005 – ’cohabitant’ means a cohabitant within the meaning of section 172(1) of the Civil Partnership and Certain Rights and Obligations of Cohabitants Act, 2010.

Section 172 of the Civil Partnership and Certain Rights and Obligations of Cohabitants Act, 2010 prescribes –‘for the purposes of this Part, a cohabitant is one of 2 adults (whether of the same or the opposite sex) who live together as a couple in an intimate and committed relationship and who are not related to each other within the prohibited degrees of relationship or married to each other or civil partners of each other’. It goes on to providethat all the circumstances of the relationship must be considered and, in particular, the following:

(a) the duration of the relationship;

(b) the basis on which the couple live together;

(c) the degree of financial dependence of either adult on the other and any agreements in respect of their finances;

(d) the degree and nature of any financial arrangements between the adults including any joint purchase of an estate or interest in land or joint acquisition of personal property;

(e) whether there are one or more dependent children;

(f) whether one of the adults cares for and supports the children of the other; and

(g) the degree to which the adults present themselves to others as a couple.

The Appeals Officer noted that the evidence submitted in support of the decision to terminate the appellant’s claim on grounds of cohabitation included reference to her partner’s car and a pair of men’s boots having been observed outside her home, her partner’s house being rented out to a long-term tenant, his other stated residence at his parent’s home not having been confirmed, and the appellant having misinformed the Inspector as to the duration of their relationship.

The Appeals Officer noted that while the appellant and her partner may present themselves as a couple within their community, there were no obvious financial links with each other, no children from the relationship, and the care and support of her children was provided by the appellant and her family. He considered that whilst an issue of credibility may arise in the case, he was not satisfied that the Department had proven cohabitation and, in the circumstances, concluded that it would be unreasonable and unfair to uphold the decision.

Outcome: Appeal allowed.

2015/22 & 2015/23 Unspecified Payment in Respect of Two Appellants

Question at issue: Cohabitation

Background: The appellants were each in receipt of named payments. In the context of a review of entitlement, and an investigation by a Social Welfare Inspector, a question arose as to cohabitation. The Inspector interviewed each of the appellants and submitted reports and accompanying documents for determination. The Deciding Officer made reference to the interviews conducted by the Social Welfare Inspector and concluded that each of the appellants had concealed a material fact, that is, that they were cohabiting with one another. Ultimately, it was concluded that both persons were disqualified for receipt of the named payments as they were cohabiting. A revised decision was made in each case, with reference to the provisions of Section 302 (a) of the Social Welfare (Consolidation) Act, 2005, and overpayments were assessed. An appeal was made by both parties. In response to a request made by solicitors acting for each of the appellants, and with the approval of the Chief Appeals Officer, the appeals were heard together – with a separate report and decision completed in each case.

Oral hearing: The appellants attended, and each was represented separately by a solicitor. The Social Welfare Inspector attended at the request of the Appeals Officer. The decision at issue in each case was outlined, as was the manner in which the Appeals Officer intended to proceed.

It was acknowledged that the second appellant resided at the address of the first appellant for some years. It was contended, however, that the parties had never cohabited within the meaning of the Social Welfare Acts and, in particular, that they had not been engaged in an intimate/sexual relationship at any time. It was submitted that they had been nothing but platonic friends, had separate bedrooms, that the first appellant had her own independent means, that she was not engaged to, nor did she have any intention of marrying the other person.

In support of the appeal, reference was made to a Court Judgment, dated 5 May 2015, In the matter of Section 194 of the Civil Partnership and Certain Rights and Obligations Cohabitants Act 2010 [2015] IEHC 309, where Baker J found [paras. 21, 77, 78, 79] that inorder to be a cohabitant for purposes of the 2010 Act, a relationship must be more than oneof mere friendship and must be or have been at some point sexually intimate.

Medical evidence was submitted outlining medical issues which prevented a sexually intimate relationship. It was also submitted on behalf of both appellants that in the report of his investigation of the two claims, the Social Welfare Inspector had stated that the appellants were co-resident.

Consideration: The Appeals Officer made reference to the provisions of the governing social welfare legislation. In particular reference was made to the definition of ‘Cohabitant’ which is defined in section 2(1) of the Social Welfare (Consolidation) Act, 2005, to mean a cohabitant within the meaning of section 172(1) of the Civil Partnership and Certain Rights and Obligations of Cohabitants Act, 2010, which provides:

– …a cohabitant is one of 2 adults (whether of the same or opposite sex) who live

together in an intimate and committed relationship and who are not related to each

other within the prohibited degrees of relationship or married to each other or civil

partners of each other.

The Appeals Officer observed that, prior to 2010, the relevant section of the Act provided for disqualification where two people were cohabiting ‘as husband and wife’. In the cases at issue, the Appeals Officer noted that if cohabitation in an intimate and committed relationship was not established, it could not be contended that the appellants concealed a material fact and, accordingly, that each would retain an entitlement to the named payments and no overpayment would arise. In this regard, he considered that the Judgment of Baker J, IEHC 309, was critical in assessing the evidence in the cases at issue. He made reference to paragraphs 21, 77, 78, 79, 86 and 95 of the Judgment as being of particular relevance, one of which states:

Para 86 – “The Act offers no assistance as to what is meant by an intimate

relationship, but having regard to s. 172(3) it is clear that the relationship must have

been at some point in time a sexual relationship for intimacy to be found. The

intimacy that is intended is a sexual intimacy and not merely the intimacy of a close

friendship”.

The Appeals Officer noted from the evidence presented by the Department in the context of its review, which pre-dated the Court Judgment cited, that many of the interconnected elements to which Baker J had made reference were considered to be in place in this case. In Paragraph 95, for example, it is stated that:

The basis of a relationship involves a number of interconnected elements such as the

degree of shared activities that persons enjoy, such as shared meals, especially

evening meals and breakfast, shared activities, shared division of household chores

and shared holidays…”

However, he had regard also to the medical evidence which confirmed that throughout the period at issue, the capacity of having an intimate relationship did not exist. On the basis of this evidence, and having regard to the unequivocal findings of Baker J [2015] IEHC 309, that a relationship must have been, at some point in time, a sexual relationship for intimacy to be found, he concluded that it had not been established that the appellants were cohabiting within the meaning of the governing legislation for the period since 2010 or, in the period prior to 2010, ‘as husband and wife’ within the meaning of the legislation which applied at the time. Accordingly, each of the appellants was entitled to the named payment during the period at issue and no overpayment applied.

Outcome: Appeal allowed.

2016:

2016/08 One Parent Family Payment

Question at issue: Co-habitation

Background: The appellant’s baby was born in 2015 when she and her partner were living together. Subsequently, she made a claim for One-Parent Family Payment, stating that they had separated and that she was parenting alone. The claim was rejected on grounds that she and her partner were living together as cohabitants.

Oral hearing: The appellant was unaccompanied and the Social Welfare Inspector attended by request. The Appeals Officer referred to the Deciding Officer’s statement that he had relied on the Inspector’s report in determining that the qualifying criteria were not met and he asked for an outline of the details.

The Social Welfare Inspector reported that he had made an un-notified call to the appellant’s home and interviewed her in connection with her claim. He stated that he had also interviewed her some eight months previously in connection with a Jobseeker’s Allowance claim. That payment had been awarded at a reduced rate, based on an assessment of means derived from her partner’s income from employment. The Inspector stated that, at the time, the appellant had sought a review of the assessment on the basis that her partner had to pay maintenance in respect of a child from an earlier relationship and that this should have been taken into account in determining means. He advised, however, that no adjustment had been made to the assessment and he noted that the appellant had made a claim for One-Parent Family Payment some months later. In his report to the Deciding Officer, he opined that the appellant and her partner had decided to separate after she received an unfavourable decision in connection with her Jobseeker’s Allowance claim. He noted that the appellant had stated that she was receiving maintenance of €100.00 per week.

In response, the appellant stated that her former partner had been paying maintenance in respect of two children from a former relationship, and not one as the Inspector had stated. She contended that there was no concrete proof of cohabitation and asserted that there had been a lot of speculation. She went on to say that she considered this to have been a defamation of her character.

The appellant submitted that she and her partner had personal issues following the birth of their child in 2015. She stated that he had not been a good parent and had not helped out at home. She said that she had relied on the support of her parents, including the provision of financial assistance. She insisted that the separation had not been just for financial reasons and asserted that she was only guilty of not having had a perfect relationship.

Consideration: The Appeals Officer sought to determine whether the appellant could be held to meet the relevant qualifying condition for receipt of One-Parent Family Payment, having been disqualified on grounds of cohabitation. He noted the provisions of the governing legislation relating to cohabitation, outlined in Section 2(1) of the Social Welfare Consolidation Act 2005:

‘cohabitant’ means a cohabitant within the meaning of section 172(1) of the Civil

Partnership and Certain Rights and Obligations of Cohabitants Act 2010;

and the disqualification at Section 175 in relation One-Parent Family Payment:

A person referred to in section 173(1) shall not, if and so long as that person is a

cohabitant, be entitled to and shall be disqualified for receiving payment of One-

Parent Family Payment.

The Appeals Officer made reference also to Guidelines on Cohabitation which the Department of Social Protection has issued for the information of Deciding Officers. He noted that this outlines the criteria by which cohabitation might be assessed and indicates that no single criterion can necessarily support a decision. He examined the evidence in the case by reference to the criteria set out in the Guidelines, including the following: the duration of the relationship, the basis on which the couple lives together, and the degree of financial inter-dependence. He noted that the appellant was emphatic in her assertion that she was not cohabiting with effect from the date specified. He noted also that the evidence submitted by the Department was circumstantial, relating to the appellant and her partner having separated after an unfavourable decision in relation to Jobseeker’s Allowance, while the appellant had outlined a number of reasons for their separation. He concluded that the evidence did not establish a basis for determining that the appellant and the person named were a couple living in a ‘committed and intimate’ relationship at the time of her claim for One-Parent Family Payment.

Outcome: Appeal allowed.

2016/318/36 One Parent Family Payment

Question at issue: Co-habitation

Grounds for review: The appellant denied being in a relationship with the nominated person while receiving One-Parent Family Payment and she alleged errors of fact, as follows:

• The information provided by the Social Welfare Inspector was incorrect,

• The Appeals Officer did not conduct the appeal hearing in a fair manner.

Background: The appellant had been awarded One-Parent Family Payment in 2002 when she had one qualified child. In the context of a review, it emerged that she had another child for whom she had not sought payment. An investigation indicated that she was registered as the joint owner of a property since 2001. Ultimately, it was held that she had failed to show that her means did not exceed the statutory qualifying limit and that she had been in a cohabiting relationship with a nominated person who was the joint owner of the property at issue. Accordingly, payment was terminated. A revised decision was applied with effect from the date of claim and an overpayment of some €135,000 was assessed.

The Appeal: The Appeals Officer indicated that she considered the evidence advanced by the Department to be more convincing and concluded that the appellant had not been eligible for receipt of One-Parent Family Payment from the date of claim on grounds that she had failed to show that her weekly means were below the appropriate limit as she had failed to declare her joint ownership of a property with a nominated person. In addition, the Appeals Officer held that the appellant had failed to show that she was not cohabiting with that person. Accordingly, the appeal was disallowed.

Review: I examined the means and cohabitation aspects of the decision separately.

Means: I noted the appellant’s assertion that she had not been asked to show that her means were below the specified limit and could see no evidence to suggest that such a request had been made but not complied with. It was not clear to me what the import of her interest in the property was in relation to her claim for One-Parent Family Payment and this was not detailed at all by the decision-makers. There was no exploration as to what legal and practical control the appellant could exercise such that she could sell or derive a profit from the property. It is clear that if she lived at the property and was cohabiting with the nominated person, as upheld by the Appeals Officer, then the question as to means did not arise as she would have been disqualified for One-Parent Family Payment in such circumstances.

Cohabitation: In a situation where an existing payment is being reviewed, the onus is on the Department to make a satisfactory case for a disallowance. In this particular case, given the lengthy period at issue and the significant financial consequences of a revised decision for the appellant, an evidence-based case was required, indicating that it was highly probable that the appellant was residing with the nominated person during the entire period in question in ‘an intimate and committed relationship’, as provided for in the governing legislation. In putting together such a case, the Department must, at a minimum, have followed its own Guidelines on Investigating Cohabitation. Those Guidelines list the criteria by which cohabitation may be assessed and I examined the evidence in this case with reference to each of those criteria, as follows:

Duration of the relationship: The appellant was clear in her contention that she had not cohabited with the nominated person in the period at issue. The only evidence to the contrary was circumstantial.

Basis on which the couple live together: The appellant jointly owned a property since 2001 and her car, registered at her parents’ address, had been observed outside that property on five occasions in 2014. The Appeals Officer noted that there was no other evidence and that the appellant had stated that she allowed the nominated person to take her car as it had a baby seat.

Degree of financial interdependence: The nominated person paid some maintenance in respect of the children. Apart from this, there was no evidence pointing to any degree of financial interdependence.

Degree and nature of any financial arrangements between the adults: The appellant and the nominated person were joint owners of a house. There was no evidence of any other financial arrangements between them.

Dependent children: There were two dependent children.

Care and support for children of the other adult: This did not arise.

Degree to which the adults present themselves as a couple: There was no evidence.

In this case, the appellant had been in receipt of a payment for many years and this was withdrawn following a review. In the circumstances, the burden of proof was clearly on the Department to establish that cohabitation existed and not on the appellant to prove the contrary. I note that the Appeals Officer considered that the evidence advanced by the Department was more credible and convincing than that put forward by the appellant and that the Officer concluded the appellant had failed to show that she was not cohabiting with the nominated person. This was clearly an error of law. In misdirecting themselves on this point, I could only conclude that the Appeals Officer had placed an unreasonable burden of proof on the appellant such as to render the appeal hearing unfair. The Department, in its guidelines on cohabitation, accepts that ‘where an entitlement may be disallowed, limited or withdrawn, the onus is on the Department to establish that cohabitation exists’. I am of the view that the Department did not meet the requirements set out in its own guidelines to establish that cohabitation existed and that the Appeals Officer did not give sufficient weight to this fact and to the other evidence provided by the appellant, as outlined above, in support of her position.

Revised decisions and overpayments: I addressed the legislative provisions relating to revised decisions outlined in Chapter 1 of Part 10 of the Social Welfare Consolidation Act 2005. The ‘effect of revised decisions by Deciding Officers’ is clearly laid out in Section 302 and prescribes in mandatory terms when and in what circumstances a revised decision is to take effect. There are potentially significant consequences flowing from these provisions, such as in the appellant’s case where an overpayment of some €135,000 had been raised. The Department’s Guidelines on Revised Decisions and Their Date of Effect state that a Decision should include reference to:

• The relevant provision in the legislation under which payment is being

allowed, disallowed, or reduced;

• The sub-section of Section 302 of the Social Welfare Consolidation Act 2005

being applied in determining the effective date of the revised decision.

The Department’s Guidelines on Overpayment Recovery state that:

An overpayment is created where a Deciding Officer or a Designated Person makes a

revised decision under Section 302 or Section 325 of the Social Welfare Consolidation

Act 2005 and the effect of the decision is to reduce a person’s entitlement

retrospectively.

I could find no evidence to indicate that the revised decision was made with reference to any of the provisions in Section 302, nor could I see where the appellant had been advised of the amount of the overpayment. This combination of failures is an error in law and in my view a serious denial of the appellant’s right to natural justice and fair procedures. The Appeals Officer did not direct her attention to the provisions and the obligations arising from this section in their consideration of the appeal. In light of all of the above considerations I concluded that the Appeals Officer had erred in law and, in the circumstances, revised the decision.

Outcome: Decision revised and appeal allowed

2017:

2017/09 One-Parent Family

Question at issue: Eligibility (Co-habitation & Means)

Background: The Department disallowed the appellant’s claim for One Parent Family

Payment (OFP) payment on the grounds that the appellant had failed to show that she was not

cohabiting or that her means were below the maximum rate of €217.80 weekly.

Oral Hearing: The appellant attended the hearing with a representative. The Social Welfare

Inspector (SWI) was also in attendance, at the request of the Appeals Officer. The SWI read

out her report which concluded that the appellant did not reside at her parents’ address as

she had claimed. This contention followed from a visit to her parents’ address by the SWI

in relation to the appellant’s sister’s claim for Jobseeker’s Allowance. The appellant was

not listed as residing at the address on the appellant’s sister’s claim at that time. The SWI

submitted that the appellant had moved to a large rented house and must have been in a

position to pay the costs of living there and on that basis must have been receiving financial

assistance from her son’s father in this regard. The SWI submitted that the appellant was

asked to provide details of her son’s father’s income as she was benefitting from this income

and that these details had not been provided.

The appellant submitted that she was resident at her parent’s address having moved out of

the rented accommodation following the breakdown of the relationship with her son’s father.

She submitted that she had no means and was being financially assisted by her parents. She

was receiving weekly maintenance of €30 from her son’s father who she stated now lived with

his parents. The appellant’s representative at the hearing confirmed that to his knowledge the

appellant’s son’s father resided at his parents’ address. The appellant submitted that she had

been unable to meet her loan repayment to the Credit Union and that at times she had needed

to get food parcels from a local food bank. This was confirmed by her representative.

Consideration: The Appeals Officer considered the evidence available. The Department was

of the view that the appellant did not reside in her parents’ address and was being supported

by the father of her son. The evidence available did not however support this conclusion. From

the evidence available the Appeals Officer concluded that the appellant resides at her parents’

address and is not living in a cohabiting relationship and that her means are well below

€217.80 weekly.

Outcome: Appeal allowed

2020:

2020/06 One-Parent Family Payment

Question at issue: Eligibility (cohabitation)

Background: The appellant’s application for One-Parent Family Payment was refused by the

Department on the basis that she had failed to show that she was not cohabiting with another

person. In her application the appellant included the liable relative of her child as part of her

household profile. She attached a personal statement in which she said their relationship had

ended but they were still living at the same address for financial reasons. She said they shared

the bills and rent, and she stated he paid a specified amount of maintenance.

The Social Welfare Inspector reported that the appellant and the father of her son had been

living at the address since August 2016. The report stated that he was in receipt of Family

Income Supplement (now known as Working Family Payment) from November 2016 to November

2019 when the appellant commenced employment. It said based on the household expenditure

form completed by the appellant they had shared the cost of all household bills 50/50 except the

grocery bill. It said they both cooked their own meals. It said they each had minded their son

when the other was working and there were childcare arrangements if both worked at the same

time.

In appealing the decision, the appellant stated that she considered herself a lone parent as while

she had physically lived with her ex-partner it was for financial reasons and particularly the issue

around availability and affordability of housing. She outlined that it was the best situation for

their son’s health and welfare. She stated her ex-partner had lived in a different room and

shopped and cooked for himself.

Consideration: In order to qualify for One-Parent Family Payment, a person must be a ‘qualified

parent’ and must not be a cohabitant.

The Appeals Officer noted that when a person makes a claim for a social welfare payment, the

onus is on the person to show that they meet the conditions of the scheme. The Appeals Officer

concluded that the evidence pointed to a cohabiting relationship and was not satisfied that the

appellant met the conditions of the scheme.

Outcome: Appeal disallowed

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Thematic Note G0140: Carer’s Benefit

Theme: Carer’s Benefit

Period of Analysis: SWAO Annual Reports 2009-2022

Keywords: Carer’s Benefit; Maternity Benefit; Concurrent Payments; Duration of Benefit; Eligibility; Overpayment; Full-time Care; Social Welfare Consolidation Act 2005

Casebase No. Case G0140

Summary of the relevant law:

What is the relevant legislation?

The Social Welfare Consolidation Act 2005 (as amended) (the “Act”) caters for various types of benefits, to include but not limited to, (i) illness benefit, (ii) disability allowance , (iii) child benefit, (iv) maternity benefit, (v) jobseeker’s benefit/allowance, (vi) state pension and early retirement, (vii) widow’s, widower’s or surviving civil partner’s pension and (vii) carer’s allowance/benefit.  Chapter 14 of the Act deals with carer’s benefit which this note will focus on.  

What is carer’s benefit?

This benefit is paid to people who leave work or reduce their hours to care for another person.

Who does the law consider to be a ‘carer’ for the purpose of receiving carer’s benefit?

A “carer” is a person aged 16 or over who resides with or, subject to certain conditions does not reside with, and provides full-time care and attention to a “relevant person”.  A “relevant person” is a person who has such a disability that he/she requires full-time care and attention.  A person is considered to require “full-time care and attention” if that person has such a disability that he/she requires from another person either (a) continuous supervision and frequent help throughout the day in relation to normal bodily functions, or (b) continuous supervision to avoid danger to themselves.

When is a carer entitled to carer’s benefit?

In addition to the above, a carer is entitled to carer’s benefit if he/she meets three criteria:

  1. The carer has worked in paid full-time employment for a minimum of 16 hours per week for any eight weeks, whether consecutive or not, in the 26 week period immediately before commencing carer’s leave or 32 hours a fortnight; 
  2. The carer is not employed, self-employed, or attending any course of education or training for more than 18.5 hours a week; and
  3. The carer satisfies certain PRSI contribution conditions. For a first claim the carer must have 156 PRSI contributions paid since starting work and either (i) 39 contributions paid in the second last complete tax year before the beginning of the benefit year (for example, for claims made in 2024, the relevant tax year is 2022); (ii) 39 contributions paid in the 12 months immediately before the start of the carer’s benefit claim; or (iii) 26 contributions paid in the second and third last complete tax year before the beginning of the benefit year (for example, for claims made in 2024, the relevant tax years are 2021 and 2022).

The maximum period in which a carer is entitled to carer’s benefit is 104 weeks, whether consecutive or not, in respect of full-time care and attention to the same relevant person.

What type of decisions relating to carer’s benefit have been challenged in recent years?

The Annual Reports of the Social Welfare Appeals Office (the “SWAO”) during the period of 2009 to 2022 highlight ten appeals in respect of carer’s benefit:

  • one appeal related to concurrent benefit payments;
  • one appeal related to the duration of the payment of carer’s benefit;
  • two appeals related to employment in the 26 week period before commencing carer’s leave; and
  • the remaining appeals related to whether the relevant person met the care required criteria.

These are a sample of the types of appeals the SWAO receives, which are hereinafter referred to as the “Case Studies”.

Key grounds of appeals by appellants:

Receipt of 2 payments and overpayment of benefit

In 2015 an appeal came before the SWAO in circumstances where a Deciding Officer held that the appellant was not entitled to carer’s benefit with effect from the date on which maternity benefit had been paid.  There was therefore an overpayment.  The appeal failed and it was found that the appellant was not entitled to receive carer’s benefit for the period that she had been paid maternity benefit.

The solicitors for the appellant sought a review of the Appeals Officer’s decision and two arguments were put forward (i) maternity benefit was not included in the Department of Social Protection’s (the “Department’s”) list of matters that would affect her entitlement to carer’s benefit and (ii) in her application for maternity benefit the appellant provided details of the carer’s benefit payment and therefore discharged any duty she had to notify the Department of her carer’s benefit payment.  

The Chief Appeals Officer was satisfied that the appellant provided the Department with full details of her carer’s benefit payment when she applied for the maternity benefit.  The Chief Appeals Officer concluded that in doing so, the appellant had fully discharged her duty to notify the Department of a change in circumstances that might affect her entitlement to carer’s benefit and it was noted that such information had been submitted to the Department in plenty of time to allow for the concurrent payment of carer’s benefit and maternity benefit to be avoided.  The Chief Appeals Officer revised the decision of the Appeals Officer and no overpayment was due.

Duration of payment of carer’s benefit

In Case Study 2017/33, the appellant’s application for carer’s benefit was rejected on the basis that she had previously received carer’s benefit for a period of 64 weeks and 40 weeks respectively (104 weeks in total) and had therefore already claimed her full entitlement and not entitled to claim for any further periods.  The appellant argued that she had worked for three years since she last applied for carer’s benefit and should therefore be allowed to re-qualify.  The appeal did not succeed on the basis that she had been in receipt of carer’s benefit for 104 weeks, whether consecutive or not, in respect of full-time care and attention to the same relevant person.

Paid Full-Time Employment

In Case Study 2017/32, the appellant had reduced her hours to 15 hours per week and was therefore unsuccessful in her appeal as she did not satisfy the requirement to work a minimum of 16 hours per week for any eight weeks of the 26 week period before the start of the carer’s leave.

In Case Study 2020/28, the appellant could not provide sufficient detail in order to satisfy the required minimum number of hours for any eight weeks of the 26 week period before the start of the carer’s leave.

Eligibility – Relevant Person Requiring Full-Time Care and Attention

Of the seven Case Studies dealing with whether or not a person classified as a ‘relevant person’ and indeed required full-time care and attention, all but one of the appeals were allowed.  In each case, the Appeals Officer considered both the appellant’s report on the level of care required, and the medical evidence put before the SWAO evidencing the level of care required.  In all cases, whether the appeal was allowed or not boiled down to whether the evidence satisfied the legislative criteria (i.e. whether: (a) the person has such a disability that he/she requires from another person (i) continual supervision and frequent assistance throughout the day in connection with normal bodily functions, or (ii) continual supervision in order to avoid danger to himself or herself; and (b) the nature and extent of his/her disability has been certified in the prescribed manner by a medical practitioner.)

Observations on appeal outcomes:

Each Case Study demonstrates the SWAO’s adherence to the criteria set out in the Act in respect of carer’s benefit.  The SWAO will look at the factual information (i.e. hours worked in the 26 weeks prior to the start of carer’s leave, PRSI contributions etc) and medical reports (where applicable).

As discussed above in relation to concurrent payment of maternity benefit and carer’s benefit, there may be circumstances where other social welfare payments may affect the entitlement to carer’s benefit.  It is therefore important to carefully review the carer’s benefit application for any such restrictions or obligations to notify the Department of circumstances that might affect entitlement to carer’s benefit payment. 

The Case Studies demonstrate that the SWAO’s approach to matters concerning carer’s benefit are consistent with the requirements of the Act taking into account the specific circumstances of each appeal. 

Relevant Case Studies of the SWAO Annual Reports 2009-2022

A.2009 
 N/A 
 2010 
 N/A 
 2011 
 N/A 
 2012 
 N/A 
 2013 
 N/A 
 2014 
 N/A 
 2015 
1.2015/15 Carer’s Benefit & Maternity BenefitQuestion at issue: Concurrent Payments
 2016 
 N/A 
 2017 
1.2017/32 Carer’s BenefitQuestion at issue: Employment in the 26 weeks prior to commencement of benefit
2.2017/33 Carer’s BenefitQuestion at issue: Duration of Payment
 2018 
1.2018/30 Carer’s BenefitQuestion at issue: Eligibility (Care Required)
 2019 
1.2019/32 Carer’s BenefitQuestion at issue: Eligibility (Care Required)
 2020 
1.2020/28 Carer’s BenefitQuestion at issue: Eligibility (Employment Condition)
2.2020/29 Carer’s BenefitQuestion at issue: Eligibility (Care Required)
 2021 
 N/A 
 2022 
1.2022/32 Carer’s BenefitQuestion at issue: Eligibility
2.2022/33 Carer’s BenefitQuestion at issue: Eligibility (Care Required)
3.2022/34 Carer’s BenefitQuestion at issue: Eligibility (Care Required & Care Provided)

2015:

2015/15 Carer’s Benefit & Maternity Benefit

Question at issue: Concurrent payment of benefits

Background: The appellant had been in full-time employment prior to the birth of her first child. When her child was diagnosed as having a disability, she made a claim for Carer’s Benefit and returned to work on a part-time basis. The claim was awarded with effect from a date in 2012 for the maximum period (104 weeks) for which Carer’s Benefit may be paid. The appellant applied for and was awarded Maternity Benefit in 2013. In connection with that claim, she had provided details of her Carer’s Benefit payment. Subsequently, however, she was advised that Carer’s Benefit is not payable with other social welfare payments such as Maternity Benefit and a Deciding Officer held that she was not entitled to Carer’s Benefit with effect from the date on which Maternity Benefit had been paid. The effect of the decision was to create an overpayment of some €5,000.

Oral hearing: The appellant outlined the background to her claim for Carer’s Benefit and her decision to make the claim. She stated that, on the application form, there had been a list of circumstances outlined that may affect Carer’s Benefit and a statement indicating that there was a requirement to notify the Department in the event of such circumstances occurring. She pointed out that payment of Maternity Benefits was not included on the list. In addition, she stated that when she completed the application form for Maternity Benefit she had declared that she was in receipt of Carer’s Benefit. She said that she did not consider that she was liable for the overpayment which had been assessed.

The appellant acknowledged that she had signed a declaration on the Carer’s Benefit claim form, indicating that she would notify the Department of any change in income or circumstances. She advised that she had been aware that her combined income was quite high but that she had considered that this was something to which she had an entitlement in view of her circumstances. She advised that her second child had also been diagnosed with the same disability and that she was in receipt of Carer’s Allowance and Domiciliary Care Allowance in respect of both children.

Consideration: Having regard to the provisions of the legislation, the Appeals Officer concluded that the appellant was not entitled to receive Carer’s Benefit for the period that she had paid been Maternity Benefit. Accordingly, the appeal was held not to succeed. Following further submissions, the Appeals Officer revised his decision and determined that it should take effect from a specified date only, with the effect that the amount of the overpayment was reduced.

Request for review: Solicitors acting for the appellant sought a review of the Appeals Officer’s decision in accordance with Section 318 of the Social Welfare Consolidation Act, 2005. The Chief Appeals Officer carried out a review, advising that her role under the terms of the legislation was a revising one rather than another avenue of appeal.

Grounds for Review: In support of the request, two points were put forward: that when the Department notified the appellant of the award of Carer’s Benefit, the receipt of Maternity Benefit was not listed as one of the circumstances that would affect her entitlement, and in her application for Maternity Benefit she had provided details of the Carer’s Benefit payment. It was asserted that the Appeals Officer did not exercise his discretion properly in relation to the reduction in the overpayment assessed against the appellant.

The Chief Appeals Officer examined the background to the case and the details of the appellant’s claim. She noted that the appellant’s attention had been drawn to the circumstances and events which might affect her Carer’s Benefit and of the necessity to notify the Department if any of these occurred. She observed that only one of the twelve events related to receipt of a payment (Domiciliary Care Allowance) and that the others related to circumstances such as change in care arrangements, change of address, bank details or marital status. Maternity Benefit was not mentioned.

Having reviewed all the material that was before the Appeals Officer, the Chief Appeals Officer was satisfied that the appellant had provided full details of her Carer’s Benefit payment when she applied for Maternity Benefit. She concluded that, in doing so, she had fully discharged her obligation to notify the Department of a change of circumstances that might affect her entitlement to Carer’s Benefit – albeit that the payment of Maternity Benefit was not listed as a payment that might affect her continued entitlement to Carer’s Benefit. She noted that the information had been submitted to the Department in ample time to allow payment of Carer’s Benefit to be discontinued and to avoid the concurrent payment of Carer’s Benefit and Maternity Benefit. She concluded, therefore, that the decision of the Appeals Officer was erroneous in that appropriate consideration was not given to all the facts of the case and that discretion had not been appropriately applied by the Appeals Officer. In the circumstances, the Chief Appeals Officer determined that the revised decision should have taken effect from a current date and no overpayment raised.

Outcome: Appeal allowed.

2017:

2017/32 Carer’s Benefit

Question at issue:

Employment in the 26 weeks prior to the commencement of benefit

Background: The appellant applied for Carer’s Benefit in July 2016 in respect of her mother. Her application was refused as she did not satisfy the employment conditions for the 26 week period immediately prior to the date of her application. The evidence was that from February 2016 the appellant had reduced the number of hours she worked to 15 hours per week. In her letter of appeal the appellant referred to the Carer’s Leave Act 2001 and the condition that you must not work outside of the home for more than 15 hours per week while on carer’s leave. She also stated that if she had the information regarding having to work a minimum of 16 hours per week for any eight weeks of the 26 week period immediately prior to the date that carer’s leave would commence, she could have arranged with her boss to work 16 hours per week.

Consideration: Section 100 of the Social Welfare Consolidation Act 2005 states that it is a condition for eligibility for Carer’s Benefit that a person must work a minimum of 16 hours per week for any eight weeks in the 26 week period immediately prior to the date that carer’s leave would commence. The Appeals Officer concluded that the statutory conditions were not fulfilled in this case; the appellant had not established that she worked a minimum of 16 hours per week for at least eight weeks in the 26 week period immediately prior to her application, and regrettably the appeal could not succeed. The appellant was advised that it was open to her to apply for a means tested Carer’s Allowance instead of Carer’s Benefit, where this work condition rule did not apply.

Outcome: Appeal disallowed.

2017/33 Carer’s Benefit

Question at issue: Duration of Payment

Background: The appellant applied for Carer’s Benefit In August 2016 in respect of care provided to her son. This application was disallowed as she had previously received Carer’s Benefit for a period of 64 weeks in 2010/2011 and for 40 weeks in 2012/2013, a total of 104 weeks. The Department pointed out in the decision letter that she had already claimed her full entitlement to Carer’s Benefit in respect of her son and consequently she was not eligible to claim Carer’s Benefit for any further periods. The appellant contended that as she had worked for three years since she last applied for Carer’s Benefit, she should be allowed to re-qualify.

Consideration: The Appeals Officer referred to Section 103 of the Social Welfare Consolidation Act 2005 which states that “a carer who has been in receipt of carer’s benefit for 104 weeks, whether consecutive or not, in respect of full-time care and attention being provided to a relevant person, shall not thereafter be entitled to that benefit in respect of full-time care and attention being provided to the same relevant person”. The Appeals Officer concluded the appeal could not succeed.

Outcome: Appeal disallowed.

2018:

2018/30 Carer’s Benefit

Question at issue: Eligibility (medical-care required)

Background: The appellant applied for Carer’s Benefit in respect of the care provided to his mother who was 80 years of age and had a diagnosis of back pain. His claim was disallowed on the grounds that the care recipient was not so invalided or disabled as to require full time care and attention as laid down in Section 99 of the Social Welfare Consolidation Act 2005. The ability/disability profile indicated that the care recipient’s ability was affected in the following areas: severe in relation to lifting/carrying; moderate in relation to bending/ kneeling/squatting and climbing stairs and mild in relation to reaching, manual dexterity, sitting/rising, standing and walking. The letter of appeal outlined that the care recipient required care in all areas of daily living including getting up, showering, getting dressed and being helped to the bathroom. The care recipient had a bell beside her bed to call the appellant during the night if she needed assistance. The appellant stated that on several occasions he had found his mother on the floor where she had fallen and could not get up.

Consideration: The Appeals Officer noting the care recipient’s age, diagnosis, the medical report and the appellant’s evidence concluded that the care recipient required full-time care and attention as laid down in the governing legislation.

Outcome: Appeal allowed.

2019:

2019/32 Carer’s Benefit

Question under appeal: Eligibility (care required)

Background: The appellant applied for Carer’s Benefit in respect of care provided to her father. The application was refused on the grounds that the caree did not require continual supervision and frequent assistance throughout the day with normal bodily functions or continual supervision in order to avoid danger to himself. The caree was diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia, deafness and psycho-organic syndrome. The GP stated in the application form that the conditions were expected to last indefinitely. In the ability/disability profile, the caree was deemed to be affected to a profound degree in most categories, moderately affected in one and severely affected in three. The appellant stated that her father was confined to bed for the past four years, used incontinence pads, could not eat or drink independently, could not walk or sit, had problems sleeping and could spend nights  shouting. Her mother was elderly and could no longer take care of her husband.

Consideration: The relevant legislation in this case is Section 99(2) of the 2005 Act which provides that a person shall not be regarded as requiring full-time care and attention unless the person has such a disability that he or she requires from another person –

a. continual supervision and frequent assistance throughout the day in connection with

normal bodily functions , or

b. continual supervision in order to avoid danger to himself or herself.

From the evidence presented, the Appeals Officer was satisfied that the appellant had established that the caree required full-time care as defined in the relevant legislation.

Outcome: Appeal allowed

2020:

2020/28 Carer’s Benefit

Question at issue: Eligibility (employment condition)

Background: The appellant’s application for Carer’s Benefit was initially refused by the Department on two grounds: (i) that she was not providing full-time care and attention, and (ii) that she had not been working for the required minimum number of hours for at least eight weeks within a 26 week period prior to her application for Carer’s Benefit. Following a review by the Department it was decided that the appellant was providing full-time care and attention but the disallowance on the grounds of not meeting the required number of hours over eight weeks within a 26 week period remained unchanged.

Consideration: The Appeals Officer outlined that in accordance with Section 100 of the 2005 Act in order to be entitled to Carer’s Benefit a person must, among other things, have been working for at least 16 hours per week for not less than eight weeks within a 26 week period prior to the date of application for Carer’s Benefit.

The evidence originally provided at the time of application showed that the applicant did not meet this requirement. The appellant provided additional general information in relation to her employment but did not provide specific details in relation to the period in question.

The Appeals Officer concluded that it had not been established that the appellant had been working for the required minimum number of hours for at least eight weeks within a 26 week period prior to her application for Carer’s Benefit.

Outcome: Appeal disallowed

2020/29 Carer’s Benefit

Question at issue: Eligibility (care required)

Background: The appellant was in receipt of Carer’s Benefit from December 2018 to March 2019. She was re-awarded from March 2019 to September 2019. She subsequently applied for another extension up until March 2020. By decision dated in November 2019, the Department stated that following medical review, the appellant was not entitled to any further period of Carer’s Benefit beyond September 2019 on the grounds that the care recipient did not require full-time care and attention as laid down in the governing legislation.

Oral Hearing: At the time of appeal, the care recipient was two-years-old. The appellant explained that when the care recipient was born in October 2017 she was diagnosed with extreme prematurity and chronic lung disease. She said this is a lifelong disease and can lead to serious complications. The care recipient was treated in the maternity hospital from birth. For the first two winters of her life, the care recipient received immunotherapy to protect her against viruses. She was then discharged into community care. By the time of the oral hearing, she had been commenced on an inhaler. The care recipient had been admitted to hospital in December 2019 with suspected pneumonia.

The appellant said as the main carer, she was required to restrict all outdoor activities and avoid crowded areas in an effort to prevent further trauma and damage to the care recipient’s lungs. Even a simple head cold massively impacted the care recipient and her ability to breathe. The appellant had to limit the care recipient’s interactions with everyone, even close family. She said they could not have a childminder as this would put her at risk. She said placing the care recipient in the care of others would have put her in danger of picking up harmful viruses, damaging her lungs further and suppressing her already weakened immune system. The appellant said due to her occupation in the medical profession she recognised the early signs of any respiratory illnesses and acted immediately by performing nasal flushes and aspirations and also steamed her in the shower a few times a day. She said it was these actions that prevented the care recipient being admitted to hospital regularly. Subsequent to the oral hearing, the appellant provided a letter of support from the consultant neonatologist in the maternity hospital.

Consideration: Section 99 (2) of the 2005 Act provides that a person shall not be regarded as requiring full-time care and attention unless the person has such a disability that he or she requires from another person continual supervision and frequent assistance throughout the day in connection with normal bodily functions or continual supervision in order to avoid danger to himself or herself.

Having examined the medical evidence, and having had regard to the appellant’s grounds of appeal and information adduced at oral hearing which served to clarify the support required by the care recipient in the context of her diagnosis, the Appeals Officer concluded that the care recipient required full-time care and attention in line with the provisions of the governing legislation.

Outcome: Appeal allowed

2022:

2022/32 Carer’s Benefit

Question at Issue: Eligibility – care required

Background: The appellant was disallowed Carer’s Benefit on the ground that the care recipient, her spouse, did not require full-time care and attention for the purposes of the legislation.

The medical report stated that the care recipient had generalised anxiety disorder, depression, hypertension and morbid obesity. The report indicated that mental health/behaviour was affected to a “severe” degree and four physical abilities were affected to a severe, moderate or mild degree.

A letter from the GP reported that the care recipient had been medically unwell for years and developed severe phobic anxiety and depression several years ago. She was fully dependant on her husband for her likely long-term care. A letter from the consultant psychiatrist reported that at one point the care recipient did not leave her house for several months. The appellant reported that his wife dealt with severe anxiety and depression. She could not leave the house alone and needed constant help in the house, for example using the stairs. He had to physically get her up most days and put her in the shower.

Consideration: The Appeals Officer noted the appellant’s report of the assistance required with showering and mobility and his specific concerns for his wife’s mental health. She also noted that the GP reported that the care recipient was “fully dependant on her husband for her likely long-term care”. On balance, the Appeals Officer was satisfied that the particular combination of the care recipient’s conditions meant that she required full-time care and attention for the purposes of the legislation.

Outcome: Appeal allowed

2022/33 Carer’s Benefit

Question at Issue: Eligibility – care required

Background: The appellant was refused an extension of his Carer’s Benefit for 2022 on the ground that the care recipient did not require full-time care and attention for the purposes of the legislation.

The medical evidence comprised a medical report, two letters of support from the GP and a letter of support from the psychiatrist. The medical report indicated that the care recipient’s mental health was affected to a “severe” degree (the 2020 report indicated a “moderate” effect) and six physical abilities were affected to a “moderate – severe” degree.

The GP reported that the care recipient was in remission from Lymphoma, was in constant pain and needed help washing, walking and with housework. The psychiatrist reported that the care recipient had a longstanding history of anxiety and depression and remained very anxious despite her medications. The appellant reported that his partner needed help getting out of bed and showering and forgot things constantly, for example locking doors and putting up the fire guard.

Consideration: Section 99(2) of the 2005 Act provides that a person shall not be regarded as requiring full-time care and attention unless the person has such a disability that he or she requires from another person continual supervision and frequent assistance throughout the day in connection with normal bodily functions, or continual supervision in order to avoid danger to himself or herself.

The Appeals Officer found that the medical evidence in 2022 did not indicate an improvement in the care recipient’s needs and if anything disclosed more complex needs as a result of both her physical and mental health. She was satisfied that the care recipient continued to require full-time care and attention for the purpose of the legislation.

Outcome: Appeal allowed

2022/34 Carer’s Benefit

Question at issue: Eligibility – care required and care provided

Background: The appellant’s application for a Carer’s Benefit in respect of the provision of care and attention to their father, aged 81, was disallowed on the grounds that the care recipient did not require full-time care and attention as required by the governing legislation. When completing the medical report the caree’s GP stated that the caree was normal in terms of nine abilities of daily living but was impaired in terms of lifting/carrying, mental health/behaviour, continence, bending/kneeling/squatting, sitting/rising, climbing stairs/ladders. In the appeal submission, the appellant elaborated on the supports and care which included managing medication, making and attending medical appointments, support with finances, household duties and strenuous work, and ensuring self-care with diet and checks for diabetes. The Department was not satisfied that full-time care and attention was required.

Consideration: The Appeals Officer outlined that Section 99 of the 2005 Act provides that in order to be considered a carer for the purposes of Carer’s Benefit the person must be providing full-time care and attention to a person who requires continual supervision and frequent assistance throughout the day in connection with normal bodily functions, or continual supervision in order to avoid danger to himself or herself.

The evidence submitted indicated that the appellant did not need continual supervision and frequent assistance with normal bodily functions throughout the day or that he was danger to himself. While the GP stated that the caree attends a cardiologist, no reports or additional information was submitted to substantiate a related care requirement. The Appeals Officer concluded, that while the care recipient required a level of care and support which the appellant provided, it had not been established that the caree required full-time care and attention within the meaning of the governing legislation.

Outcome: Appeal disallowed

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Thematic Note G0141: Carer’s Allowance

Theme: Carer’s Allowance

Period of Analysis: SWAO Annual Reports 2009-2022

Keywords:  Full-Time Care; Means Test; Care Required; Oral Hearing; Evidence

Casebase No. Case G0141

Summary of the relevant law:

What is the relevant legislation?

The Social Welfare Consolidation Act 2005 (as amended) (the “Act”) caters for various types of benefits, to include but not limited to, (i) illness benefit, (ii) disability allowance, (iii) child benefit, (iv) maternity benefit, (v) jobseeker’s benefit/allowance, (vi) state pension and early retirement, (vii) widow’s, widower’s or surviving civil partner’s pension and (vii) carer’s allowance/benefit.  Chapter 8 of Part 3 (Social Assistance) of the Act deals with carer’s allowance which this note will focus on. 

Chapter 4 of Part 3 (Social Assistance Payments) of the Social Welfare (Consolidated Claims, Payments and Controls) Regulations 2007 (the “2007 Regulations”) provides further guidance for assisting carer’s allowance applications.  

The  Act deals with the entitlement to the carer’s allowance.  The 2007 Regulations is supplemental to the Act and deals with conditions to be satisfied by a carer.

What is carer’s allowance?

This is a weekly payment to people who care for another person because of age, disability or illness (including mental illness).  The carer’s income is means tested and must be below a certain threshold in order to qualify for the payment.

Who does the law consider to be a ‘carer’ for the purpose of receiving carer’s allowance?

A “carer” is a person who resides with or, subject to certain conditions does not reside with, and provides full-time care and attention to a “relevant person”. 

A “relevant person” is a person (other than a person in receipt of an increase of disablement pension under section 78 of the Act in respect of constant attendance) who has such a disability that he/she requires full-time care and attention who is either 16 years or over; or is under 16 and is in receipt of an allowance for domiciliary care of children under section 61 of the Health Act 1970. 

A person is considered to require “full-time care and attention” if that person has such a disability that he/she –

(i) requires from another person either

(a) continuous supervision and frequent help throughout the day in relation to normal bodily functions, or

(b) continuous supervision to avoid danger to themselves; and

(ii) is likely to need such full-time care and attention for at least 12 consecutive months.

When is a carer entitled to carer’s allowance?

In addition to the above, a carer is entitled to carer’s allowance if he/she meets the following criteria:

  1. is a person aged 18 or over and satisfies a means test;
  2. is a person habitually resident in the State;
  3. is not living in a hospital, convalescent home or other similar institution;
  4. for a non-resident carer, (a) there must be a direct system of communication between the carer’s residence and that of the relevant person (to include a telephone or alarm system) and (b) the relevant person is not already receiving full-time care and attention within his/her own residence from a person other than the applicant; and
  5. the care must be for at least 35 hours per week, over 5 to 7 days.

A carer can continue to receive carer’s allowance:

  • for up to 13 weeks, if the carer or the relevant person is receiving medical or other treatment of a temporary nature in a hospital (or other institution);
  • for up to 12 weeks, where the carer would qualify for the allowance but for the fact that the relevant person has been permanently admitted to a hospital (or other institution);
  • where the relevant person is attending either (i) a non-residential course of rehabilitation training provided by a recognised organisation or (ii) a non-residential place of day care approved by the Minister for Health;
  • where provision has been made for the care of the relevant person and the carer is employed, self-employed or attending any course of education or training for not more than 18.5 hours a week;
  • where the number of hours providing such care is not less than 35 hours in a period of 7 consecutive days, and care is provided on any 5 days, whether consecutive or not, within a period of 7 consecutive days; or
  • for up to 26 weeks, if (i) the relevant person is under 16 years of age, (ii) that relevant person meets the criteria for the domiciliary care allowance and (iii) the relevant carer would otherwise qualify for the allowance but for the fact that the relevant person is undergoing medical or other treatment of a temporary nature in a hospital (or other institution).

What type of decisions relating to carer’s allowance have been challenged in recent years?

The Annual Reports of the Social Welfare Appeals Office (the “SWAO”) during the period of 2009 to 2022 highlight forty-five appeals relating to carer’s allowance. These are a sample of the types of appeals the SWAO receives, which are hereinafter referred to as the “Case Studies.  The majority related to the care required and/or care provided (i.e. whether full-time care and attention was required and whether such care was being provided in line with the eligibility criteria),  and a few Case Studies related to the means test.  

Key grounds of appeals by appellants:

Assessment of Means

Four Case Studies address the assessment of means.  To qualify for carer’s allowance, the applicant’s means must fall below a certain figure which is reviewed by the Department of Social Protection (the “Department”).  The Department looks at all sources of the applicant’s and/or their spouse/civil partner/cohabitant’s income and then deducts some costs as set out in the legislation.   

Where there is a change in the applicant’s income, this may affect their entitlement to the payment. It is important to note that a recipient of social welfare has an obligation to inform the Department o of a change in their circumstances, including an increase or decrease in their means or income.

In an appeal, the Appeals Officer may take into account any evidence relating to a change of income. For example, in Case Study 2016/19, the applicant’s yearly income was affected by a drop in milk prices, reducing projected milk income by some 23%, while overheads remained largely the same.  The Appeals Officer took this into account to the extent that it affected the applicant’s gross income and projected net profit.

In other Case Studies relating to means, it has been noted that an applicant can seek a review of their entitlement at any time where there is a decrease in means.

Overpayment of carer’s allowance

 One of the Case Studies concerned overpayment of carer’s allowance (2016/318/34).  For more details on Overpayment, see Thematic Note on Overpayments on Casebase.

In this Case Study, it was determined that a mother was no longer entitled to carer’s allowance as her son was admitted to a children’s residential unit and therefore, she was no longer considered to be providing full-time care and attention.  The issue then arose that she had been overpaid carer’s allowance for a period in which she was no longer entitled to the carer’s allowance.  The overpayment had been appealed and refused so a further appeal to the Chief Appeals Officer was made under section 318 of the Act.

The appellant challenged the decision of the Appeals Officer in an effort to reduce the overpayment due, however the Chief Appeals Officer upheld the Appeal Officer’s decision on all three grounds of appeal:

  1. the appellant argued the overpayment due should be reduced due to an error or failure on the part of the Department.  The Chief Appeals Officer upheld the decision of the Appeals Officer and would not reduce the overpayment due as the Deciding Officer had written to the appellant advising her that her change in circumstances would affect her entitlement to carer’s allowance.
  2. the appellant argued her case fell within the exemption of section 136 of the 2007 Regulations which provide that a carer may be considered to continue to be providing full-time care and attention in circumstances where the caree is living in an institution, and not with the carer, for a period not longer than 13 weeks.  The Chief Appeals Officer determined on the facts that the care arrangements were not temporary and therefore did not fall within the scope of this exemption; and
  3. the Chief Appeals Officer affirmed the appeal officer’s stance on recovery of overpayment; this is a matter for the Department and not the SWAO.

Full-time care and attention required – SWAO considerations & evidence

There have been many appeals in this area that assess whether a person has such a disability that he/she (i) requires from another person either (a) continuous supervision and frequent help throughout the day in relation to normal bodily functions, or (b) continuous supervision to avoid danger to themselves; and (ii) is likely to need such full-time care and attention for at least 12 consecutive months.

The appeals in this area, while strict in the application of the legislation, have taken into account the following evidence:

  • medical practitioner reports,
  • Garda reports and/or
  • a social welfare officer reports.

Oral and documentary evidence has also proven helpful in supporting medical evidence and can provide background to that relevant person’s specific circumstances.

Such evidence can be particularly important where, for example, a carer is not resident with the relevant person on a full-time basis, other family members assist with carer or where the medical condition has deteriorated sufficiently since the initial assessment.

Distinctions have been made in such appeals between requiring ongoing care and attention as opposed to full-time care and attention. In Case Study 2015/11, medical evidence provided in respect of the appellant’s parents indicated that there was a moderate effect of mental health, balance/co-ordination, vision and hearing and a mild to moderate effect on their ability to undertake the activities of daily living.  There was no concern in relation to the parent’s safety.  While the Appeals Officer acknowledged that the appellant undertook domestic tasks (e.g. preparing meals, cleaning and washing clothes) and attended to some of her parent’s personal needs, the evidence indicated that the parent’s were able, without support to mobilise and for the most part attend to their own normal bodily functions.  The level of care required in this case was not considered full-time care and attention within the meaning of the legislation.

Case Study 2016/218/33 was a review of an appeal which was disallowed on the basis that full-time care and attention was not required.  In this Case Study, the reviewing officer considered a medical report and letter from a psychiatrist and whether or not such evidence supported the appellant’s argument that the person being cared for required full-time care and attention.  It was specifically examined whether the caree required continual supervision in order to avoid being a danger to herself as it was accepted that she did not require supervision and assistance with normal bodily functions.  It was held that the medical evidence provided did not provide definitive proof that the caree required full-time care and attention but was sufficient to indicate that full-time care and attention was probable.  This conclusion along with oral testimony established a likelihood that she could not function safely without continual supervisions by the appellant.  The decision was revised and the appeal was allowed on the basis that evidence presented supported the appellant’s argument that the caree required continual supervision to avoid danger to herself and the extent of the care provided by the appellant was full-time care and attention.

This case highlights the importance of requesting an oral hearing in appeals of this nature, especially where factual evidence is in dispute.

In Case Study 202/318/63, a decision was revised on the basis that the written and oral testimony established that the caree required continual supervision and frequent assistance throughout the day in connection with normal bodily functions and that the Appeals Officer gave disproportionate weight to the evidence that the caree tried to do some light housework.  The evidence however did not support that the caree required continual supervision in order to avoid danger to herself.

Case Study 207/29 assessed whether the caree met the medical criteria for the scheme and whether the appellant was working/studying for more than 15 hours per week outside the home.  The Appeals Officer was satisfied that the nature of the caree’s medical conditions and the severity of these conditions, as certified by a GP, were such that he required continual supervision and frequent assistance throughout the day in connection with normal bodily functions and continual supervision to avoid danger to himself.  The Appeals Officer was also satisfied that, based on evidence from the appellant’s place of study, that the aggregate duration of the appellant’s course of study did not exceed 15 hours per week.

Full-Time Care Provided

There have been many appeals in this area that assess whether the care being provided by the carer is full-time care and attention.

In Case Study 2015/12, the appellant applied for carer’s allowance in connection with care being provided to her grandfather, who resided with his daughter.  The claim was refused on the grounds that the appellant was held not to be providing full-time care and attention as she was not resident with the caree on a full-time basis and that the care was shared with her aunt who was living with the caree.  At an oral hearing, the carer provided background on the arrangement and outlined the daily routine.  The appellant undertook a carer’s training course with the intention of caring for the caree. It was noted that the appellant was unemployed and in receipt of jobseeker’s allowance.  The appeal was allowed on the basis of the evidence put forward to include that the appellant lived with the caree for the majority of the time and was his sole carer.

Where care is shared among parties, a claim depends on how much care the appellant is providing within the context of a number of parties providing care in order to assess whether the care being provided by the appellant constitutes full-time care and attention (Case Study 2017/318/63).

In Case Study 2018/25, the appeal was disallowed on the basis that there is no provision in the legislation for a payment to be made in respect of part time care.  In this Case Study, the appellant provided care to the caree for 4.5 hours per day, 7 days a week and requested a part payment of the carer’s allowance.  On-call periods are also not considered as part of the overall provision of care based on the outcome of Case Study 2018/318/66.

In Case Study 2019/28 an appeal was disallowed on the basis that the appellant was working more than 15 hours per week (which was supported by documentary evidence from the appellant’s employer) outside the home and was therefore not providing full-time care and attention.  The appellant was advised that should her circumstances change, it was open for her to re-apply for carer’s allowance.

In Case Study 2020/23, the Appeals Officer noted that, while full-time care is not defined in the legislation, the Department’s  guidance considers 35 hours per week to be necessary to meet the full-time care and attention requirement set out in the legislation.  In the circumstances of this Case Study, the Appeals Officer was satisfied that the appellant had not included the hours of care provided to the caree in the carer’s home.  In those circumstances the Appeals Officer was satisfied that the appellant was providing full-time care and that the level of care provided was in excess of the guidelines.  In contrast, the Appeals Officer dismissed the appeals in Case Study 2021/39 and 2022/30 that, based on the appellant’s evidence, the appellants did not satisfy the minimum 35 hours of care per week requirement and was therefore not considered to be full-time care and attention within the meaning of the legislation.

Appeals have been dismissed based on lack of information to support the claim that the carer is providing full-time care and attention.  For example, in Case Study 2020/22 the appellant had informed the Appeals Officer that he provided care seven days a week but did not state for how many hours each day.

It is also necessary that an applicant meets the criteria of providing full-time care at the time of making the application for carer’s allowance.  The Appeals Officer explained in Case Study 2019/27, that in circumstances where the level of care provided by the applicant has increased since the making of the application, it is advisable that the applicant re-applies rather than appealing the Deciding Officer’s decision, as the Appeals Officer will only consider the facts at the time of the making of the application.  It is worth noting that there is inconsistency between Case Studies as additional medical evidence was submitted at the appeals stage to assist in corroborating a claim as seen in Case Study 2021/36 and 2018/26.

Observations on appeal outcomes:

Each Case Study demonstrates the SWAO’s adherence to the criteria set out in the Act in respect of carer’s allowance.  The SWAO will look at the totality of the evidence presented in a case (e.g. medical reports, documentary evidence, oral testimony etc.) in order to assess the requirement for full-time care and attention and whether it is being provided.

It is clear from the Case Studies that only one limb of the care test (i.e. that the relevant person requires from another person either (a) continuous supervision and frequent help throughout the day in relation to normal bodily functions or (b) continuous supervision to avoid danger to themselves) needs to be satisfied in order to establish whether full-time care and attention is required.   

If making an application for carer’s allowance it is advisable to provide the Department with an, as detailed as possible, account of the level of care provided.  It is clear from the Case Studies that there is a high evidentiary threshold to satisfy for the level of care to be deemed as ‘full-time’.

There may be circumstances where other social welfare payments (such as illness benefit) may affect the full rate entitlement to carer’s allowance.  It is important to notify the Department in any change of circumstance which may affect the carer’s entitlement to carer’s allowance.

The Case Studies demonstrate that the SWAO’s approach to matters concerning carer’s allowance are consistent with the requirements of the Act and the 2007 Regulations taking into account the specific circumstances of each appeal. 

Relevant Case Studies of the SWAO Annual Reports 2009-2022

A.2009 
 N/A 
 2010 
 N/A 
 2011 
 N/A 
 2012 
1.2012/01 Carer’s AllowanceQuestion at issue: Eligibility (Care Required)
2.2012/02 Carer’s AllowanceQuestion at issue: Eligibility (Care Required)
 2013 
 N/A 
 2014 
 N/A 
 2015 
1.2015/11 Carer’s AllowanceQuestion at issue: Eligibility (Care Required)
2.2015/12 Carer’s AllowanceQuestion at issue: Eligibility (Care Provided)
 2016 
1.2016/18 Carer’s AllowanceQuestion at issue: Eligibility (Provision of Full-Time Care)
2.2016/19 Carer’s AllowanceQuestion at issue: Eligibility (Means)
3.2016/318/33 Carer’s AllowanceQuestion at issue: Full-Time Care and Attention Required
4.2016/318/34 Carer’s AllowanceQuestion at issue: Overpayment Assessed
 2017 
1.2017/28 Carer’s AllowanceQuestion at issue: Means & Overlap of Entitlement between Schemes
2.2017/29 Carer’s AllowanceQuestion at issue: Full-Time Care Required & Working/Studying more than 15 hours per week
3.2017/30 Carer’s AllowanceQuestion at issue: Eligibility (Care Required)
4.2017/31 Carer’s AllowanceQuestion at issue: Eligibility (Full-Time Care)
5.2017/318/63 Carer’s AllowanceQuestion at issue: Full-Time Care
6.2017/318/64 Carer’s AllowanceQuestion at issue: Full-Time Care Required
 2018 
1.2018/25 Carer’s AllowanceQuestion at issue: Eligibility (Care Provided)
2.2018/26 Carer’s AllowanceQuestion at issue: Eligibility (Care Provided)
3.2018/27 Carer’s AllowanceQuestion at issue: Eligibility (Care Required)
4.2018/28 Carer’s AllowanceQuestion at issue: Eligibility (Care Required)
5.2018/29 Carer’s AllowanceQuestion at issue: Eligibility (Care Provided)
6.2018/318/65 Carer’s AllowanceQuestion at issue: Eligibility (Care Required)
7.2018/318/66 Carer’s AllowanceQuestion at issue: Eligibility (Care Provided)
 2019 
1.2019/27 Carer’s AllowanceQuestion at issue: Eligibility (Care Provided)
2.2019/28 Carer’s AllowanceQuestion at issue: Eligibility (Care Required & Care Provided)
3.2019/29 Carer’s AllowanceQuestion at issue: Eligibility (Care Required)
4.2019/30 Carer’s AllowanceQuestion at issue: Eligibility (Care Required)
5.2019/318/63 Carer’s AllowanceQuestion at issue: Eligibility (Care Required)
 2020 
1.2020/22 Carer’s AllowanceQuestion at issue: Eligibility (Care Provided)
2.2020/23 Carer’s AllowanceQuestion at issue: Eligibility (Care Provided)
3.2020/24 Carer’s AllowanceQuestion at issue: Eligibility (Care Required)
4.2020/25 Carer’s AllowanceQuestion at issue: Eligibility (Care Required)
5.2020/26 Carer’s AllowanceQuestion at issue: Eligibility (Care Required & Care Provided)
6.2020/27 Carer’s AllowanceQuestion at issue: Eligibility (Means)
7.2020/318/63 Carer’s AllowanceQuestion at issue: Eligibility (Care Required)
8.2020/318/64 Carer’s AllowanceQuestion at issue: Eligibility (Care Required)
 2021 
1.2021/36 Carer’s AllowanceQuestion at issue: Eligibility (Care Required)
2.2021/37 Carer’s AllowanceQuestion at issue: Eligibility (Care Required)
3.2021/38 Carer’s AllowanceQuestion at issue: Eligibility (Care Provided)
4.2021/39 Carer’s AllowanceQuestion at issue: Eligibility (Care Required & Care Provided)
5.2021/40 Carer’s AllowanceQuestion at issue: Eligibility (Care Provided)
5.2021/77 Carer’s AllowanceQuestion at issue: Eligibility
 2022 
1.2022/27 Carer’s AllowanceQuestion at issue: Eligibility (Care Required)
2.2022/28 Carer’s AllowanceQuestion at issue: Eligibility (Care Required)
3.2022/29 Carer’s AllowanceQuestion at issue: Eligibility (Care Required)
4.2022/30 Carer’s AllowanceQuestion at issue: Eligibility (Care Required)
5.2022/31 Carer’s AllowanceQuestion at issue: Eligibility (Means)

2012:

2012/01 Carer’s Allowance

Decision under appeal: claim rejected – reason(s) stated:

The Chief Medical Advisor having examined the medical evidence has decided that, in his opinion, the person being cared for is not so invalided or disabled as to require full-time care and attention as laid down in the Carer’s Allowance legislation.

Background: In 2007, Carer’s Allowance was awarded in respect of the appellant’s son. Following a review in 2011, payment was terminated in line with the decision outlined above. It was the opinion of the Department’s Medical Advisor that while available medical evidence indicated a level of dependence, it did not indicate the need for full-time care and attention. Her son’s GP advised that he expected the condition diagnosed to continue indefinitely; in completing an ability/disability profile, he indicated that her son’s condition was severe under a number of headings, including mental health/behaviour; learning/intelligence and consciousness/seizures.

Diagnosis: Epilepsy, depression and ADHD Hyperkinetic disorder

At oral hearing: the appellant referred to her son’s diagnosis. She said that he is 17 years old and cannot be left alone at any time. She provided an outline of a typical day, which included getting up at 9-10 a.m. and then sitting in the living room wrapped in a duvet. She said that he does not go out alone, but sometimes goes to the shops with her. She reported that this can be difficult as he has temper tantrums and is easily provoked. She went on to say that he gets more agitated in the evenings and can lash out. He goes to bed at about 10 p.m. but can still be awake at 2-3 a.m. The appellant said that they had removed a television from his bedroom as a precaution when he began throwing things out the window.

The appellant spoke about her son’s depression and said that he also experiences frustration. He had attended counselling for three sessions but then refused to go back. She advised that the Gardaí had been called to the house on a number of occasions, the last being three weeks earlier, because of her son’s aggression within the household. In terms of his epilepsy, he attends Beaumont Hospital every six months. The appellant said that he takes ‘petit mal’ seizures every two to three days; he drools, gets headaches and generally has to go to bed until the episode passes. Previously, he had suffered from ‘grand mal’ seizures, but these had been controlled since he was hospitalised with one during 2011. He also attends the Child and Adolescent Mental Health Services every two to three months, and is under the guidance of the child psychologist there. In addition, he attends his GP every two months or so. The GP talks to him, checks his medication and observes him. In conclusion, the appellant submitted a number of letters and reports in respect of her son’s condition.

Comments/Conclusions: In determining the appeal, the Appeals Officer took into consideration the testimony of appellant at the hearing, and an assessment of the relevant documentation on file and the additional documentary evidence submitted at the oral hearing. In the circumstances set out by the appellant, and supported by the medical evidence to hand, he concluded that the appeal should succeed.

Decision of the Appeals Officer: The appeal is allowed.

2012/02 Carer’s Allowance

Decision under appeal: claim terminated – reason(s) stated:-

Your Carer’s Allowance claim is terminated with effect from [specified date] on grounds that you are no longer proving full-time care and attention for a relevant person.

Background: The appellant had been in receipt of Carer’s Allowance in respect of his father, who was in his late sixties, and had been diagnosed with alcohol dependency, diabetes and depression. Following a report to the Department of Social Protection from the local Gardaí, the claim was reviewed and subsequently terminated. In his appeal submission, the appellant contended that he provided full-time care for his father. He outlined the nature of that care, including the supervision of medication and being available around the clock. He stated that his father had fallen two months earlier and had broken his hip and arm. He submitted that his father was totally reliant on him.

At oral hearing: the Deciding Officer attended at the request of the Appeals Officer, as did the Garda who was involved in the case. The Deciding Officer confirmed that he had relied upon a Garda report made to the Department of Social Protection, in which it was stated that the appellant appeared not to be carrying out his caring duties and suggested that the appellant’s father be placed in alternative care.

The Garda reported that he had visited the appellant’s address and had found the house in filth. He stated that there was evidence of intravenous drug use and that he had observed the appellant to be in a very unhealthy state. He submitted that the appellant was obviously using heroin and was incapable of looking after himself, not to mention his father. He noted that there were other occupants in the house, living upstairs.

In response, the appellant stated that he was now off drugs and had been on a methadone treatment programme for the previous four months. He reported that he was in receipt of Jobseeker’s Allowance, that he was availing of meals on wheels and that the public health nurse visited once a week. He conceded that he had been incapable of providing full-time care for his father while using heroin.

The Garda accepted that the appellant had cleaned himself up and noted that he had put on weight. He expressed concern that the appellant’s erstwhile friends might resume their residence with the appellant, to his detriment and that of his father. However, he acknowledged that the appellant genuinely wanted to care for his father and said he hoped that the situation could be resolved.

In conclusion, the Appeals Officer advised the appellant that he would require an update from the Department of Social Protection (the local Social Welfare Inspector) to the effect that the qualifying conditions for Carer’s Allowance were satisfied before reinstatement could be considered.

Consideration: The Appeals Officer noted receipt of the Social Welfare Inspector’s report. He considered that it confirmed that the Deciding Officer was correct to withdraw payment of Carer’s Allowance on the grounds that the appellant had not been caring for his father at the time: he had been incapable of providing care. He noted that the Garda involved in the case had accepted that the appellant was now addressing his drug habit, and that the Social Welfare Inspector had noted a significant improvement by comparison with his earlier visit to the appellant. He concluded that it had been established that the appellant once again satisfied the conditions for payment of Carer’s Allowance. In the absence of an alternative date, he determined that Carer’s Allowance should be reinstated with effect from [specified date], when the appellant attended the oral hearing and the indications were that he was in a position to care for his father.

The Appeals Officer observed that this case had had an encouraging outcome and that the role of the Gardaí was appreciated. As the Gardaí would not always be in a position to attend oral hearings, he suggested that future reports should be directed through Social Welfare Inspectors who could then present the evidence of their investigations.

Decision of the Appeals Officer: The appeal is allowed from [specified date] only.

Note on reason(s) for decision: In the absence of an alternative date, I am prepared to re-instate the Carer’s Allowance from [specified date], when the appellant attended the oral hearing and the indications were that he was in a position to care for his father.

2015:

2015/11 Carer’s Allowance

Question at issue: Eligibility (Care Required)

Background: The appellant made a claim for Carer’s Allowance in respect of care being provided for her parents, both of whom were in their seventies. Her father had been diagnosed with Ischaemic Heart Disease, Diabetes Mellitus and Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease (COPD), while her mother had a diagnosis of Diabetes Mellitus, Anaemia, Hypertension, High Cholesterol, COPD and Chronic Kidney Disease. The claim was refused on grounds that neither person was held to require full-time care and attention as provided for in the governing legislation.

Oral hearing: The appellant attended the hearing in the company of one of her parents. The Appeals Officer sought to clarify the provisions of the legislation, making reference to the circumstances in which a person may be considered to have a need for full-time care and attention. He outlined the medical evidence which was available.

In outlining her parents’ care needs, the appellant provided some background to her circumstances and an account of a typical day, with specific attention to her caring role. In this she submitted:

o Her parents live close by and she would generally call into them at around 9.30 a.m. By that time, they have usually mobilised, dressed and groomed. They do not need regular assistance with dressing or matters of hygiene, including washing/showering. She assists her mother with showering occasionally and also does physiotherapy to relieve joint discomfort associated with Arthritis.

o The appellant attends to making the breakfast and housekeeping, which includes making beds, cleaning and washing clothes.

o Her parents are reluctant to go out and usually stay indoors, watching television or listening to the radio. She usually accompanies her mother to collect her pension and do a little shopping. Her father takes short walks for exercise.

o The appellant prepares the dinner for 1 p.m. and all the family, including the appellant’s own family, have their dinner in her parents’ house. Her parents usually stay around the house in the afternoon. They have a light tea in the evening.

o The appellant does not usually call on her parents in the evening but is available, if needed. Her parents retire to bed, unassisted.

o The appellant pointed out that she monitors her mother’s bloods daily as she is unable to do it herself. She understands the readings and notifies the relevant service when bloods are high. He mother self-injects her insulin.

o The appellant’s brother brings both parents to their various hospital and G.P. appointments. He also looks in daily on his parents and looks after the fire, fetching turf and so on.

Consideration: The governing legislation, Section 179 of the Social Welfare (Consolidation) Act, 2005 prescribes that for the purposes of Carer’s Allowance a relevant person is regarded as requiring full-time care and attention where –

(a) The person has such a disability that he or she requires from another person –

(i) Continual supervision and frequent assistance throughout the day in

connection with normal bodily functions, or

(ii) Continual supervision in order to avoid danger to himself or herself, and

(b) The nature and extent of his or her disability has been certified in the prescribed

manner by a medical practitioner

The Appeals Officer noted the medical evidence provided in respect of each of the appellant’s parents, and the fact that the family G.P. had suggested that they both required ongoing care and attention. He noted also that no issues of concern were raised in relation to their safety. In relation to the appellant’s father, he noted that his medical condition was considered to have a moderate effect on his mental health, balance/co-ordination, vision and hearing, a mild effect on his continence and a mild to moderate effect on his ability to undertake the activities of daily living.

The Appeals Officer noted that the medical evidence provided in relation to the appellant’s mother indicated that her condition had a moderate effect on her mental health, balance/co-ordination and vision and a mild to moderate effect on her ability to undertake the activities of daily living.

The Appeals Officer noted that the appellant’s evidence had indicated that her parents were able, without support, to mobilise in the morning and attend to their own grooming, including hygiene. She had advised that her parents spend most of their time indoors, being reluctant to going out particularly because of mobility challenges associated with their medical conditions. He noted that for the most part, the appellant does the domestic tasks, including preparing all meals, making beds, cleaning and washing clothes. He noted that the appellant attended to some of her parents’ personal needs, including assisting her mother with bathing, monitoring her blood sugar levels, and providing some physiotherapy. After a careful assessment, he concluded that whilst the evidence established that the appellant’s parents required a level of care, it had not been established that they required full-time care and attention within the meaning of the provisions of social welfare legislation.

Outcome: Appeal disallowed.

2015/12 Carer’s Allowance

Question at issue: Eligibility (Care Provided)

Background: The appellant applied for Carer’s Allowance in respect of care being provided for her grandfather, who resides with his daughter and her family. He is in his late sixties and had been deemed to require full-time care. The appellant lived with her parents and went to a rural area to care for her grandfather on a Monday to Friday basis. This was confirmed in the report of a Social Welfare Inspector. The claim was refused on grounds that the appellant was held not to be providing full-time care and attention as she was not resident with her grandfather on a full-time basis and the care was shared with her aunt who was living with him. In her appeal, the appellant stated that she provides full-time care from Sunday to Friday and that her aunt looks after her grandfather on Saturdays only.

Oral hearing: The appellant advised that she was in receipt of Jobseeker’s Allowance and that she continued to live at her parents’ home. She outlined the background to the current arrangement in which she provides care for her grandfather. The appellant’s aunt continued to live with her parents after she married. She has three children and is in full-time employment. When the appellant’s grandmother became ill some years ago, the appellant went to live with and care for her. She continued to visit her grandfather for a few days a week after her grandmother’s death in 2012, initially just to keep him company. As his health declined, however, she began and has continued to care for him. She referred to her grandfather’s diagnosis of Parkinson’s disease, together with Angina and renal problems.

The appellant stated that she used to stay with her grandfather from Monday to Friday, going home each Saturday and returning on Sunday and, more recently, going home on Sunday and returning around mid-day on Monday. She advised that she travels by train and she submitted receipts for some of the weeks involved (a total of 19 return tickets), stating that she had not kept them all.

The appellant reported that she gets her grandfather up in the morning, helps him to wash and dress and then gets his breakfast. She advised that his Parkinson’s has deteriorated and that he is almost fully incontinent. She administers his medications, collecting them and putting them in order. Her aunt collects his pension and assists him in paying the bills and she has no knowledge or input to this. She advised that she had completed a carer’s training course, which had helped her to cope, especially in relation to protecting her back, which had been taking a lot of strain. She went on to say that she cooks for all the family, does her grandfather’s laundry and, while she does not drive, she accompanies him to all medical appointments, usually getting a lift from a neighbour or another family member, who lives nearby.

Consideration: The Appeals Officer noted that the appellant was fully unemployed and in receipt of Jobseeker’s Allowance, whilst her aunt and family were working. She noted the circumstances in which the current arrangements had arisen and the fact that the appellant had undertaken a carer’s training course, with the intention of caring for her grandfather. She had regard also to the fact that the other household members were absent during the day, returning only in the evening, and that the appellant was providing personal care on a daily basis. She observed that the appellant’s account, given at the oral hearing, was genuine and credible and she noted that the provision of care now extends to part of each weekend. On the basis of the evidence available, including the fact that appellant lives with her grandfather for the majority of the time and is his sole carer, the Appeals Officer was satisfied that she was providing full-time care and attention, despite travelling home at weekends.

Outcome: Appeal allowed

2016:

2016/18 Carer’s Allowance

Question at issue: Eligibility (Provision of Full-Time Care)

Background: The appellant’s claim for Carer’s Allowance was disallowed on grounds that she was not providing full-time care and attention for her husband, who was in his late 70s. He had a diagnosis of severe chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), cerebral vascular accident (CVA) and coronary artery disease (CAD). The claim had been referred to a Social Welfare Inspector, who interviewed the appellant. At that time, her husband was in hospital. The Inspector reported that while there was a level of personal care being provided, he considered that the care the appellant was providing was not full-time care and attention within the meaning of legislation. This had been accepted by the Deciding Officer in his determination. In her appeal, the appellant asserted that she provides care around the clock.

Oral hearing: The appellant attended the hearing alone, while the Social Welfare Inspector attended at the request of the Appeals Officer. He outlined the details of his report and stated that he was satisfied that it reflected accurately the information which had been provided by the appellant during the course of their meeting. He stated that the appellant had advised that her husband was able, for the most part, to attend to his own personal care needs, independent of her support. He reported that while it was clear that she was providing some support, it appeared that the major part of the time she spent with her husband was in situations where companionship was required rather than care. In response, the appellant contended that her husband requires full-time care and attention and, given the circumstances, that she is his carer. She reported that her husband had experienced three stokes which had a significant impact on his independence and his ability to undertake daily activities without continual support and supervision. She made reference to a significant history of COPD and advised that he was using home oxygen at all times.

The appellant advised that her husband receives Home Help, for one hour a day, two days a week. She said that at such times he is assisted with showering and at all other times she is his only carer. She advised that he is susceptible to losing his balance and falling, that he uses crutches when getting around the house and has a wheelchair for outdoor use. She reported that his sleep can be disturbed significantly and that she is on constant alert for any difficulties arising, particularly any problems with oxygen intake or supply. The Social Welfare Inspector confirmed that the appellant’s husband had been in hospital at the time he interviewed her and conceded that it might have been more helpful if he had observed him at home.

Consideration: The Appeals Officer noted that the question of the appellant’s husband requiring full-time care and attention was not at issue and accepted, based on this fact and having regard to the medical evidence available, that full-time care and attention was required. He noted also that the appellant was the main care provider, albeit her husband had the benefit of two hours a week by way of Home Help. He made reference to the significant difficulties her husband was experiencing as a consequence of the medical conditions diagnosed and noted that the appellant was in constant attendance, to ensure his safety. He concluded that the appellant must be held to be providing full-time care within the meaning of the governing social welfare legislation.

Outcome: Appeal allowed.

2016/19 Carer’s Allowance

Question at issue: Eligibility (Means)

Background: In 2015, the appellant made a claim for Carer’s Allowance in respect of care being provided for her son. This was rejected on grounds that her weekly means, derived from her husband’s income from self- employment as a farmer, were in excess of the statutory limit. In assessing means, the Deciding Officer referred to farm income of the order of €67,000 per annum, recorded as drawings in the accounts for 2013.

Oral hearing: The appellant was accompanied by her son, for whom she provides care. It was confirmed that the question at issue referred only to means. The appellant asserted that in assessing means from the farm holding, no account had been taken of the price drop experienced by milk suppliers. She stated that this had resulted in a significant reduction in projected gross income for 2016 and she submitted monthly statements from her local Creamery Co-Operative (Co-Op) as evidence of the drop in milk prices. She asserted that it was unreasonable to calculate means with reference to accounts for previous years when the milk price had effectively collapsed in 2016, forcing the farm enterprise to engage in further borrowing.

The appellant accepted that all other current income and expenditure was broadly in line with 2014 returns, which had formed the basis of the assessment, and she undertook to provide details. She also submitted evidence of an operating loan issued by the bank in 2016, with details of interest applied and repayments being made. She undertook to provide details of milk supply in 2015 and 2016 for comparison purposes and to illustrate why projected income was expected to fall sharply. She provided farm accounts for 2014 which recorded a net profit of some €70,000. (Further documentary evidence, as outlined, was submitted following the oral hearing.)

Consideration: The Appeals Officer noted that the profit from the holding had not been assessed and, instead, personal drawings recorded in the accounts were used. He observed that, in the assessment of means, drawings were not to be assessed without qualification. He noted that a decision maker must be satisfied that the drawings are sustainable on an ongoing basis before being assessed as means and, in addition, that the source of the funds from which the drawings are made must be examined. In this case, he noted that the drawings at issue were made up of farm income, rental income, a Revenue refund, a Value Added Tax (VAT) refund, a dividend and an insurance settlement. He observed that, of these, only the farm income was assessable as means derived from cash income as the rental income had already been considered as capital. By assessing the drawings as income, he suggested that the decision maker was attempting to assess the same source of means as both capital and as income, and he pointed out that this was not appropriate.

The Appeals Officer accepted the appellant’s contention that current yearly income was affected by the drop in prices, reducing projected milk income by some 23%, while overheads had remained largely the same. He noted that this was reflected in gross income and projected net profit. He made an assessment on this basis and concluded that the appellant had weekly means of €87.00.

Outcome: Appeal partially allowed

2016/218/33 Carer’s Allowance

Question at issue: Full-Time Care and Attention Required

Grounds for review: It was asserted that the Appeals Officer had provided little if any information with respect to the evidential weight attributed to the evidence in the case and that his reasoning and findings were not compatible with the facts and the law. It was submitted, essentially, that the evidence pointed to a finding that full-time care and attention was required although the Appeals Officer’s decision was to disallow the appeal.

Background: The claim in this case was made in respect of the care of a person, in their late 50s, who had a diagnosis of recurrent psychotic depression. It was reported that she had been attending a psychiatrist since 2009, when she presented with a severe depressive episode with associated psychotic symptoms and severe anxiety. Her psychiatrist provided an account of her responses to treatment and subsequent relapses, as well as an account of what were described as three different powerful medications which she had been prescribed. The appellant made a claim for Carer’s Allowance in 2015 in respect of care he was providing and this was refused as the Deciding Officer considered that the person being cared for was not so invalided or disabled as to require full-time care and attention, in line with the provisions of the relevant legislation. The Appeals Officer held an oral hearing and concluded subsequently that while it had been shown that support was required, it had not been established that there was a need for full-time care and attention as defined in social welfare legislation.

Review: The relevant legislation is Section 179(4) of the Social Welfare Consolidation Act 2005, which provides that a relevant person shall be regarded as requiring full-time care and attention where –

(a) the person has such a disability that he or she requires from another person—

(i) continual supervision and frequent assistance throughout the day in

connection with normal bodily functions, or

(ii) continual supervision in order to avoid danger to himself or herself,

(b) the person has such a disability that he or she is likely to require full-time care and

attention for at least 12 consecutive months, and

(c) the nature and extent of the person’s disability has been certified in the prescribed

manner by a registered medical practitioner.

In the course of my review, I considered all of the evidence which was before the Appeals Officer including the following medical evidence:

• Medical report which formed part of the Carer’s Allowance claim form – completed by a nominated psychiatrist,

• Letter (specified date in 2015), from the same psychiatrist.

The question at issue was whether or not the evidence which was before the Appeals Officer supported the appellant’s contention that the person being cared for required full- time care and attention within the meaning of the governing social welfare legislation. In considering this matter, I examined the question as to whether she might be held to require continual supervision in order to avoid danger to herself, in line with Section 179(4)(a)(ii) of the Social Welfare Consolidation Act 2005. It was accepted that she did not require supervision and assistance with normal bodily functions, as outlined in Section 179(4)(a)(i).

I noted that the evidence which was before the Appeals Officer comprised the medical evidence outlined above, as well as the appellant’s written submission and his testimony at oral hearing. The salient points made in relation to the care requirements of the person in question were as follows:

• She is unable to do any cooking as she forgets she is cooking and lets food burn.

• She falls asleep most days and has fallen on to the floor on a number of occasions.

• She puts items away and becomes distressed thinking they are lost.

• She often thinks other people are talking about her and can get distressed.

• She will not go anywhere unaccompanied.

• She will not answer the phone or open post.

• She does not really manage any tasks independently.

• When the appellant must be away, he arranges for someone to stay in the house as

she would not be safe left on her own.

In the request for a review of the Appeals Officer’s decision, it was submitted that while the medical evidence did not provide definitive proof that the person being cared for required full-time care and attention, it included sufficient information to indicate that the need for full-time care was quite probable. It was asserted that when this was examined together with the appellant’s testimony, it established the likelihood that she could not function safely without continual supervision by the appellant.

Having reviewed the evidence in the case, I took the view that the Appeals Officer did not give sufficient consideration or weight to the question as to the level of supervision required in order that the person being cared for would avoid danger to herself, in the context of her diagnosis and having due regard to the appellant’s account of the difficulties she encountered in relation to the activities of daily living. I considered that the evidence presented supported the contention that she required continual supervision in order to avoid danger to herself in accordance with Section 179(4)(a)(ii) and that the extent of the care which the appellant had outlined was, therefore, consistent with full-time care and attention as defined in the legislation. For that reason I decided to revise the Appeals Officer’s decision and to allow the appeal.

Outcome: Decision revised and appeal allowed.

2016/318/34 Carer’s Allowance

Question at issue Overpayment Assessment

Grounds for Review: A review was sought on the basis that the Appeals Officer had not given sufficient weight to certain facts relating to the appeal, as follows:

• The appellant had relied on an opinion of a social worker engaged with Tusla

regarding her continued entitlement,

• No consideration had been given to the exemption of 13 weeks provided for in the

Social Welfare (Consolidated Claims, Payments and Control) Regulations 2007 (No.

142 of 2007),

• In relation to the recovery of any amounts due, the appellant was prepared to make

repayments as specified.

Background: The appellant was awarded Carer’s Allowance in September 2009 in respect of care she was providing for her son. In 2015, a Social Welfare Inspector called to her home and it emerged at this meeting that her son was no longer residing there having been admitted to a children’s residential unit at the end of 2013. As a result, a Deciding Officer, relying on Section 302(b) of the Social Welfare Consolidation Act 2005, decided that the appellant was not entitled to Carer’s Allowance with effect from the relevant date. In addition, she was held not to have had an entitlement to a Respite Care Grant paid in 2014. (This was re-named Carer’s Support Grant in 2016.) Following an oral hearing, an Appeals Officer disallowed the appeal.

Review: I examined each of the three grounds separately.

Information provided in error by Tusla: The contention here is essentially that the appellant’s reliance on information provided by Tusla should be equated to the provisions of Article 246(1) of the of the Social Welfare (Consolidated Claims, Payments and Control) Regulations 2007 (S.I. No. 142 of 2007) which provides that:

The amount of an overpayment to be repaid may be reduced or cancelled where the

overpayment arose because of –

(a) a failure by the Department to act within a reasonable period on

information which was provided by or on behalf of the person concerned, or

(b) an error by the Department,

and the person concerned could not reasonably have been expected to be aware that

a failure or error had occurred.

It cannot be said that the Department acted in error in this case and I can find no grounds on which I can equate the provisions of Article 246(1) to the provision of information provided by Tusla. There is an onus on all recipients of social welfare payments to notify the Department of any change in their circumstances that may impact on their entitlement or continued entitlement. It was open to the appellant to contact the Department if she had any enquiries relating to her payment or her continued entitlement to Carer’s Allowance. The onus was not on Tusla to contact the Department.

From my review of the evidence, I note that some weeks before the appellant’s son was admitted to the residential unit, a Deciding Officer of the Carer’s Allowance section had written to her and advised that a review of her entitlement had been undertaken. This letter outlined in some detail the events which may affect entitlement to Carer’s Allowance, including circumstances where full-time care and attention is no longer being provided or where the carer or the person being cared for is admitted to hospital or to residential care. For the reasons outlined I found no grounds to revise the decision of the Appeals Officer on the basis of this contention.

Consideration of exemption for 13 weeks: It was submitted that the report of the oral hearing indicated that the Appeals Office did not consider if the exemption provided for by Article 136(a) of the Social Welfare (Consolidated Claims, Payments and Control) Regulations 2007 (S.I. No. 142 of 2007) applied in the appellant’s case. Article 136(a) provides that a carer may continue to be regarded as providing full-time care and attention to a relevant person where –

(a) he or she would qualify for payment of an allowance but for the fact that either

the carer or the relevant person is undergoing medical or other treatment of a

temporary nature in an institution for a period of not longer than 13 weeks, or …

I noted that the Appeals Officer’s report of the oral hearing made reference to the appellant’s account of the arrangements put in place for her son, stating that it had been intended initially that he would return home on 3 to 4 days per week. However, his behaviour had become increasingly violent and it was agreed that he would remain in the residential unit from late in 2013. From my review of the evidence, it was clear that the care arrangement was voluntary and that both the appellant and her husband were actively involved in a shared parenting plan and visited their son on a daily basis. However, I am satisfied that the care arrangement, while voluntary, was not temporary in the sense provided for by Article 136(a). I therefore found no grounds to revise the decision of the Appeals Officer on the basis of this contention.

Recovery of Overpayment: As outlined by the Appeals Officer, the recovery of the overpayment does not come within the remit of the Social Welfare Appeals Office and is a matter between the Department of Social Protection and the appellant. For the reasons outlined above, I was satisfied that the Appeals Officer did not err in fact or law and consequently I declined to revise the decision in this case.

Outcome: Request for revision denied.

2017:

2017/28 Carer’s Allowance

Question at issue: Means & overlap of entitlement between schemes

Background: The appellant’s entitlement to Carer’s Allowance was reviewed based on her means from her husband’s insurable employment. She was informed her payment would cease from 14 April 2017 as she was assessed with means of €261.23 per week which exceeded the statutory limit appropriate to her family circumstances. This assessment was based on her husband’s income details for the full year of 2016. She appealed this decision and provided recent pay slips for her husband’s income. The Department reviewed her entitlement on the basis of these new income details for her husband and decided that she should be assessed with means of €181.26 per week. These means were assessed from a backdated date of 5 January 2017.

Consideration: The Appeals Officer reviewed the means calculation and was satisfied that the revised means were correct and calculated in accordance with the legislation. However, he also noted that the appellant was in receipt of Illness Benefit until 31 March 2017 which meant that she was getting half rate Carer’s Allowance. He pointed out that while she was receiving Illness Benefit payment, she had not been entitled to an increase in her Carer’s Allowance in respect of her children. However, when the Illness Benefit ended on 31 March 2017, and she was entitled to Carer’s Allowance at the full rate appropriate to the means assessable, she would also be entitled to an increase for her two dependent children and would therefore be on a higher rate of payment from 1 April 2017. The Appeals Officer also noted that, as with all means tested payments, the appellant was entitled to seek a review of her entitlement at any time if her means decreased. Equally, she was required to inform the Department if her means increased.

Outcome: Appeal partially allowed.

2017/29 Carer’s Allowance

Question at issue: Full-time care requirement and working/studying more than 15 hours per week

Background: The appellant applied for Carer’s Allowance in respect of his father in January 2016 and was refused by the Department on two grounds: that the caree did not meet the medical criteria for the scheme and the appellant was working/studying for more than 15 hours per week outside the home. The medical evidence showed that the caree suffered from multiple significant medical conditions. The GP indicated that the conditions would continue indefinitely, that he was attending a number of specialists on an ongoing basis, that he was severely affected in manual dexterity, standing and walking, and profoundly affected in lifting/carrying and climbing stairs/ladders. The appellant was attending a part- time course in legal studies.

Consideration: In order to meet the medical eligibility criteria for Carer’s Allowance, the person being cared for must have such a disability that he/she requires full time care and attention from another person. The Appeals Officer was satisfied that the nature of the caree’s multiple medical conditions and the severity of these conditions, as certified by the GP, was such that he required continual supervision and frequent assistance throughout the day in connection with normal bodily functions, as well as continual supervision in order to avoid danger to himself. In accordance with Section 179(4) of the Social Welfare Consolidation Act 2005, the Appeals Officer was satisfied that full time care and attention was required.

Section 136 of Social Welfare (Consolidated Claims Payments and Control) Regulations, 2007 (S.I. No. 142 of 2007) states that a carer may, subject to adequate provision being made for the care of the relevant person, engage in employment/self-employment/training for a maximum of 15 hours per week. The evidence presented by the appellant’s place of study confirmed that he was a student and attended tuition on average every 2nd weekend over a 16 hour period for 14 weekends. The appellant clarified that the average number of hours that he attended classes was 8.75 hours per week and that he was able to care for his father as well as continue with his studies. The Appeals Officer was satisfied that the aggregate duration of the appellant’s course of study did not exceed 15 hours per week and therefore the appellant satisfied this condition in respect of his Carer’s Allowance application.

Outcome: Appeal allowed.

2017/30 Carer’s Allowance

Question at issue: Eligibility (Care Required)

Background: The appellant’s claim for Carer’s Allowance was disallowed on the grounds that her partner who was in her early 30s was not so invalided or disabled as to require  full time care and attention. Her partner had a diagnosis of fibromyalgia, IBS and severe lower back pain. The GP had assessed her abilities as severely affected in lifting/carrying and moderately affected in mental health/behaviour, reaching, manual dexterity, bending/kneeling/squatting, sitting/rising, standing, climbing stairs/ladders and walking. He stated that she required assistance with basic activities of daily living such as dressing, sitting and standing, and with using the toilet and personal hygiene. She could not do any housework or lift her child.

Oral Hearing: The appellant attended the hearing accompanied by her partner for whom she had applied for Carer’s Allowance. As well as the fibromyalgia, IBS and back pain she had been diagnosed 6 months ago with pubis symphysis and was awaiting a review with a gynaecologist in relation to this. She had been reviewed by an orthopaedic specialist with regard to her back problem but they were prevented from doing anything until the pelvic problem was further investigated. She outlined her medications. She was due to start physiotherapy for her back and pelvis. She required a wheelchair or rollator for mobility when outside the home.

The appellant outlined the care she provided for her partner. She assisted her getting in and out of bed, dressing, bathing, washing hair, and toileting. She also helped her with mobility and assisted her when arising and when sitting. She did all of the housework and cooking. She had to do all physical activities with their child as her partner was not able to do these.

Consideration: The Appeals Officer noted that in order to qualify for Carer’s Allowance, the legislation requires that the person receiving care must be so impacted by an illness/ disability as to require continual supervision and frequent assistance throughout the day in connection with normal bodily functions, or continual supervision in order to avoid danger to himself or herself. She noted the medical evidence submitted which outlined the extent of the appellant’s partner’s symptoms which were on-going and severe and were markedly limiting in terms of basic activities of daily living. She also noted the appellant’s testimony provided at oral hearing as to the nature of the care that she provides on a daily basis. The Appeals Officer concluded that the appellant’s partner required full-time care and attention and that the need for such care was likely to last for at least 12 months.

Outcome: Appeal allowed.

2017/31 Carer’s Allowance

Question at issue: Eligibility (Full-Time Care)

Background: The appellant’s claim for Carer’s Allowance was disallowed on the grounds that she was not providing full-time care and attention to the caree. She did not reside with the caree but called to his home every day. The caree was 73 years of age and had a diagnosis of emphysema, cognitive impairment, low back pain, heart disease and anxiety. His GP provided a letter of support for the Carer’s Allowance application, listing his medical conditions and noting that the caree was very dependent on the appellant on a daily basis.

Oral hearing: The appellant explained that she called to the caree’s home every morning to physically help him out of bed. She explained that he would not get up or take his medications if she was not there. She would bring him to the bathroom, wash him, assist him to dress, and give him his medications in the morning, afternoon and night-time. She explained that, if left alone, he would not take his medications. She encouraged him to get out of the house and brought him for a walk each day. She helped him to undress again at night-time, into bed and then returned to her own home. He would stay in bed until she returned the following day. She brought him to all medical appointments, and helped to calm him when he was feeling anxious or having a panic attack.

Consideration: The Appeals Officer noted that the available medical evidence supported the appellant’s contention that, as a result of restrictions in the caree’s abilities, he required assistance with washing, dressing and mobilising. He also noted that the caree had poor memory and that, despite strong medical recommendations that he was at high risk of stroke and should take warfarin to thin his bloods, he refused to do so. This evidence supported the appellant’s contention that, if she did not administer his medications to him at the appropriate times he would not take them and would be a danger to himself. The Appeals Officer was satisfied that the caree required full-time care and attention as legislatively prescribed, and so the remaining question to be answered was whether this care was being provided. The appellant’s evidence was that she called to the caree’s home every day, seven days per week at about 12 noon and remained with him to provide this care on a continuous basis from mid-day until he went to bed at night. The Appeals Officer decided that this evidence established the appellant provides full-time care and attention, as legislatively prescribed.

Outcome: Appeal allowed.

2017/318/63 Carer’s Allowance

Question at issue: Provision of Full-Time Care

Grounds for review: The appellant requested a review of an Appeals Officer’s decision on the grounds that the Appeals Officer erred in fact and/or law in concluding that the care the appellant was providing to another person could not be regarded as full-time care and attention within the meaning of social welfare legislation.

Background: The appellant applied for Carer’s Allowance, but this was rejected by the Department, including on review, on the grounds that he was not providing full-time care and attention. Following an oral hearing, the appeal was also disallowed on the same grounds.

Review: The relevant legislation in this case is Chapter 8 of Part 3 of the Social Welfare Consolidation Act 2005 and Chapter 4 of Part 3 of the Social Welfare (Consolidated Claims, Payments and Control) Regulations 2007 (S.I. No. 142 of 2007).

The key legislative provisions in this case are:

Section 179(1) of the Act of 2005, which provides for a definition of “carer” as follows:

““carer” means—

a. person who resides with and provides full-time care and attention to a relevant person, or

b. person who, subject to the conditions and in the circumstances that may be prescribed, does not

reside with but who provides full-time care and attention to a relevant person.” and

Section 179(4) of the Act of 2005, which provides as follows:

“(4) For the purposes of the definition of ‘relevant person’ in this Chapter, a person shall not be

regarded as requiring full-time care and attention unless the person has such a disability that he or

she—

a. requires from another person—

i. continual supervision and frequent assistance throughout the day in connection with normal

bodily functions, or

ii. continual supervision in order to avoid danger to himself or herself, and

b. is likely to require such full-time care and attention for at least 12 consecutive months.”

Article 57(1)-(3) of S.I. No.142 of 2007 also provides that where it is shown to the satisfaction of a Deciding Officer or an Appeals Officer that adequate provision has been made for the care of the relevant person, a carer may engage in employment where the aggregate duration of the activities outside the home shall not exceed 15 hours per week and the earnings derived from employment outside the home shall not exceed €332.50 per week.

The issue before the Appeals Officer was to determine if the appellant was providing full time care and attention within the meaning of the legislation. In reviewing the Appeals Officer’s decision I didn’t concern myself with a large number of written comments submitted by the appellant in relation to the Appeals Officer’s report and instead focussed on the evidence relating to the core issue that was before the Appeals Officer.

I reached a number of conclusions in this review. Firstly, I concluded that the inclusion of certain, arguably extraneous, information by the Appeals Officer did not of itself render the decision erroneous by reason of a mistake of fact or law. It was simply an attempt by the Appeals Officer to grapple with detailed comments made and information provided by the appellant. Secondly, I found no evidence that the Appeals Officer had drawn certain inferences that the appellant had alleged were tainted with sexism in the context of male carers. Thirdly, I agreed with the appellant’s contention that there is no requirement that a carer must or should know what social welfare payments a caree is receiving.

Of more central relevance, however, was my finding that the Appeals Officer had correctly identified the relevance of the fact that there were a number of parties providing care in this case. That several people were providing care was relevant to the question of whether full time care and attention was being provided specifically by the appellant. That is not to say that other family members are not permitted to help with the caring role, but I found that the Appeals Officer was correct to identify how much care the appellant was providing within that context in order to assess whether it constituted full-time care and attention.

In conclusion, I found that the contentions advanced by the appellant did not identify any error of fact or law which rendered the decision of the Appeals Officer erroneous.

Outcome: Decision not revised.

2017/318/64 Carer’s Allowance

Question at issue: Full-Time Care Requirement

Grounds for review: It was submitted that an Appeals Officer erred both in law and in fact in his consideration of an appeal in relation to whether full-time care and attention was required by a person who was already in receipt of Disability Allowance. In summary, it was contended that the Appeals Officer failed to fully assess the application in a manner compatible with natural and constitutional justice, fair procedures and the relevant Departmental guidelines; that the Appeals Officer overlooked or afforded insufficient weight to significant medical evidence, including evidence of mental ill health; and that the Appeals Officer appeared to discriminate against mental health disabilities in favour of physical disabilities.

Background: The appellant submitted a claim for Carer’s Allowance in respect of the care of her husband but this was rejected, including on review, by the Department on the basis that the person being cared for did not meet the care requirements as set out in Section 179(4) of the Social Welfare Consolidation Act 2005. That decision was appealed and was again rejected, including on review, by an Appeals Officer.

Review: The relevant legislation in this case is Chapter 8 of Part 3 of the Social Welfare Consolidation Act 2005 and Chapter 4 of Part 3 of the Social Welfare (Consolidated Claims, Payments and Control) Regulations 2007 (S.I. No. 142 of 2007).

The key legislative provisions in this case were:

Section 179(1) of the Act of 2005, which provides for a definition of “carer” as follows:

““carer” means—

a. person who resides with and provides full-time care and attention to a relevant person, or

b. person who, subject to the conditions and in the circumstances that may be prescribed, does not

reside with but who provides full-time care and attention to a relevant person.”

And section 179(4) of the Act of 2005, which provides as follows:

“(4) For the purposes of the definition of ‘relevant person’ in this Chapter, a person shall not be

regarded as requiring full-time care and attention unless the person has such a disability that he or

she—

a. requires from another person—

i. continual supervision and frequent assistance throughout the day in connection with normal

bodily functions, or

ii. continual supervision in order to avoid danger to himself or herself, and

b. is likely to require such full-time care and attention for at least 12 consecutive months.”

There are therefore, two main requirements to be met in order to be entitled to Carer’s Allowance: that the carer must be providing full-time care and the caree must require that full-time care. It was clear from the Deciding Officer’s decision that the claim was disallowed on the basis that it was considered that the care required did not meet the statutory requirements, but the question of the care being provided was not at issue. While the question of the care provided is an important element to be considered, I did not agree with the appellant’s contention that the primary focus of the appeal should have been on the care provided by her.

With regard to the legislative requirements, I noted that the Appeals Officer had incorrectly paraphrased the applicable legislation in that he set out that the legislation in relation to the care required must be “on a continuous and continual basis for period of at least 12 months”. This is incorrect as the legislation does not specify that the care required must be continuous (as in all of the time), but rather that the caree requires from another person:

continual supervision (as in frequently or on a regular basis) and frequent assistance throughout the day in connection with normal bodily functions, OR continual supervision in order to avoid danger to himself or herself.

This error appeared to have been central to the Appeals Officer’s overall consideration of the appeal and in this respect I found that the Appeals Officer misdirected himself as to the level of care required as set out in the governing legislation.

In the course of my review I also reviewed all of the evidence which was before the Appeals Officer, including the medical evidence which indicated the caree was severely affected in relation to his mental health (there was a diagnosis of depression) and in relation to several aspect of his physical mobility and well-being (there was a diagnosis of epilepsy and ongoing repercussions from a past spinal fracture).

The Department’s guidelines on Carer’s Allowance, which are provided to facilitate medical assessors in determining eligibility for Carer’s Allowance, were referred to in the grounds for review wherein ‘Mental Health and Suicidal Intent’ is listed as a condition for which Carer’s Allowance would automatically be granted. The guidelines specify that the condition must be recent and medically confirmed.

Having reviewed the evidence, I formed the view that the Appeals Officer had factually erred in his account of the caree’s medical history and had overlooked significant details relating to those medical conditions and resulting care needs. I found that the Appeals Officer did not have due regard to the medical evidence relating to the appellant’s mental health in that he had incorrectly noted that the caree had not been attending psychiatry services when the evidence on file showed that he was attending a Consultant Psychiatrist. For that reason alone, I was satisfied that the Appeals Officer had erred and the decision should be revised.

It appeared to me that the Appeals Officer had also discounted significant medical and oral evidence in favour of his own observations during the limited period of time available for the oral hearing and that the medical evidence indicated that the caree required continual supervision in order to avoid danger to himself, in line with Section 179(4)(a)(ii) of the Social Welfare Consolidation Act 2005.

I also concluded that in incorrectly paraphrasing the governing legislation, the Appeals Officer misdirected himself and applied an incorrect legal standard.

Outcome: Decision revised and appeal allowed.

2018

2018/25 Carer’s Allowance

Question at issue: Eligibility (full time care provided)

Background: The appellant’s claim was disallowed on the grounds that he was not providing full time care and attention to the caree, as set out in the governing legislation. The information provided on the Carer’s Allowance application form was that the caree was residing in a property adjacent to the appellant. The appellant stated that he provided care to the caree 4.5 hours per day, 7 days per week. He stated that there was a communications link between the residences. The appellant outlined that the daily duties he performed for the caree included administrating medicine, shopping, taking the caree to hospital and GP appointments, and looking after her house. In his appeal, the appellant stated that although he did not provide full time care, his application was based on the hours for which he provided care. He requested a part payment of a Carer’s Allowance.

Consideration: The Appeals Officer considered all of the information provided by the appellant, with his application and on appeal. The legislation governing Carer’s Allowance is specific in that a person acting as a carer must be providing full time care, as set out in Section 179 (1)(b) of the Social Welfare Consolidation Act 2005. There is no provision in the legislation for a payment to be made in respect of part time care, as was set out in the appellant’s appeal. Noting the level of care provided by the appellant as stated on the application form, and his statement on appeal the appellant recognised that he was not providing full time care to the caree, the Appeals Officer concluded that the appellant did not meet the definition of “carer” as set out in the governing legislation.

Outcome: Appeal disallowed.

2018/26 Carer’s Allowance

Question at issue: Eligibility (full time care provided)

Background: The appellant applied for Carer’s Allowance in respect of the care provided to his father. The appellant’s claim was disallowed by the Department on the basis that he was not providing full time care and attention. A review under Section 317 of the Social Welfare Consolidation Act 2005 by way of oral hearing was recommended following further evidence being submitted by the appellant. Section 317 provides that an Appeals Officer may at any time revise any decision of an Appeals Officer, where it appears to the Appeals Officer that the decision was erroneous in light of new evidence or new facts brought to his or her notice since the date on which it was given.

Oral Hearing: The appellant stated when he made his application he provided care for 4 hours per day for 6 or 7 days per week. His father was admitted to hospital in January 2018 for approximately two weeks and was waiting for two surgical procedures. The appellant outlined that his father’s health had deteriorated since his hospital admission and he had lost two stone in weight. All his meals needed to be supervised. The appellant had to provide personal care to his father such as helping him out of bed, dressing, washing and toileting.

His father needed help with mobility and medication due to failing sight. The appellant also continued to bring his father to appointments and anywhere he needed to go. The appellant outlined that his hours of caring had increased since his father’s hospitalisation and he went over to his house at 8.30 a.m. most days and spent the whole day there. Other family members stayed with his father if the appellant needed to go anywhere. The appellant outlined that his mother had her own health issues and was unable to physically look after his father.

Consideration: Having examined all the evidence, including that adduced at oral hearing, the Appeals Officer concluded that while the appellant was providing care and assistance to his father at the time of his application, the amount of care he was providing at that time could not be considered to be full time care and attention as required under the legislation.

However, taking account of his evidence at oral hearing and the fact that his father’s health had deteriorated necessitating more personal care since his discharge from hospital, the Appeals Officer concluded that from the date his father was discharged from hospital, the appellant could be regarded as providing full-time care and attention within the meaning of the social welfare legislation from that date.

Outcome: Appeal partially allowed.

2018/27 Carer’s Allowance

Question at issue: Eligibility (medical – care required)

Background: The appellant’s application for Carer’s Allowance in respect of the care provided to his wife was disallowed by the Department on the grounds that full time care and attention was not required by the person being cared for. The appellant’s wife, in her early 50s, had a diagnosis of arthritis in her hands, shoulders and knees, spondylitis of the spine and gastritis. She was in receipt of Disability Allowance. The medical evidence consisted of the medical report completed by her GP. The appellant stated on the application form that her husband provided full time care 7 days a week. No detail was given in relation to daily duties. In appealing the decision, the appellant expressed his dissatisfaction with the disallowance and stated that his wife needed help.

Consideration: The question under appeal was whether the appellant’s wife required full time care and attention as defined in the legislation. The Appeals Officer noted the medical report completed by the caree’s GP which indicated diagnoses of arthritis in her hands, shoulders and knees, spondylitis of the spine and gastritis. The caree was awaiting a rheumatology appointment, was on medication and was getting hydrotherapy. The GP indicated that the caree had restricted movement due to pain in wrists, shoulders and knees. On the ability/disability profile, the GP had indicated that the caree was ‘moderately’ affected. The appellant noted that his wife got dizzy spells and her knees could go from underneath her. Though it had not yet happened, he was concerned about her falling and felt she needed to be supervised at all times.

Having considered the evidence including that adduced at oral hearing, the Appeals Officer concluded that while it was clear that the appellant’s wife had a number of medical conditions that had an impact on her daily functioning and that necessitated some assistance with daily activities, the Appeals Officer did not consider that the level required constituted either continual supervision and frequent assistance throughout the day in connection with normal bodily functions, or continual supervision in order to avoid danger to herself, as required in the governing legislation.

Outcome: Appeal disallowed.

2018/28 Carer’s Allowance

Question at issue: Eligibility (medical – care required)

Background: The appellant’s application for Carer’s Allowance in respect of the care provided to her mother was disallowed by the Department on the grounds that full time care and attention was not required by the person being cared for. The medical evidence showed that the caree had severe asthma, COPD and a history of hypertension and diverticulitis. On the disability/ability profile the GP indicated that the caree was severely affected in 5 areas: lifting/carrying, bending/kneeling/squatting, sitting/rising, climbing stairs, walking and the remaining 11 areas were normal. The GP indicated that the condition was likely to continue indefinitely. Subsequent to the Department’s decision, additional medical evidence was submitted from a consultant respiratory physician to the effect that the caree had end stage lung disease.

Oral Hearing: At the oral hearing the appellant outlined that her mother’s condition had deteriorated dramatically, that her medication was no longer effective and that surgery was not an option as she was too frail. The appellant outlined the daily care she provided including assistance with dressing, toileting, showering, cooking, cleaning/housework, administration of medication, transport to appointments. She said that she was the youngest of a large family and other family members were not in a position to care for their mother. She said that she would have liked to work part-time for the permitted 15 hours per week but could not countenance that as she was caring for both her son and her mother. The appellant stated that she would care for her mother even if her appeal were not successful.

Consideration: To qualify for Carer’s Allowance the caree must be so disabled that they require from another person continual supervision and frequent assistance throughout the day in connection with normal bodily functions, or continual supervision in order to avoid danger to themselves. The caree must be likely to require full-time care and attention for at least 12 consecutive months. The Appeals Officer noted the medical evidence submitted and the appellant’s oral evidence, in particular, the evidence that the caree needed ongoing assistance with the activities of daily living. The Appeals Officer concluded that it was shown that the caree met the medical criteria for the award of Carer’s Allowance.

Outcome: Appeal allowed.

2018/29 Carer’s Allowance

Question at issue: Eligibility (provision of full-time care)

Background: The appellant applied for Carer’s Allowance in respect of the care provided to his grandson. The application was refused by the Department on two grounds: (1) that there was no system of communication between the appellant’s household and the caree’s household and (2) that the appellant was not providing full-time care and attention to his grandson as the child was already receiving full-time care and attention within his own home from his mother.

Consideration: In relation to there being no system of communication between the appellant’s household and the caree’s household, the Appeals Officer found that this did not stand up in relation to the unchallenged evidence that the appellant spent most of his time, including most overnights, in his grandson’s home. The question in relation to the existence of a mobile phone was unanswered by the appellant on the application form and the ‘no’ box was ticked by the Social Welfare Inspector in relation to whether there was a panic button or other form of direct communication between the two households. The Appeals Officer found that this ground for refusal was weak in the overall context of an appellant who was mostly physically present with the child.

In relation to the appellant not providing full-time care and attention, the medical evidence before the Appeals Officer was clear that the caree had very complex care needs requiring round-the-clock interventions. Special training in how to care for the child was given to the appellant and his daughter (as the two principal carers) as attested to by Crumlin Children’s Hospital. The evidence on file provided by the appellant and his daughter and the medics who were personally known to them was that the child required and received from his grandfather, an extraordinary amount of care and attention, well in excess of the Department’s 35 hours per week guidelines as to what constituted ‘full-time care’. The Appeals Officer was of the view that if it was considered that a full week consisted of 168 hours and the child needed care for all of them, the caree’s mother could not possibly do that, or even half of that, alone, in the context of having two other young children and, at the time of application, expecting another child. The Appeals Officer concluded that the uncontested evidence was that the appellant provided care to the caree for well in excess of 60 hours per week. The Appeals Officer was of the view that to describe the appellant as being in a ‘secondary’ caring role was an unfair representation of the care arrangements. The Appeals Officer outlined that the term ‘full-time care and attention’ could mean radically different things in different contexts and in the context of this child it meant multiples of the Department’s 35 hours per week guideline. The Appeals Officer, based on the evidence presented, formed the view that it would not be humanly possible for the child’s mother to provide full-time care and attention in the context of the child’s complex care needs and the evidence supported a conclusion that the appellant was certainly providing ‘full-time care and attention’ in the context of the legislation and the guidelines.

Outcome: Appeal allowed.

2018/318/65 Carer’s Allowance

Question at issue: Eligibility (Care Required)

Background: The appellant submitted a claim for Carer’s Allowance in respect of the care provided to her husband. The application was refused on the basis that the Deciding Officer and an Appeals Officer on appeal considered that the person being cared for did not meet the care requirements as set out in Section 179(4) of the 2005 Act.

Grounds for review: The primary contention submitted by the appellant was that the Appeals Officer either overlooked, or awarded insufficient weight to a number of significant facts outlined by the appellant in the course of her appeal and that the Appeals Officer failed to give proper consideration to the level of supervision required by the appellant’s husband in order to avoid danger to himself.

Review: The conditions for receipt of Carer’s Allowance are contained in Chapter 8 of Part 3 of the Social Welfare Consolidation Act 2005 and Regulations made thereunder.

Section 179 (1) provides that a “carer” means:

(a) a person who resides with and provides full-time care and attention to a relevant person,

or

(b) a person who, subject to the conditions and in the circumstances that may be prescribed,

does not reside with but who provides full-time care and attention to a relevant person.

“relevant person” means a person (other than a person in receipt of an increase of disablement

pension under section 78 in respect of constant attendance) who has such a disability that he or she

requires full-time care and attention, and who—

(a) has attained the age of 16 years, or

(b) is under the age of 16 years and is a person in respect of whom an allowance is paid for

domiciliary care of children under section 61 of the Health Act 1970;

(2) The Minister may make regulations specifying the circumstances and conditions under which a

person is to be regarded as providing full-time care and attention to a relevant person.”

The circumstances and conditions under which a person is to be regarded as providing full- time care and attention to a relevant person are set out in Chapter 4 of Part 3 of the Social Welfare (Consolidated Claims Payments and Control) Regulations, 2007 (S.I. No. 142 of 2007).

The circumstances in which a person shall be regarded as requiring full-time care and attention are set out in Section 179 (4) of the Social Welfare Consolidation Act 2005 (as amended) which provides that “a relevant person shall be regarded as requiring full-time care and attention where –

“(a) the person has such a disability that he or she requires from another person—

(i) continual supervision and frequent assistance throughout the day in connection with

normal bodily functions, or

(ii) continual supervision in order to avoid danger to himself or herself,

(b) the person has such a disability that he or she is likely to require full-time care and

attention for at least 12 consecutive months, and

(c) the nature and extent of the person’s disability has been certified in the prescribed manner

by a registered medical practitioner.”

There are therefore, two requirements to be met in order to be entitled to Carer’s Allowance: the carer must be providing full-time care and the caree must require care. With regard to these legislative requirements, I noted that the Appeals Officer has correctly set out the applicable legislation.

It was clear from the Deciding Officer’s decision that the appellant’s claim was disallowed on the basis that it was considered that the care required by the caree did not meet the statutory requirements. The question of care being provided was not at issue. While the question of care provided is an important element to be considered, the focus of this appeal was on the care required and not on the care provided by the appellant. In this respect, I noted that many of the points submitted by the appellant related to the care being provided.

The appellant’s submission was to the effect that the Appeals Officer erred in overlooking significant details relating to the care needs of the caree, and, in particular that the Appeals Officer failed to properly consider the caree’s mental health issues and the level of supervision he required as a result of those issues in order to avoid danger to himself.

In the course of my review, I considered the evidence which was before the Appeals Officer which included medical evidence with a particular focus on the appellant’s contention that her husband required full time care and attention within the meaning of the governing social welfare legislation.

In considering this matter, I examined each aspect of the ‘care test’ set out in Section 179(4) of the 2005 Act:

Whether the caree required continual supervision and frequent assistance throughout the day in connection with normal bodily functions

In light of the appellant’s testimony and the medical evidence, it was clear that the appellant assisted her husband to a considerable extent with some of the activities of daily living e.g. preparation of meals, taking his medication, accompanying him to medical appointments etc.

However, in my view, the evidence did not show that the caree required continual supervision and frequent assistance throughout the day in connection with normal bodily functions (such as  dressing, going to the toilet, bathing etc.) as required in the governing legislation.

Whether the caree required continual supervision in order to avoid danger to himself The evidence which was before the Appeals Officer regarding this aspect of the legislative care test included the documentary and oral evidence adduced by the appellant. The medical evidence made no specific references to the question of danger, so I did not consider the medical evidence relevant in considering this aspect of the care test. I noted however, that the medical evidence outlined that the caree was taking anti-depressants.

The evidence also showed that the caree had regular falls and on occasion in the past this had resulted in significant injury.

Notwithstanding that my review of the Appeals Officer’s decision, his subsequent review of that decision and having regard to the medical evidence and the direct evidence of the appellant at the oral hearing, I was satisfied that the Appeals Officer gave full consideration to all of the evidence and has not overlooked any of the evidence presented. While it was clear that the appellant was understandably concerned about her husband’s general health issues and their effects on him, on balance, I did not consider that the totality of the evidence presented pointed to a need for continual supervision to be provided to the caree in order to avoid danger to himself.

Outcome: Decision not revised.

2018/318/66 Carer’s Allowance

Question at issue: Eligibility (Care Provided)

Grounds for Review: The appellant’s solicitors requested a review, under Section 318 of the Social Welfare Consolidation Act 2005, of the Appeals Officer decision on the grounds that the Appeals Officer erred in fact and law in concluding that the care which the appellant provided to her uncle could not be regarded as full-time care and attention within the meaning of the social welfare legislation.

It was contended that the Appeals Officer failed to take account of the fact that the appellant was effectively on-call 24 hours a day and it was submitted that the on-call periods must be considered as part of the overall provision of care. It was further contended that there is no legislative basis for the requirement that a carer must be providing 35 hours per week in care. In this respect it was submitted by the appellant’s solicitors that arguably such a requirement would be contrary to law, or at least morally indefensible, as it would create an effective pay rate of €5.97 per hour, which is substantially below the minimum pay rate.

Background: The appellant was awarded Carer’s Allowance in respect of the care she provided to her uncle. Following an investigation by the Department, a Deciding Officer relying on Section 302(b) of the Social Welfare Consolidation Act 2005 determined that the appellant was not entitled to Carer’s Allowance for a two month period as she was not providing full-time care and attention in line with the eligibility criteria for Carer’s Allowance. The effect of this decision was the raising of an overpayment. An Appeals Officer disallowed the appeal on the same grounds as the Deciding Officer.

Review: The conditions for receipt of Carer’s Allowance are contained in Chapter 8 of Part 3 of the Social Welfare Consolidation Act 2005 and Regulations made thereunder.

Section 179 (1) provides that a “carer” means:

“(a) a person who resides with and provides full-time care and attention to a relevant person,

or

(b) a person who, subject to the conditions and in the circumstances that may be prescribed,

does not reside with but who provides full-time care and attention to a relevant person.

“relevant person” means a person (other than a person in receipt of an increase of disablement pension under section 78 in respect of constant attendance) who has such a disability that he or she requires full-time care and attention, and who—

(a) has attained the age of 16 years, or

(b) is under the age of 16 years and is a person in respect of whom an allowance is paid for

domiciliary care of children under section 61 of the Health Act 1970;

(2) The Minister may make regulations specifying the circumstances and conditions under which a person is to be regarded as providing full-time care and attention to a relevant person.”

The circumstances and conditions under which a person is to be regarded as providing full-time care and attention to a relevant person are set out in Chapter 4 of Part 3 of the Social Welfare (Consolidated Claims Payments and Control) Regulations, 2007 (S.I. No. 142

of 2007).

Article 136 provides:

“136. A carer may, for the purposes of Chapter 8 of Part 3 and this Chapter, continue to be regarded

as providing full time care and attention to a relevant person where –

(a) he or she would qualify for payment of an allowance but for the fact that either the carer or the relevant person is undergoing medical or other treatment of a temporary nature in an institution for a period of not longer than 13 weeks,

or

(b) the relevant person is attending –

(i) a non residential course of rehabilitation training provided by an organisation (being an organisation recognised by the Minister for Health and Children for the purposes of the 4.6 Case Studies: Section 318 Reviews135 provision of such training), or

(ii) a non residential place of day care approved by the Minister for Health and Children, or

(c) subject to paragraph (d), where it is shown to the satisfaction of a deciding officer or an appeals officer that adequate provision has been made for the care of the relevant person, a carer may –

(i) engage in employment, or

(ii) engage in self-employment, or

(iii) undertake such training or courses of education as the Minister may from time to time determine.

(d) the aggregate duration of the activities outside the home referred to in sub-paragraphs (i), (ii) and (iii) shall not exceed 15 hours per week.”

My conclusion, on review, was that the legislation as outlined above envisages the actual provision of care and attention and does not make any reference to the taking account of on- call periods. In this respect, I did not consider that the Appeals Officer had erred in law or in fact.

In relation to the contention that there is no legislative basis for the requirement that a carer must be providing 35 hours per week in care, I agreed that it is the case that the legislation does not set out the number of hours of care that constitutes full time care and attention. In the absence of a legal definition, full time care is considered to be 35 hours per week by the Department. I formed the view that it is open to the Department to provide such guidance in order to ensure a consistent approach by all decision makers in their consideration of whether full time care and attention is being provided. The report of the Social Welfare Inspector outlined that the appellant spends approximately 17 hours per week caring for her uncle. The Appeals Officer noted in his report of the oral hearing of the appellant’s appeal, that the evidence adduced was very much in line with what the appellant told the Social Welfare Inspector albeit that at the oral hearing the appellant outlined some additional hours in the afternoons. Notwithstanding that, the number of hours of care provided by the appellant per week fell significantly short of the 35 hours per week considered by the Department to be the required number of hours of care in order to be considered to be providing full time care and attention. I did not consider that the decision of the Appeals Officer was rendered erroneous by his adherence to this guidance.

In relation to the contention that the requirement to be providing care for 35 hours per week is contrary to law or as contended morally indefensible, I outlined that the rates of payment of all social welfare payments are set out in social welfare legislation as passed by the Oireachtas. Social welfare payments provide income support to people meeting certain contingencies such as unemployment, illness or, as in this case, the provision of care and are  also subject to scheme specific eligibility conditions. I outlined that social welfare payments are not ‘pay’ in the sense of being subject to employment law legislation and/or national minimum wage legislation and as such I found that this contention was misplaced.

Outcome: Decision not revised.

2019:

2019/27 Carer’s Allowance

Question at issue: Eligibility (care provided)

Background: The appellant’s application for Carer’s Allowance was refused on the basis that she was not providing full-time care and attention as required by the governing legislation. On the application form, the appellant stated that she assisted the caree in bathing and showering, dressing and toileting. The caree also needed assistance with mobility. The appellant completed a full-time care and attention form, issued by the Department, in which she stated that she resided a short distance from the caree. She stated that she provided care to the caree 7 hours per day, 3 days per week, and set out the type of assistance she provided. The caree resided alone. In her appeal, the appellant provided additional medical information and a schedule of care which she provided for the caree, in which she stated that she had increased the hours during which she provided care.

Oral Hearing: At the oral appeal hearing the appellant stated that the caree’s medical condition had worsened and she was now prone to falls. The appellant stated that she increased the number of hours that she provided care, since the original decision was made, to 5 hours on three days and 9 hours on another three days. Further letters were provided relating to the caree’s medical condition.

Consideration: The Appeals Officer noted the level of care which the appellant stated that she was providing prior to the Deciding Officer’s decision being made on her application. He also noted that the level of care, which she submitted with her appeal, commenced some months after that decision had been made, as confirmed by the appellant at the oral hearing.

The Appeals Officer was restricted to taking account of evidence which existed at, or prior to, the date of the application. As the caree’s circumstances had changed since the date of the original decision, and the level of care provided as set out in the appeal was based on those changed circumstances, the Appeals Officer was restricted to assessing the evidence on the basis of the level of care that was being provided at the date of claim.

The Appeals Officer concluded that at the date of claim the appellant was not providing full- time care and attention to the caree as required by the governing legislation. The appellant was advised that it was open to her to re-apply for Carer’s Allowance and have her current eligibility assessed on the basis of any change in circumstances.

Outcome: Appeal disallowed

2019/28 Carer’s Allowance

Question at issue: Eligibility (care required and care provided)

Background: The appellant applied for Carer’s Allowance and was refused on the basis that she was not providing full-time care and attention to the caree and that the caree was not in need of full-time care and attention as required by the governing legislation.

The appellant stated on the application form that she provided care to the caree 13 hours per day, 7 days per week and she outlined the daily duties that she performed for the caree. The appellant stated that she was working up to 15 hours per week and planned to remain working for up to 15 hours per week. The appellant’s employer completed a form confirming the number of hours that the appellant worked each week for a set period. The employer stated that she worked not less than 24 hours for each week during the period in question.

In her appeal the appellant stated that she had to work full-time in order to pay off her mortgage. She stated that if she was unsuccessful in her application she would reduce her working hours.

The medical report in respect of the caree, completed by his GP, stated that he had severe depression for a number of years. He had a medical history of severe and chronic depression, hypertension and mild coronary artery disease. He had multiple admissions to hospital as a result of his medical conditions and had attended specialists and was prescribed multiple medications. The manner in which his medical condition affected his ability to perform certain activities was stated to be severe to profound in the case of mental health/behaviour and normal in the case of all other listed activities. In her appeal, the appellant stated that the caree had been an in-patient in two hospitals on several occasions. She stated that on his last visit he was deemed not to be fit to live on his own and she elaborated further on the care requirements of the caree.

Consideration: The questions to be considered by the Appeals Officer were whether the caree was in need of full-time care and if the appellant was providing full-time care as set out in the governing legislation.

The Appeals Officer noted the caree’s medical condition, the treatment that he was receiving and the degree to which it affected his activities of daily living, as certified by his GP. The Appeals Officer also noted the description of his medical condition and his care needs, as set out by the appellant in her appeal. On the basis of the information available to him the Appeals Officer determined that the caree was in need of full-time care and attention within the meaning of the governing legislation.

The Appeals Officer noted the documentation provided by the appellant’s employer stating that she continually worked more than 15 hours per week for the period from July 2018 to March 2019. The relevant regulations provide that a person who is working outside the home for more than 15 hours per week cannot be considered to be providing full-time care to a caree. On the basis of the information available to the Appeals Officer, he determined that the appellant was working more hours outside the home than those permitted by the regulations and that the appellant could not be considered to be providing full-time care. The appellant was advised that should her circumstances change it was open for her to re- apply for a Carer’s Allowance and have her eligibility assessed on the basis of any change in her circumstances.

Outcome: Appeal disallowed

2019/29 Carer’s Allowance

Question at issue: Eligibility (care required)

Background: The appellant’s application for Carer’s Allowance in respect of the care of his wife was disallowed by the Department on the grounds that it had not been established that the caree required full-time care and attention. The appellant’s wife, who was in her late 30’s, had diagnoses of fibromyalgia, chronic fatigue, chronic back pain and depression. She was in receipt of Disability Allowance. The appellant indicated on his application form that the daily duties he carried out for his wife included: household chores, looking after their child, school runs, grocery shopping, cooking, laundry, and caring for his wife’s daily needs.

Oral hearing: At the oral hearing, the appellant provided a detailed account of his wife’s medical conditions and how they affected her daily functioning. The appellant explained how his wife needed assistance in getting out of bed, going up and down stairs, getting in and out of the car, and putting on socks. He described how she could not manage ordinary household chores or to look after their two young children without assistance.

He stated that she managed her own medication, and used the toilet, bathed/showered and dressed herself, apart from putting on her socks, independently. The appellant stated that he was not employed himself and had never been employed. His wife had worked full-time prior to becoming ill.

Consideration: The Appeals Officer noted that from the detailed account provided by the appellant in his written evidence and at oral hearing, it was evident that he took responsibility for all household tasks. It was noted that the appellant looked after the couple’s two children as well as providing practical assistance to his wife with whatever she needed in addition to giving her emotional support.

Full-time care and attention is defined in Section 179 (4) of the 2005 Act as “continual supervision and frequent assistance throughout the day in connection with normal bodily functions”, or “continual supervision in order to avoid danger to himself or herself”. While the Appeals Officer accepted that the appellant’s wife required assistance and was restricted in many of her otherwise normal daily activities, she was not satisfied that it reached the level where it could be considered that she required full-time care and attention as defined in the governing legislation.

Outcome: Appeal disallowed

2019/30 Carer’s Allowance

Question at issue: Eligibility (care required)

Background: The appellant applied for Carer’s Allowance in May 2018 in respect of the care she provided to her husband. The application was disallowed on the grounds that the caree was not in need of full-time care and attention as prescribed in the governing legislation. The caree was in his early 60s and was diagnosed with Ischaemic Heart Disease (IHD) with recent coronary artery bypass surgery, Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease (COPD) and peripheral vascular disease for which he was awaiting surgery. He was deemed to be severely affected in terms of his manual dexterity, ability to reach, to lift/carry, to bend/ kneel/squat to sit/rise, to stand, to climb stairs and to walk. The appellant explained that her husband had been advised that he was facing more cardiac surgery. She stated that due to COPD, he could not go anywhere without assistance. She stated that he would become very faint and lethargic which left him with a very poor quality of life and she stated that his independence was gone. She explained that her husband needed her assistance on a daily basis and at night time, it could be difficult for him given that he could wake up feeling breathless.

In support of her appeal, the appellant submitted additional medical evidence which included report from her husband’s doctor. It stated that the caree had a quadruple bypass in April 2018 and he had shortness of breath on minimal exertion and got cramps in both legs when walking. It stated that his shortness of breath may be caused from mild COPD and IHD.

Consideration: The appellant’s husband was suffering from serious illnesses and had quadruple by-pass surgery in April 2018. The appellant’s GP had certified that the caree was severely affected in all aspects of his agility and mobility.

It was noted that the caree would require further surgery which was complicated by the fact that he was suffering with COPD. As per her letter of appeal, the appellant had clearly  outlined her husband’s ill health.

It was accepted that the caree was likely to recover from his surgery; however, he remained severely affected by his condition and the Appeals Officer took due consideration for the requirement for further surgery as confirmed by the caree’s GP.

Having therefore, considered all of the evidence on file and noting that the caree was severely affected in terms of agility and mobility, the Appeals Officer concluded the evidence confirmed that the caree was severely compromised in terms of his ability to manage basic tasks of daily life without significant care and attention. In such circumstances, the Appeals Officer was satisfied that the caree required full-time care and attention. The evidence also indicated the requirement for supervision given that the caree was severely affected with mobility and suffered with shortness of breath on movement. The evidence also indicated that the caree was likely to require full-time care and attention for at least 12 consecutive months, as provided for in the governing legislation.

Outcome: Appeal allowed.

2019/318/63 Carer’s Allowance

Question at issue: Eligibility (Care Required)

Grounds for review: An advocate acting on behalf of the appellant requested a review of the Appeals Officer’s decision on the basis that the Appeals Officer erred in fact and in law. The  question at issue was whether the appellant’s son required care within the meaning of the governing social welfare legislation. Specifically, it was contended that the Appeals Officer failed to:

• fully assess the appellant’s application and subsequent oral hearing in a manner compatible with natural and constitutional justice and fair procedures – in this respect it was asserted that the Appeals Officer did not fully consider the factors given at the oral hearing;

• give appropriate weight to the evidence presented;

• assess the risk factor in relation to the child’s safety; and

• fully recognise the additional care needs carried out by the appellant for her son.

Background: The appellant’s claim for Carer’s Allowance in respect of the care of her son was refused on the basis that the Deciding Officer of the Department considered that the person being cared for did not meet the care requirements as set out in Section 179(4) of the 2005 Act. The subsequent appeal was disallowed and the position remained unchanged following a review conducted by the Appeals Officer under the provisions of Section 317 of the 2005 Act in light of additional evidence provided by the appellant.

Review: The conditions for receipt of Carer’s Allowance are contained in Chapter 8 of Part 3 of the 2005 Act and Regulations made thereunder. In accordance with Section 179 (1) there are two requirements to be met in order to be entitled to Carer’s Allowance: the carer must be providing full-time care and the caree must require care.

The circumstances and conditions under which a person is to be regarded as providing full- time care and attention to a relevant person are set out in Chapter 4 of Part 3 of the Social Welfare (Consolidated Claims Payments and Control) Regulations, 2007 (S.I. No. 142 of 2007).

The circumstances in which a person shall be regarded as requiring full-time care and attention are set out in Section 179 (4) of the 2005 Act which provides that “a relevant person shall be regarded as requiring full-time care and attention where –

(a) the person has such a disability that he or she requires from another person—

(i) continual supervision and frequent assistance throughout the day in connection with

normal bodily functions, or

(ii) continual supervision in order to avoid danger to himself or herself,

(b) the person has such a disability that he or she is likely to require full-time care and

attention for at least 12 consecutive months, and

(c) the nature and extent of the person’s disability has been certified in the prescribed manner

by a registered medical practitioner.”

In my review of the Appeals Officer’s decision, I found no grounds to support the contention that the Appeals Officer had failed to consider all of the evidence presented by the appellant. The remaining contentions related by and large to the weight the Appeals Officer afforded to the evidence submitted by the appellant and the medical evidence.

I noted that the Appeals Officer formed the view that there was no doubt but that the appellant’s son required a level of care, but it had not been established that he required continual supervision and frequent assistance throughout the day in connection with normal bodily functions or continual supervision in order to avoid danger to himself.

It was also asserted that the Appeals Officer erred in refusing to obtain photographic evidence on the grounds that it was not medical evidence and therefore irrelevant. From my review it was unclear what specific evidence was being referred to but the appellant was afforded an opportunity to submit this evidence which could then be reviewed under the provisions of Section 317 of the 2005 Act.

Insofar as it was contended that the Appeals Officer erred in failing to access the risk factor in relation to the safety of the appellant’s son, it seemed to me that this assertion was related to the contention that if the appellant did not provide constant care and attention her son’s health would deteriorate rapidly and this would ultimately result in him being admitted to ICU. From my review of the file, I was satisfied that this assertion was not supported by the evidence. The Appeals Officer reported that the appellant’s son’s last admission to hospital was some years previous and the medical evidence before the Appeals Officer indicated that the appellant’s son was moderately affected by his conditions in some areas. While the caree needed assistance with diet and sugar monitoring, insulin calculation and administration, all other activities were indicted as normal. The evidence also indicated that the caree could manage many functions of daily living independently but required supervision with bathing and showering. However, the evidence did not, in my opinion, support a conclusion that the caree required ‘continual supervision in order to avoid danger to himself’ as required by Section 179 (4) of the 2005 Act.

The evidence which was before the Appeals Officer regarding this latter aspect of the legislative care test included the documentary and oral evidence adduced at the oral hearing. The medical evidence made no specific references to the question of danger. Having regard to the totality of the evidence that was before the Appeals Officer, I did not consider that the evidence supported a conclusion of a need for continual supervision to be provided to the caree in order to avoid danger to himself.

It was clear from the Deciding Officer’s decision that the appellant’s claim was disallowed on the basis that it was considered that the care required by the appellant’s son did not meet the statutory requirements. The question of care being provided was not at issue. I noted however that many of the points submitted by the appellant’s advocate related to the care provided by the appellant. While the question of care provided is an important element to be considered, the focus of the appeal in this case had to be on the care required by the caree and not on the care provided by the carer.

Outcome: Decision not revised

2020:

2020/22 Carer’s Allowance

Question at issue: Eligibility (care provided)

Background: The appellant’s application for Carer’s Allowance was refused on the grounds that he was not providing full-time care and attention as required by the governing legislation. In his application form, the appellant stated that he resided 10 kilometres from the care recipient’s address, he worked during the week and sometimes at weekends and that he intended to remain at work for up to 15 hours per week. He stated that he provided care seven days a week but did not state how many hours per day he provided this care. He outlined that there was a communication link between the residences. He described the daily duties that he performed for the care recipient as reminding him to eat sometimes and to take medication. He stated that he brought the care recipient to collect his pension and also helped with personal hygiene and housework. He stated that the care recipient resided alone.

In his appeal, the appellant stated that he was providing full-time care to the care recipient who had substantial medical needs. A letter from a public representative was provided which stated that the appellant was of the view that he had been providing quite substantial care to the care recipient. At the time of the appeal the appellant informed the Appeals Officer that he had ceased caring for the care recipient and stated that he had been available and looking for full-time employment.

Consideration: The Appeals Officer noted the information provided by the appellant in his application form. He noted that the appellant stated that he was in employment and that he intended to work less than 15 hours per week. He noted that while the appellant stated that he was providing care to the care recipient seven days a week, he did not state how many hours care he provided each day. The Appeals Officer concluded that while the appellant set out in general terms the duties he had been performing for the care recipient, he had not provided sufficient information in either his application or in his appeal to demonstrate that he was providing care to a level or for a sufficient time period that could be considered to be full-time in nature within the meaning of the governing legislation.

Outcome: Appeal disallowed

2020/23 Carer’s Allowance

Question at issue: Eligibility (care provided)

Background: The appellant’s application for Carer’s Allowance was refused on the grounds that she was not providing full-time care to the care recipient as required by the governing legislation.

The appellant lived three kilometers from the care recipient and stated in her application form that she provided 28 hours care over seven days every week. The medical report showed that the care recipient was diagnosed with anxiety, panic disorder and depression and the conditions were expected to last indefinitely. In the ability/disability profile the care recipient was assessed as severely affected in relation to mental health and had hospital admissions in connection with psychiatric issues. He was on high doses of medication to treat his conditions. The medical evidence also outlined that the care recipient’s mental health had deteriorated dramatically in the previous year and he could not function or look after himself. A social worker was visiting weekly and a new plan was being put in place for homecare.

Consideration: At the oral hearing the appellant provided a detailed account of the care provided to the care recipient. She outlined that on a typical day she went to the care recipient’s house and, in addition to attending to household chores, assisted with getting the care recipient out of bed, washing, dressing and preparing food. The care recipient was prescribed some 20 tablets per day and the appellant dispensed this medication. At lunchtime the appellant brought the care recipient to her home until late evening when he returned to his own home. The appellant also informed that since the date of the Department’s decision the care recipient had been diagnosed with vertigo and prescribed additional medication in connection with that diagnosis.

The Appeals Officer noted that while full-time care is not defined in legislation, the Department considers 35 hours of care per week to be necessary to meet the full-time care standard set out in the governing legislation. The Appeals Officer also noted that the Department was not satisfied that the appellant’s provision of care met this threshold. However, having regard to the evidence adduced at the oral hearing the Appeals Officer was satisfied that the appellant had not included the hours of care provided to the care recipient in her own home. In those circumstances, the Appeals Officer was satisfied that the appellant was providing full-time care and that the level of care provided was well in excess of the guidelines set out by the Department.

Outcome: Appeal allowed

2020/24 Carer’s Allowance

Question at issue: Eligibility (care required)

Background: The appellant’s application for Carer’s Allowance was disallowed on the grounds that it was considered that it had not been demonstrated that the care recipient was in need of full-time care and attention as required by the governing legislation.

The medical report stated that the care recipient, aged in his early 40s, suffered from lower back pain arising from an accident several years previously. He had no history of surgery or recent hospital admissions. At the time of application, he was waiting to see a specialist and was prescribed medication for his condition which was stated to affect his mental health. The medical evidence stated that the care recipient was independent in terms of feeding, continence, and bathing/showering, and dependent in dressing. He was independent in terms of mobility but had some difficulty with walking due to pain. His GP stated that he sustained a deficit in his activities of daily living of at least 25% to 30% since his accident. Letters from a specialist were provided which stated that the care recipient was walking/moving independently. Following the results of an MRI the care recipient was advised to continue with physiotherapy and was encouraged to do

core strengthening exercises and pool-based exercises.

In his appeal, the appellant stated that he did everything for the care recipient and referred to  the content of the report completed by the care recipient’s GP.

Consideration: The Appeals Officer noted that the care recipient’s GP indicated that he was independent in most functions with the exception of mental health and dressing. Based on the GP’s report that the care recipient “can need help” with dressing the Appeals Officer concluded that the need for help was occasional and not continuous or frequent. The Appeals Officer also noted that the GP stated that the care recipient had some difficulty with mobility, despite indicating that he was independent in relation to this activity.

Section 179(4) of the 2005 Act provides that a person shall not be regarded as requiring full-time care and attention unless the person has such a disability that requires “continual supervision and frequent assistance throughout the day in connection with normal bodily functions”, or “continual supervision in order to avoid danger to himself or herself”.

Having regard to the totality of the evidence presented in this case, the Appeals Officer concluded that the need for continuous supervision or frequent assistance in connection with normal bodily functions had not been demonstrated or supported by the evidence. Consideration of the need for supervision in order to avoid danger to himself did not arise.

Outcome: Appeal disallowed

2020/25 Carer’s Allowance

Question at issue: Eligibility (care required)

Background: The appellant’s application for Carer’s Allowance was disallowed on the grounds that the care recipient did not require full-time care and attention as required by the governing legislation. The care recipient, in her late 40s, had diagnoses of abdominal wall defect and mental health issues. The care recipient’s GP certified that the care recipient suffered from bipolar disorder and her physical ailments had an adverse effect on her mental health. It was stated that she required someone with her at all times, required assistance getting in and out of the bath and was dependent due to restricted mobility caused by abdominal pain. It was stated that the care recipient was expected to require on-going care for a period of 12 to 24 months.

In support of his claim the appellant submitted an additional GP report where it was certified that the care recipient had a long history of mental health issues and required numerous medications. She was diagnosed with a stage 1B melanoma which had been excised and required on-going treatment. It was stated that she had suffered severely with abdominal wall issues over the last number of years which required surgery. Following complications arising from surgery the care recipient was on a waiting list for combined plastic surgery and gastrointestinal surgeons to coordinate a repair. It was stated that she had an open wound which needed repair and had been in constant pain related to this issue. The GP outlined that the care recipient had been suffering from unusual seizure like episodes and had been diagnosed with a functional neurological disorder. It was stated that the combined issues had a significant debilitating effect on her day to day quality of life.

In appealing the decision, the appellant outlined that the care recipient had a long history of poor health for which she had been heavily medicated for the past number of years. He explained that due to abdominal issues she had been in constant pain and unable to walk or complete basic tasks and required strong doses of morphine. He outlined that arising from the certified neurological condition the care recipient was prone to collapse and therefore he had to be with her at all times.

Consideration: Section 179(4) of the 2005 Act provides that a person shall not be regarded as requiring full-time care and attention unless the person has such a disability that requires “continual supervision and frequent assistance throughout the day in connection with normal bodily functions”, or “continual supervision in order to avoid danger to himself or herself”.

The Appeals Officer noted that the care recipient had been diagnosed with multiple chronic conditions and had significant mobility issues for which she required assistance. Having regard to the care report the Appeals Officer noted that due to mental health issues and other diagnoses the care recipient required someone with her at all times. The Appeals Officer was satisfied that the evidence confirmed that the care recipient required continual supervision and frequent assistance throughout the day and that this requirement was likely to continue for a period in excess of at least one year.

Outcome: Appeal allowed

2020/26 Carer’s Allowance

Question at issue: Eligibility (care required and care provided)

Background: The appellant’s application for Carer’s Allowance in respect of the care of her mother was disallowed on the grounds that full-time care and attention was not required by the person being cared for and that, although the appellant was providing a certain level of care, the time involved was not considered to be full-time.

The care recipient, in her early 70s, had diagnoses of anaemia and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease. She lived across the road from the appellant, with the appellant’s sibling who was in full- time employment. The appellant indicated that she provided four hours of care each weekday and five hours of care each day at the weekend.

In appealing the decision, the appellant stated that she lived one minute from her mother’s house and was available during the day whenever the need arose. She stated that she prepared breakfast as otherwise the care recipient would not eat. She assisted with washing/showering in the morning and helped with changes of clothes which were sometimes wet due to incontinence. She prepared lunch and dinner, arranged GP visits, brought the care recipient to medical appointments, collected prescriptions, supervised the taking of medication, collected her pension, paid household bills, did the shopping and assisted with cleaning. A GP letter was submitted with the appeal which summarised what the appellant had informed the GP of in terms of her mother’s care needs. The GP stated that he would further review the care recipient regarding

these concerns.

Consideration: The Appeals Officer considered the medical evidence which consisted only of the GP medical report and which noted diagnoses of COPD and anaemia. It indicated that the care recipient was on two inhalers and no other medication. The care recipient was noted to have become forgetful and was due to attend for assessment of same. She was also awaiting assessment by a gynaecologist in relation to continence. Mild anxiety was reported. No impairment or care needs were reported in relation to consciousness/seizures, speech/hearing, vision or dressing. The GP noted the appellant prepared meals, but the care recipient was able to feed herself. She needed some assistance to shower. She was independent in her mobility but needed inhalers for any walks. The appellant estimated that she provided approximately 30 hours of care per week.

The Appeals Officer accepted from the evidence that the appellant provided considerable supports to her mother on a daily basis, both in terms of practical household support (cooking, cleaning, shopping, collecting pension) and some support with her mother’s personal care (assistance with showering, changing/dressing and taking medication). However, on the basis of the evidence, the Appeals Officer was not satisfied that it had been established that the extent and nature of the care that was required, and that was being provided by the appellant, was at a level where it could be considered either continual supervision and frequent assistance throughout the day in connection with normal bodily functions, or continual supervision to avoid danger to herself.

Outcome: Appeal disallowed

2020/27 Carer’s Allowance

Question under appeal: Eligibility (means)

Background: The appellant’s claim for Carer’s Allowance was disallowed on the basis that his means, assessed as being over €2,000 per week, were in excess of the statutory limit applicable in his case. The means derived from property, investments and an occupational pension.

In appealing the decision, the appellant submitted that he had no family support and was not receiving any state support to reflect the reality of their situation. He stated that he wanted to care for his wife at home for as long as possible and that the Carer’s Allowance would make a great difference. The appellant acknowledged that his income exceeded the means test limit and he did not contest the assessment of means but stated that he has been advised by many to make the application.

Consideration: The Appeals Officer outlined that, in accordance with Section 179(3) of the 2005 Act, a person’s means for the purposes of Carer’s Allowance must be calculated in accordance with the Rules contained in Part 5 of Schedule of that Act. The Appeals Officer outlined that under the governing legislation all cash income, investments, and the yearly advantage of any property other than a domestic dwelling are taken into account. The Appeals Officer also outlined that in assessing the means of a couple for the purposes of Carer’s Allowance, Article 144(b) of the 2007 Regulations provides for a weekly income disregard of €665.

The Appeals Officer was satisfied that the appellant’s means were assessed correctly in accordance with the legislative provisions and that there was no discretion to deviate from these provisions.

Outcome: Appeal disallowed

2020/318/63 Carer’s Allowance

Question at issue: Eligibility (care required)

Grounds for Review: The appellant requested a review of the Appeals Officer’s decision on the basis that he considered that the evidence submitted supported a conclusion that the qualifying conditions for the receipt of Carer’s Allowance were met.

Background: The appellant’s claim for Carer’s Allowance in respect of the care of his wife was refused on the basis that the Deciding Officer considered that the person being cared for did not meet the care requirements set out in Section 179(4) of the 2005 Act. The subsequent appeal was disallowed and the position remained unchanged following a review by the Appeals Officer under the provisions of Section 317 of the 2005 Act in light of additional evidence provided by the appellant. The appellant provided further correspondence stating that his wife’s condition had deteriorated and provided details of modifications being undertaken to the family home in recognition of his wife’s difficulties climbing stairs.

Review: The conditions for receipt of Carer’s Allowance are contained in Chapter 8 of Part 3 of the 2005 Act and Regulations made thereunder. In accordance with Section 179(1) there are two requirements to be met in order to be entitled to Carer’s Allowance: the carer must be providing full-time care and the caree must require full-time care. It was the second of these conditions that was at issue in this appeal.

The circumstances in which a person is to be regarded as requiring full-time care and attention are set out in Section 179 (4) of the 2005 Act which provides that a person shall not be regarded as requiring full-time care and attention unless the person has such a disability that he or she:

(a) requires from another person—

(i) continual supervision and frequent assistance throughout the day in connection with normal bodily functions, or

(ii) continual supervision in order to avoid danger to himself or herself,

(b) the person has such a disability that he or she is likely to require full-time care and attention for at least 12 consecutive months, and

(c) the nature and extent of the person’s disability has been certified in the prescribed manner by a registered medical practitioner.

In the course of my review I considered all of the evidence which was before the Appeals Officer including the medical evidence. In considering this matter I examined each aspect of the ‘care test’ set out in Section 179(4) of the 2005 Act separately.

The first question to be considered was whether the caree required continual supervision and frequent assistance throughout the day in connection with normal bodily functions.

The evidence before the Appeals Officer clearly established that the caree required considerable assistance throughout the day with cooking, cleaning, washing and dressing. It was also clear that the caree was primarily housebound and needed assistance with other household work, shopping and caring for the couple’s children. The Appeals Officer also noted that the caree tried to do some light housework but was only able to sustain this for short periods of time. The caree’s GP outlined that the caree had suffered from low back pain with sciatica for a number of years, which had gradually got worse. The GP outlined that the pain affected the caree’s sleep, she had trouble dressing, was on long-term pain relief and was attending a pain clinic. The GP also stated that he advised the caree regarding her safety in climbing stairs and also getting in/out of a bath as she was at risk of falling.

In light of the appellant’s written and oral testimony and the evidence from the caree’s treating doctor, it was clear that the caree required considerable assistance with all activities of daily living. I concluded that the evidence established that the caree required continual supervision and frequent assistance throughout the day in connection with normal bodily functions as required in the governing legislation and I considered that the Appeals Officer gave disproportionate weight to the evidence that the caree tried to do some light chores.

In light of the above conclusion and while it was not then necessary to examine if the caree met the requirements of Section 179(4)(a)(ii), I also examined this aspect of the care test.

The medical evidence which was before the Appeals Officer regarding this aspect of the legislative care test certified that the caree was at risk of falling when using stairs and also getting in/out of a bath. Evidence was also provided that work was underway to install a stair lift and construct a bedroom and shower downstairs as the caree could no longer use the stairs.

While I formed the view that the evidence may not have supported a conclusion that the caree required continual supervision in order to avoid danger to herself the evidence strongly supported the conclusion that the caree required continual supervision and frequent assistance throughout the day in connection with normal bodily functions.

Outcome: Decision revised

2020/318/64 Carer’s Allowance

Question at issue: Eligibility (care required)

Grounds for Review: The appellant in this case requested a review of the Appeals Officer’s decision on the basis that she considered that the decision was unfair and that the evidence submitted supported a conclusion that the qualifying conditions were met. The appellant also asserted that she and her husband were discriminated against on grounds of ethnic origin.

Background: The appellant’s claim for Carer’s Allowance in respect of the care of her husband was refused on the basis that the Deciding Officer of the Department considered that the person being cared for did not meet the care requirements as set out in Section 179(4) of the 2005 Act. The subsequent appeal was disallowed and the position remained unchanged following two further reviews by the Appeals Officer under the provisions of Section 317 of the 2005 Act in light of further correspondence from the appellant which included additional medical evidence.

Review: The appellant asserted that the Appeals Officer had failed in his duty by not taking account of the caree’s health problems and the evidence provided. It was also asserted that the Appeals Officer failed to take into consideration the caree’s mental health conditions. It was clear the Appeals Officer accepted that the appellant’s husband suffered from a number of medical conditions including mental health conditions and required a level of care that was provided by the appellant. However, the question before the Appeals Officer was whether the evidence supported a conclusion that the caree had a disability that required Continual supervision and frequent assistance throughout the day in connection with normal bodily functions. In this respect the Appeals Officer outlined that the caree’s GP certified that the caree’s incapacities included diaphragmatic hernia, depression, sleep apnea, knee and lower back pain. The GP also certified the caree as being normal in cognition and consciousness /seizures and as being independent in speech, hearing, vision, feeding, bathing/showering, dressing, continence and toileting. The GP also certified that the caree was dependent with regards to mobility and that knee and back pain were having an impact. The GP outlined that the caree’s mental health was affected.

From my review of the decision I was satisfied that the Appeals Officer had considered all of the medical evidence. I was satisfied from my review that the evidence provided by the appellant and the evidence from the caree’s GP and consultant psychiatrist did not support a conclusion that the caree required full-time care and attention within the meaning of Section 179(4) of the 2005 Act.

In addition, I found no evidence or reference in the Appeals Officer’s decision or in his consideration of the appellant’s requests to review his decision that he discriminated against the couple on grounds of ethnic origin.

Outcome: Decision not revised

2021:

2021/36 Carer’s Allowance

Question at issue: Eligibility – care required.

Background: The appellant’s application for Carer’s Allowance was disallowed by the Department on the grounds that the care recipient did not require full-time care and attention as required by the governing legislation.

The care recipient had diagnoses of depression/anxiety, borderline personality disorder with a history of addiction, self-harm, OCD and fractures.

The Department’s Medical Assessor who provided an opinion reported that there were no safety concerns and constant supervision was not required by the care recipient.

The medical report confirmed that the care recipient had impaired mental health with polysubstance addiction and history of overdoses. The medical reports also confirmed that the care recipient had up to 20 admissions to a mental health unit. The care recipient’s doctor confirmed that the care recipient had attended him on 17 occasions in the previous 5 months. The medical evidence also recorded a suicide attempt some years prior to the claim for Carer’s Allowance.

In the appeal submission, the appellant provided additional significant updates from the GP and she elaborated on the supports and care which included looking after his finances, doing shopping, preparation of food, administering medication, ensuring self-care and responding to self-harm ideation.

Consideration: The Appeals Officer noted that the Department’s Medical Assessor did not have the benefit of the additional report from care recipient’s GP.

The Appeals Officer outlined that in accordance with Section 179(4) of the Act, a person shall not be regarded as requiring full-time care and attention unless the person has such a disability that requires continual supervision and frequent assistance throughout the day in connection with normal bodily functions, or continual supervision in order to avoid danger to himself or herself.

The Appeals Officer took account of the hospital admissions, frequent medical support and medication management/supervision. He found that the appellant had made a convincing submission which was corroborated by additional medical evidence and concluded that the evidence confirmed that the care recipient required constant supervision in order to avoid being a danger to himself.

Outcome: Appeal allowed.

2021/37: Carer’s Allowance

Question at issue: Eligibility – care required.

Background: The appellant’s application for Carer’s Allowance was disallowed by the Department on the grounds that the care recipient did not require full-time care and attention as required by the governing legislation.

The care recipient had diagnoses of ischaemic heart disease, moderate COPD and hypercholesterolemia. In the ability/disability profile the care recipient was assessed as normal in relation to cognition, mental health, speech/hearing and consciousness/seizures, and independent/age appropriate in relation to bathing/showering, feeding, dressing, continence/toileting, and mobility. It was outlined that the care recipient wore glasses and had recent cataract surgery. In support of her claim the appellant submitted an additional GP report indicating that the care recipient had weakness and fatigue with breathlessness on minimal effort. She couldn’t do household duties and required assistance with personal tasks. The appellant submitted that the care recipient’s conditions were permanent and progressive and complicated by deafness which was leading to increasing isolation and she needed assistance at home.

In her appeal submission the appellant stated that she looked after her mother from early in the morning until late in the evening. She stated that her mother was in very bad health, had poor hearing, could not walk for more than a few feet and could not talk for more than a few minutes without getting breathless and coughing. The appellant stated that she did everything for her mother including shopping, cleaning, household duties, cooking, lighting fires and bringing her to appointments and that her mother totally depended on her care for any quality of life.

Consideration: The Appeals Officer outlined that Section 179 of the Act provides that a person shall not be regarded as requiring full-time care and attention unless the person has such a disability that requires from another person continual supervision and frequent assistance throughout the day in connection with normal bodily functions or continual supervision in order to avoid danger to himself or herself.

The Appeals Officer concluded that while the medical evidence outlined the care recipient’s conditions, the degree to which it affected her ability in certain areas, it did not indicate the need for assistance with normal bodily functions throughout the day or that the care recipient required continual supervision in order to avoid danger to herself. The Appeals Officer concluded, that while the care recipient required a level of care and support which the appellant provided, it had not been established that she required full-time care and attention within the meaning of the governing legislation.

Outcome: Appeal disallowed

2021/38: Carer’s Allowance

Question at issue: Eligibility – care provided.

Background: The appellant’s application for Carer’s Allowance was disallowed by the Department on the grounds that she was not providing full-time care and attention to the care recipient as required by the governing legislation.

In her application form the appellant stated that she provided a total of 21 hours care per week over 7 days. The appellant described the daily duties that she carried out which included giving the care recipient his medication, preparing breakfast and spending at least 1.5 hours with the care recipient in the mornings. The appellant spent a further 3-4 hours preparing meals, doing housework and helping the care recipient to shower. In her appeal submission, the appellant stated that she forgot to mention in her application that she also went to his home every night for 2 hours to sort his medications and to help him get ready for bed. In addition, she accompanied the care recipient to all his medical appointments. She stated that she may need to reduce her working hours in order to continue to provide the care required.

Oral Hearing: During the oral hearing the appellant provided a more detailed account of the care she provided to the care recipient. She stated that she worked 15 hours per week over three evenings. She confirmed that she went to the care recipient’s home each morning. In the afternoon she went back to his house for a number of hours to do housework if she was not in work. On the three evenings that she worked the appellant called to the care recipient for an hour before going to work. She accompanied him on the train to all his medical appointments.

Consideration: The Appeals Officer outlined that Section 179 of the Act provides that in order to be considered a carer for the purposes of Carer’s Allowance the person must be providing full-time care and attention to a person who requires continual supervision and frequent assistance throughout the day in connection with normal bodily functions, or continual supervision in order to avoid danger to himself or herself.

Article 136(1)(e) of the 2007 Regulations provides that a carer may be regarded as providing full-time care and attention, where the number of hours of care provided is not less than 35 hours in a period of 7 consecutive days, and care is provided on any 5 days, whether consecutive or not, within a period of 7 consecutive days. The Appeals Officer determined that both the hours of care provided and the nature of the care provided fell to be considered.

The Appeals Officer concluded that while the evidence demonstrated that the appellant provided support to the care recipient, the care related mainly to household duties and general assistance rather than personal care aligned with continual supervision and frequent assistance throughout the day in connection with normal bodily functions, or continual supervision in order to avoid danger to the care recipient.

The Appeals Officer concluded that the evidence provided by the appellant did not support a conclusion that she provided care to a level or for a sufficient time period that could be considered to be full-time within the meaning of the governing legislation.

Outcome: Appeal disallowed.

2021/39: Carer’s Allowance

Question at issue: Eligibility – care required and care provided.

Background: The appellant’s application for Carer’s Allowance was disallowed by the Department on the grounds that he was not providing full-time care and attention to the care recipient and that the care recipient did not require full-time care and attention within the meaning of the governing legislation.

The care recipient, in her 60s, was the appellant’s father’s partner and had diagnoses of arthritis, back pain and depression. In the medical report submitted with the application form the care recipient was assessed as having chronic anxiety and low mood and experienced significant pain while walking, shopping or doing

household chores.

The appellant reported that the care recipient had chronic pain and arthritis and required support with cooking, cleaning, household duties, shopping, attending appointments and general assistance due to reduced mobility.

Consideration: The Appeals Officer noted that the medical report was consistent with the appellant’s account that the care recipient had back pain/arthritis and mobility needs. The Appeals Officer acknowledged that the appellant provided practical supports to the care recipient, such as housework and shopping. However, the Appeals Officer concluded that the need for continual supervision and frequent assistance throughout the day in connection with normal bodily functions had not been demonstrated or supported by the evidence. The Appeals Officer also concluded that it had not been demonstrated that the care recipient required continual supervision in order to avoid danger to herself.

The Appeals Officer also noted that the appellant’s evidence was that he provided 28 hours of care and attention per week. In those circumstances the Appeals Officer concluded that as the appellant did not provide a minimum of 35 hours of care per week he could not be considered to be providing full-time care and attention.

Outcome: Appeal disallowed.

2021/40: Carer’s Allowance

Question at issue: Eligibility – care provided.

Background: The appellant’s application for Carer’s Allowance was refused by the Department on the grounds that he was not providing full-time care and attention as required by the governing legislation. In his application form, the appellant stated that he resided next door to the care recipient and provided care for 17 hours per week over 7 days. He described the daily duties that he performed for the care recipient as shopping, doing laundry and other household duties, preparing meals, collecting medication and bringing the care recipient to medical appointments. The appellant also brought the care recipient to and from day care service two mornings per fortnight. The appellant also stated that he provided emotional support and companionship to the care recipient.

In his appeal, the appellant stated the care recipient had complex medical and physical needs, had extremely limited mobility and was in the early stages of memory loss. The care recipient was reported to be independent in terms of personal care.

Consideration: The Appeals Officer outlined that Section 179 of the Act provides that in order to be considered a carer for the purposes of Carer’s Allowance the person must be providing full-time care and attention to a person who requires continual supervision and frequent assistance throughout the day in connection with normal bodily functions, or continual supervision in order to avoid danger to himself or herself.

Article 136(1)(e) of the 2007 Regulations provides that a carer may be regarded as providing full-time care and attention, where the number of hours of care provided is not less than 35 hours in a period of 7 consecutive days, and care is provided on any 5 days, whether consecutive or not, within a period of 7 consecutive days.

The Appeals Officer concluded that while the appellant provided support to the care recipient it had not been established that the appellant provided care to a level or for a sufficient time period that could be considered to be full-time within the meaning of the governing legislation.

Outcome: Appeal disallowed

2021/77 Carer’s Allowance

Question at issue: Carer’s Allowance eligibility – care required

Grounds for Review: The medical evidence in this case was that the care recipient, in his mid-20s, had diagnoses of oppositional defiant disorder, obsessive compulsive disorder and attention deficit disorder. It was submitted that he was vulnerable to suggestion and recently served a term of youth detention in relation to a drugs offence. It was outlined that the evidence presented demonstrated that the care recipient remained vulnerable in his local area. The carer submitted that the care recipient’s behaviour was erratic, and she was concerned that the care recipient was vulnerable to gangs in the area in which he lived and he had become a prisoner in his own home. The carer was concerned as to the level of naivety demonstrated by the care recipient and submitted that the care recipient presented a danger to himself and was easily taken advantage of by others. It was submitted that the carer’s sole purpose was to protect the care recipient against these risks.

Background: The appellant’s claim for Carer’s Allowance, in respect of care which she was providing was disallowed by the Department on the grounds that the care recipient was not in need of full-time care and attention as required by the governing legislation.

The Appeals Officer noted historical medical evidence from the appellant’s previous application but concluded that the evidence was of limited relevance to a current claim.

In considering the question of care required in the context of Section 179(4)(a)(i) of the Act, the Appeals Officer outlined that the medical evidence was to the effect that the care recipient was largely independent in terms of normal bodily functions and that the appellant had not demonstrated that the care recipient required continual supervision and frequent assistance throughout the day in connection with these functions.

In considering the question of care required in the context of Section 179(4)(a)(ii) of the Act, the Appeals Officer noted the content of the GP’s report and referral for counselling but there was no medical evidence that the care recipient was a danger to himself. The Appeals Officer noted the appellant’s evidence adduced at the oral appeal hearing in relation to the care recipient’s activities and behaviour and the associated dangers that they posed to him. However, the Appeals Officer was not satisfied from the information provided that the appellant had demonstrated that the care recipient required continual supervision in order to avoid danger to himself.

In those circumstances the Appeals Officer concluded that the appellant was not a “relevant person ” as defined by Section 179(1) of the Act.

Consideration: In reviewing the Appeals Officer’s decision, I set out the legislation that applied to the claim. It was clear from the Department’s decision that the appellant’s claim was disallowed on the basis that it was considered that the care required by the care recipient did not meet the statutory requirements. I outlined that the question of care being provided, while important, was not at issue and the focus of the appeal must therefore be on the care required by the care recipient and not on the care provided by the appellant.

The evidence that was before the Appeals Officer in relation to whether the care recipient required continual supervision in order to avoid danger to himself was to the effect that the care recipient presented a danger to himself and was easily taken advantage of by others, required protection against risks outside of the home and the appellant protected him against these risks. However, the Appeals Officer was not satisfied from the information provided that it had been demonstrated that this aspect of the legislative care test had been satisfied. In reviewing the Appeals Officer’s decision I found no error of fact or law such that the decision should be revised.

I found that the evidence presented did not contain the degree of detail in relation to the specific risks that the care recipient encountered such that he required continual supervision in order to avoid danger to himself as is envisaged by Section 179(4)(a)(ii) of the Act.

Outcome: Decision not revised.

2022:

2022/27 Carer’s Allowance

Question at Issue: Eligibility – care required

Background: The appellant was disallowed Carers Allowance on the grounds that the care recipient did not require full-time care and attention as required by the governing legislation.

The care recipient, her husband, had been diagnosed with insulin dependent diabetes and ischaemic heart disease. His medical report indicated that the care recipient was independent in terms of his personal care, and assessed as normal in terms of mental health, speech and hearing, vision, feeding, bathing/showering, dressing, continence/toileting, and mobility. He attended a diabetes clinic and had not been referred to a specialist for assessment/investigation. 

The appellant has stated that she provides 58 hours of care per week for the care recipient and has been providing care for over two years.

Consideration: The Appeals Officer outlined that in accordance with Section 179(4) of the 2005 Act, a person shall not be regarded as requiring full-time care and attention unless the person has such a disability that requires continual supervision and frequent assistance throughout the day in connection with normal bodily functions, or continual supervision in order to avoid danger to himself or herself.

The care recipient’s medical condition as identified in the medical report, was acknowledged. The Appeals Officer noted that that the care recipient did not require any assistance in connection with normal bodily functions. The Appeals Officer was not satisfied that the medical evidence established that he required continual supervision in order to avoid danger to himself.

Having examined the evidence in this appeal, the Appeals Officer concluded that the care recipient did not meet the definition of ‘relevant person’ as specified in Section 179(4) of the 2005 Act.

Outcome: Appeal disallowed

2022/28 Carer’s Allowance

Question at Issue: Eligibility – care required and care provided

Background: The appellant was disallowed Carer’s Allowance in respect of his father on the grounds that he was not providing full-time care and attention as within the meaning of the governing legislation. Although he was seen as providing a certain level of care, the time involved was not considered to be full time by the Department. The appellant had stated on the application form that he provided 30 hours care per week care to the care recipient.

In his grounds of appeal, the appellant submitted that the decision was unfair because, as it stood, he already cared for his father by helping him with showering, dressing, cleaning, shopping etc He provided a letter from his father’s GP that indicated that his patient was a frail gentleman with a complex medical history.

Consideration: The Appeals Officer determined that both the hours of care being provided and the nature of that care fell to be considered under the governing legislation. Section 179 of the 2005 Act defines the nature of full-time care as providing the care recipient with frequent assistance throughout the day in connection with normal bodily functions and/or continual supervision in order to avoid danger. Article 136(1)(e) of the 2007 Regulations defines the measure of full-time care as being not less than 35 hours in a period of 7 consecutive days, where the care is provided on any 5 days of that 7.

In this particular case the appellant declared on the application form for Carer’s Allowance that he cared for his father for 30 hours per week. Whilst he did not specifically address the number of hours of care that he provided in his appeal correspondence, he did outline the nature of that care. The Appeals Officer noted that this included a very significant level of personal care and supervision. Given the nature of his father’s medical diagnosis and the most recent medical evidence, the Appeals Officer was satisfied that the evidence demonstrated that he was providing frequent assistance throughout the day to his father in connection with normal bodily functions and also continual supervision to avoid danger to him.

Therefore, having considered all the evidence available, the Appeals Officer was satisfied that the appellant was providing full-time care and attention for the purposes of Carer’s Allowance under the governing legislation.

Outcome: Appeal allowed

2022/29 Carer’s Allowance

Question at issue: Eligibility – care required

Background: The appellant, aged 73 applied for a Carer’s Allowance in respect of the provision of care and attention to her friend, aged 79. When completing the medical report the caree’s GP stated that she was normal in terms of cognition, mental health,  consciousness/seizures, speech, and hearing – independent in terms of feeding, bathing/showering, dressing, continence/toileting and mobility – and was impaired in terms of her vision, corrected with glasses. The Department was not satisfied that full-time care and attention was required.

Consideration: The Appeals Officer outlined that Section 179 of the 2005 Act provides that a person shall not be regarded as requiring full-time care and attention unless the person has such a disability that requires from another person continual supervision and frequent assistance throughout the day with normal bodily functions or continual supervision to avoid being a danger to themselves. The evidence submitted indicated that the appellant did not need assistance with normal bodily functions or that she was danger to herself. While the GP states that the caree attends Psychotherapy and Counselling – no reports or additional information was submitted as to same. The Appeals Officer was not satisfied that the appellant had demonstrated that her friend required full-time care and attention as detailed in the governing legislation.

Outcome: Appeal disallowed

2022/30 Carers Allowance

Question at Issue: Eligibility – care required

Background: The appellant was disallowed Carer’s Allowance on the grounds that she was not providing full time care and attention as required. The appellant had stated on the application form that she provided care to her father for 19 hours per week.

In her appeal letter, the appellant stated that due to the nature of her father’s care needs, she may need to call to him multiple times throughout the day. She assisted with daily living activities, transport, and supervised his medication. The appellant also disputed the means assessment carried out in relation to her claim.

Consideration: The relevant legislation in this case is Section 179 (1), Section 179 (3) in accordance with the Rules contained in Part 5 of Schedule 3 and Section 179 (4) of the 2005 Act.

The appellant declared on application that she cared for her father 19 hours per week (3 hours per day Monday to Friday and 2 hours per day on Saturday and Sunday). The Appeals Officer determined that the duration of care provided did not constitute full time care and attention as prescribed in the legislation. This is generally accepted to mean at least 35 hours per week.

Having regard to the evidence, the Appeals Officer did not consider that the care recipient had such a disability that he required full-time care and attention, Further, the Appeals Officer was not satisfied that the appellant had established that she was providing a type and level of care that is deemed to constitute full-time care and attention, within the legislatively defined care needs of the person being cared for. The appellant had not addressed this contention in her appeal letter or given any reasoning as to why there was an increase in the care provision subsequent to her application.

Having examined all the evidence in this case at the time of application, the Appeals Officer concluded that the care provided did not constitute full-time care and attention within the meaning of the social welfare legislation.

The Appeals Officer clarified that the total net weekly means of €116.00 assessed related to the spouse’s employment. The disputed capital assessment of her Credit Unit balance and loan recorded a ‘nil’ means amount.

Outcome: Appeal disallowed

2022/31 Carer’s Allowance

Question at issue: Calculation of Means

Background: The appellant’s weekly payment of Carer’s Allowance was reduced in a revised decision based on means from her and her spouse’s income from employment. Means were calculated from gross earnings per provided payslips. The Department allowed legislative disregards, plus administrative deductions for PRSI, Union subscriptions and weekly travel expenses and halved the means for a couple. The appellant’s grounds for appeal were that the payment reduction was unjust in light of the severe care needs of both children and rising medical costs.

Consideration: Section 181 of the 2005 Act provides for payment of Carer’s Allowance where the weekly means do not exceed the amount of Carer’s Allowance payable if the person had no means and for a reduced rate where means are lower than this amount. Rules for calculating means for Carer’s Allowance in Part 5, Schedule 3 of the 2005 Act, provide which income is taken into account, and that the means of a couple are halved. Article 144 of the 2007 Regulations prescribes amounts that may be disregarded in the calculation of means.

The Appeals Officer reviewed the Department’s calculations of the appellant’s means and found, based on the information available, that the means were assessed correctly in line with legislation with all legislative disregards applied. The Appeals Officer advised that ongoing entitlement to Carer’s Allowance is dependent on a recipient continuing to meet the qualifying conditions, including having means below a certain threshold, with the amount of entitlement reduced by any means assessed. It was noted the means calculations were not disputed by the appellant.

Outcome: Appeal disallowed

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Case Report G0142: Razneas v Chief Appeals Officer [2022] (10 JIC 1402)

Title of Payment:  Jobseekers Allowance

Date of Final Decision: 14 October 2022

Keywords: Jobseeker’s Allowance, EU citizen, worker status, residence, voluntary work, judicial review, European Convention on Human Rights Act.

Organisation who represented the Claimant:  Free Legal Advice Centre (FLAC)

Casebase no: G0142

Case summary:

This case concerned an appeal against a decision of the High Court in relation to a judicial review application, concerning a decision to refuse Jobseeker’s Allowance (“JSA”) to an EU citizen from another EU Member State living in Ireland.

The decision was made on the basis that the applicant did not have the ‘right of residence’ required to access the benefit under the s.246 Social Welfare Consolidation Act 2005.

The applicant, who is an EU national from Romania, had lived in Ireland since 2016. Due to personal circumstances, the applicant was required to enter the workforce. The applicant spent a trial period of 4 weeks carrying out voluntary work with a charity, the Mendicity Institution. The purpose of the trial was to demonstrate that the applicant had the capacity and commitment to move into a community employment scheme (the “CE Scheme”). The applicant did not receive any payment during the trial period but was provided with lunch each day. The applicant was unsuccessful in the trial period and the Mendicity Institution did not transfer her to the CE Scheme. The applicant then sought work unsuccessfully elsewhere and subsequently applied for JSA in July 2018. At around the same time, the applicant also made an application for residency in Ireland, which was refused.

The application for JSA was refused and her appeal to an appeals officer was unsuccessful. Following this, she made an application to the High Court for judicial review of the decision.

The decision of the High Court

The High Court decided that:

  1. JSA amounted to a form of ‘social assistance’ rather than a ‘financial benefit’ intended to assist a person entering the labour market. Accordingly, a condition that a person seeking JSA had a ‘right to reside’ in Ireland was a legitimate and proportionate limitation within the meaning of EU law.
  2. the appeals officer was correct to reach the conclusion that the applicant was not a ‘worker’, and therefore could not qualify for JSA under the Social Welfare Consolidation Act 2005.
  3. the relevant provisions of the Social Welfare Consolidation Act 2005 were compatible with the Constitution and the European Convention on Human Rights (the “ECHR”).

The decision of the Court of Appeal

The applicant appealed the above decision of the High Court to the Court of Appeal.

The legal framework

The Court of Appeal looked at the legal framework, in particular the Residence Directive, the Coordination Regulation and the Social Welfare Consolidation Act 2005.

The Residence Directive provides EU citizens with the right of entry and residence in a Member State of the EU for up to three months under Article 6. It also provides, under Article 7, that EU citizens are allowed to stay for longer than 3 months provided that they are (a) workers or self-employed in the host Member State; or (b) have sufficient resources for themselves and their family members not to become a burden on the social assistance system of the host Member State; or (c)are enrolled at an establishment for the purpose of study and have comprehensive sickness insurance cover and have sufficient resources for themselves and their family members not to become a burden on the social assistance system of the host Member State; or (d) are family members accompany an EU citizen who has satisfied conditions in (a), (b) or (c). The Residence Directive requires that EU citizens to be treated equally to citizens from the host Member State (under Article 24(1)) with the exception of matters relating to ‘social assistance’. Article 24(2) states that host Member States are not required to give social assistance during the three-month period or the longer period, prior to the acquisition of a permanent right to residence. The Court, therefore, noted that a key concept of the Residence Directive is that of ‘social assistance’ and that if JSA qualified as ‘social assistance’, then the Member State is not under any obligation to provide access to measure for the first three months of residence or for the longer period. The Residence Directive is given effect to in Ireland under the Statutory Instrument 548/2015, the European Communities (Free Movement of Persons) Regulations 2015.

The Coordination Regulation deals with the coordination of social security systems with regards to the free movement of EU citizens, with the aim of improving the standard of living and conditions of employment. However, the Court noted that it does not go so far as to create a common scheme of social security. The Coordination Regulation provides that cash benefits payable under the legislation of one or more Member States shall not be reduced, suspended, withdrawn or confiscated on the basis that the person who is to benefit from it, or the members of his/her family, live in a Member State other than that of the institution responsible for the payment. The Coordination Regulation provides for the exclusion of certain types of ‘special non-contributory cash benefits’ from its scope and the annex to the Coordination Regulation (annex X) provides a list of such excluded payments with respect to Ireland including JSA, non-contributory State pension, widow and widower’s non-contributory pension, disability allowance, mobility allowance, and blind pension.  The applicant, argued however, that the Court should look at the substance of the payment and that its inclusion in annex X to the Regulation did not determine the issue.

The Court also noted that the Social Welfare Consolidated Act 2005 also classifies JSA as ‘social assistance’ in Part 3 of the Act. The Court noted that JSA is a means-tested payment to unemployed adults who prove that they are unemployed and capable of, available and are genuinely seeking employment. As part of this the person must be habitually resident in Ireland, and s. 246(5) provides that a person cannot be considered habitually resident where they do not have the right to reside in Ireland.

Key conclusions

The Court of Appeal decided as follows:

  1. it agreed that JSA qualified as ‘social assistance’ and not a payment to facilitate access to the labour market;
  2. the applicant did not qualify as a ‘worker’ within the meaning of the Residence Directive, due to the voluntary nature of the work carried out, and therefore did not have a right to reside in Ireland;
  3. it was not a breach of the guarantee of equality in Article 40.1 of Constitution to deny the applicant access to JSA, as the applicant was not comparable with an Irish citizen and a person with the right to reside in Ireland; and
  4.  the decision refusing JSA did not amount to a violation of the applicant’s rights under Article 8 and Article 14 of the ECHR.

Relevant Legislation:

  • Social Welfare Consolidation Act 2005;
  • European Convention on Human Rights Act 2003;
  • Directive 2004/38 EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States; and
  • Regulation 883/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the coordination of social security systems.

Key arguments:

The applicant argued that:

  1. the decision of the High Court should be quashed in respect of the refusal of the applicant’s JSA application on the basis that JSA should not be characterised as a form of ‘social assistance’ and should, instead, be characterised as a payment intended to facilitate entry into the labour market as a matter of EU law;
  2. the applicant should be considered a ‘worker’ as a matter of EU law due to the nature of the work carried out with the Mendicity Institution and accordingly has a ‘right to residence’ according to the Residence Directive;
  3. the relevant provisions of the Social Welfare Consolidation Act 2005 regarding JSA which make it a pre-condition that a person must have a right to reside in the State to obtain access to JSA (namely section 246(5), (6) and (7)) are unconstitutional and contrary to Article 40.1 of the Constitution regarding the guarantee of equality and contrary to Articles 14 and 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights regarding the right to be treated equally and the right to family life respectively. In particular, the applicant submitted that the provisions of the Social Welfare Consolidation Act 2005 make no allowance for people in similar vulnerable circumstances as them and therefore these provisions are incompatible with the ECHR, given effect to by the European Convention on Human Rights Act 2003. As such, the applicant argued that she should be granted a declaration that s.246(5) of the Social Welfare Consolidate Act 2005 is incompatible with the European Convention on Human Rights Act 2003.

The respondent argued that:

  1. JSA did constitute a form of ‘social assistance’ according to Irish law and EU law, rather than a payment to facilitate entry to the workforce. The respondent argued that the intention of JSA is to provide a minimum subsistence payment. In addition, the respondent argued that the applicant does not have a right to reside merely because she is a long-term jobseeker, rather they have a right not to be expelled under Article 14(4)(b) of the Residence Directive. This argument was made on the basis of the decision of the Court of Appeal in Munteanu v. Minister for Social Protection Ireland and the Attorney General, where the Court held JSA is a form of ‘social assistance’ and that therefore no reference was required to the Court of Justice of the EU with regards to the status of ‘social assistance’. This case also held that while JSA on its face was discriminatory in that Irish residents who lived in Ireland automatically satisfied the requirement of having the right to reside, the measure was justified on the basis of preventing persons from becoming an unreasonable burden on the State.
  2. the applicant could not be classified as a ‘worker’ with regards to the work carried out in the Mendicity Institution, due to the voluntary nature of the work. In addition, they noted that the applicant did not meet the criteria of an employee, emphasising the absence of a contract. Furthermore, they noted that the Mendicity Institution was not an approved CE Scheme and does not operate or employ persons on CE Schemes.
  3. there was no basis for the argument that the Social Welfare Consolidation Act 2005 was unconstitutional and contrary to the ECHR as needing to have the right to reside to qualify for JSA was a valid basis for a difference in treatment of two categories of persons.
  4. there was no violation of the right to equal treatment in Article 14 of the ECHR as the precondition of having the right to reside was a proportionate and lawful condition.

Decision of the Court of Appeal:

Characterisation of JSA

The Court dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the High Court, that JSA is characterised as a form of ‘social assistance’ and not a payment designed to facilitate entry into the labour market. The Court held that as JSA is considered a form of ‘social assistance’ that Ireland is permitted to limit its application in accordance with annex X of the Coordination Regulation. The Court based this decision, not on the domestic classification of the payment, but on a detailed analysis of case-law which looked at the ‘nature, purpose and conditions’ of the JSA payment and which noted that the payment is intended to be social assistance for persons unable to provide for their own basic living costs during working age.

Characterisation of ‘worker’

With regards to the to the argument that the applicant was a ‘worker’ under EU law and therefore had a right to reside in Ireland, the Court held that, on the basis of EU case-law, the definition of ‘worker’ is not broad enough so as to include the voluntary arrangement the applicant had with the Mendicity Institution in April 2018.  While the Court noted that the level of income from the activity did not determine the status as worker, where the activity is solely a means to rehabilitate or re-integrate the person to allow them to take up ordinary employment, he or she cannot be considered a ‘worker’. In addition, the Court noted that a person who enters another Member State looking for work and who has not yet worked in the State cannot be considered a ‘worker’ due to their ‘job-seeking status’. Finally, the Court noted that participation in a community based on religion, or another philosophy could only be regarded as an economic activity, in some circumstances, where a person provides services to the community in return for accommodation, food and other basics of life which may then confer ‘worker status’ on the individual. However, the Court held that the applicant’s activities with the Mendicity Institution lacked the essential features of an employment relationship due to its voluntary nature and the fact it lacked remuneration, which is considered a key feature of EU case law. The Court distinguished the provision of daily lunch to EU case law where ‘full bed and board’ was provided to workers in return for their services.  In addition, the Court also noted that the Mendicity Institution workshop was not itself part of a CE Scheme and in any event, even if the applicant was part of a CE Scheme that this alone would not be enough to classify the applicant as a worker.

Reference to the Court of Justice of the EU

The Court held that there was no need to make a reference to the Court of Justice of the EU, noting that no point of EU law required clarification, as the law was settled with regards to the status of JSA and the definition of ‘worker’. The Court accepted that, while the applicant was genuinely seeking work, this makes no difference with regards to the relevant classifications.  

Compatibility with the Constitution of Ireland and the European Convention on Human Rights

With regards to the argument that there was a breach of Constitution, the Court held, firstly, that there is no constitutional right for an EU national from another Member State to social assistance in Ireland and secondly that that there was no breach to the guarantee of equality by denying the applicant JSA. This was on the basis that Irish citizens and persons with a right to resident in the state, on the one hand, and EU nationals who did not have a right to residence, on the other, were not considered comparable.

Similarly, the argument that the refusal of JSA amounted to a breach of the right to equality for the purposes of the Article 14 of the ECHR, was rejected by the Court on the basis that no argument was put forward to suggest that the differentiation amounted to discrimination prohibited by the ECHR. Similarly, no argument sufficiently demonstrated that there was a breach of Article 8 ECHR with regards to the right to family life. As such the appeal was dismissed.

Date of final Decision: 14 October 2022

Observations:

This decision has the implication that in order to qualify for JSA an applicant must have a right to residency in the State and furthermore highlights that voluntary work is not sufficient to give a person ‘worker status’ under EU law.

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Social Welfare Appeal G0134: Carer’s Allowance – Overpayment

Title of Payment: Carer’s Allowance

Date of Final Decision: 29 August 2022

Keywords: Overpayment – Carer’s Allowance – Reduction of Overpayment

Organisation who represented the Claimant: Community Law & Mediation

Casebase No. G0134

Case Summary:

This case relates to an appeal of the decision of the Deciding Officer of the Department of Social Protection (DSP) that there was an overpayment of the Carer’s Allowance to the appellant. 

Carer’s Allowance is a means-tested social assistance payment available to people on low incomes who are full-time carers of another person.  The person being cared for may need support due to disability, illness or age and they must require full-time care.  There is a number of criteria which needs to be fulfilled in order for a carer to be found entitled and granted payment.  In accordance with social welfare legislation, the carer is under a legal obligation to inform the DSP of any change in circumstances after they have been granted payment.

One of the qualifying conditions for this payment is that the person being cared for must not be living in a hospital, convalescent home or other similar institution.

The appellant in this case had been receiving Carer’s Allowance since having been found eligible for the payment in March 2011.  However, in June 2015, the DSP was notified that the person being cared for had been in long-term residential care since May 2013.  Following this, the Directing Officer of the DSP notified the appellant that they were not entitled to receive payment for the period of 6 May 2013 to 17 June 2015.  This gave rise to an overpayment of €25,037 and this would have to be recovered.

As the appellant genuinely believed that they were entitled to the payment during this period, and had not lied nor hidden information, this was found not to be fraud.  If it was fraud, the appellant may have been criminally prosecuted and a reduction in the sum of the overpayment recoverable would not be available.  However, regardless of the fact that this was not fraud, there was still deemed to have been an overpayment.

The Social Welfare Appeals Process in accordance with the Social Welfare (consolidation) Act 2005 as amended is as follows:

s. 300 – Deciding Officer makes decision on social welfare application.

s. 301 – Applicant can request that a Deciding Officer reviews a refusal.

s. 311 – Applicant can appeal to the Social Welfare Appeals Office (SWAO) and an Appeals Officer makes a decision.

s. 317 – Appellant can request a review of the Appeals Officer’s decision.

s. 318 – Appellant can request a review by the Chief Appeals Officer.

s. 327 – Appellant can make a statutory appeal to the High Court.

The appellant took the following actions to challenge the Deciding Officer’s decision.

On 1 July 2015, the client initially responded to the Deciding Officer of the DSP stating that they genuinely believed they were entitled to the payment during this period as they were still providing care.  They also explained that they were already in a difficult financial situation.

On 19 April 2021, Money Advice and Budgeting Service (MABS) sent a letter on behalf of the appellant

submitting that there had been no offset and that the appellant would have been entitled to Supplementary Welfare Allowance (SWA) during that period.  This was an unsuccessful argument for the following reasons. 

Firstly, the Carer’s Allowance overpayment could not be offset as  the SWA was an allowance or social assistance payment. An overpayment can only be offset if the payment the appellant would have been eligible for was a benefit or social insurance payment.  The difference being that an allowance is means tested whereas a benefit is a PRSI benefit from having worked previously.

Secondly, the appellant could only be held eligible if they had applied for SWA.  They could then apply in 2021, however it could only be backdated by six months and so this would not apply to the period of concern.  The Social Welfare Services Office decided to not revise the Deciding Officer’s decision.

The appellant then appealed the decision to the Social Welfare Appeals Office (SWAO).  The SWAO upheld the decision, dismissing the appeal, and held that discussion concerning the recovery of overpayment should be with the Debt Recovery Unit of the DSP.  The SWAO also held that only the issue of the entitlement of the appellant to Carer’s Allowance was under review.  Issues such as other potential entitles, off sets and the appellant’s financial situation was held to be outside the scope of the SWAO.

Therefore, on the 29 August 2022, the final decision was made by the SWAO that the appeal remained disallowed.

Social Welfare Appeal G0133: Invalidity Pension

Date of Final Decision: 25 October 2022

Keywords: Invalidity Pension, Partial Capacity Benefit, Effective Date, Evidence, Section 317, Overpayment, Offset, Reduction in Overpayment, Oral Hearing

Organisation who represented the Claimant: Community Law & Mediation

Title of Payment: Invalidity Pension

Casebase no: G0133

Case Summary:

This case concerns an appeal of a decision of an Appeals Officer (AO) which had upheld the original decision of a Deciding Officer (DO). Those decisions asserted that the Appellant had been overpaid Invalidity Pension (INVP) from 30 June 2016 to 3 February 2021, as a result of her having returned to work as a carer during that period. As a consequence, it was asserted that the Appellant was liable to pay the Department of Social Protection (Department) the sum of €55,829.70. On appeal, the Appellant asserted that she had been informed by a Limerick officer of the Department that she could continue to receive INVP if she returned to work; that the Revenue and Department had been made aware on various occasions that she was working and still in receipt of INVP and had failed to act in a reasonable time, and therefore the date of effect of the decision of overpayment should take effect from the date she became aware of her mistake in February 2021 (and not the date she commenced work in June 2016).

In April 2016, the Appellant was deemed entitled to INVP as she was prevented from working due to a depressive illness. In 2016, she visited a Department Intreo office in Limerick, where she spoke with a Department work (Officer) and applied for and was granted a training grant with a view to returning to work. The Appellant claimed that she was advised at this meeting that she could continue to claim INVP if she returned to work. The Appellant was a walk-in visitor, meaning she had not booked an appointment in advance of attending the Intreo office. The Appellant claimed that she subsequently called the same Officer to tell him that she received a job offer, and that she was again advised by him that she could continue to claim INVP when she returned to work, though she would pay a higher level of tax. The Appellant commenced work as a carer in June 2016.

In October 2016, the Appellant completed a medical questionnaire relating to her continued entitlement to INVP. On the questionnaire, she declared to the Department that she was in employment. The Appellant continued to receive INVP from the Department, and she was again deemed to still be eligible for INVP following a Department review in 2017.

During her period of employment, the Appellant continued to declare her INVP income to Revenue and made seven treatment benefit claims (which she was entitled to as a result of her employment).

In February 2021, the Appellant ceased working due to a relapse. She was informed by a friend that she could be entitled to partial capacity benefit (PCB) if she returned to work. The Appellant applied for and was awarded partial capacity benefit at 50% (though she never claimed this as she did not return to work. It was around this time that she became aware of her mistake as to her entitlement to INVP. On 11 March 2021, the DO issued a decision that the Appellant had not been entitled to INVP during her period of employment with effect from 30 June 2016, and as such she had received an overpayment of INVP of €55,829.70.

The Appellant appealed this decision to the AO. While she accepted that she had not in fact been entitled to INVP during the period of employment, she argued the DO had not taken the circumstances of her case into account when deciding the decision effective date (as required by s.302(b)), in particular her “innocent mistake and the Department’s failure to notice it notwithstanding the information she provided it”. The appeal failed and the AO upheld the decision of the DO (Revised Decision).

The Appellant originally sought to appeal the AO’s decision to the Chief Appeals officer under s.318 on the basis that the AO had erred in law or in fact in deciding that the Officer would not have provided the advice claimed by the Appellant, in the absence of an oral hearing or any evidence from that Officer. 

On 29 June 2022, in light of the Appellant’s submissions and request for an oral hearing, the Chief Appeals Officer considered that a review of the AO’s decision should in the first instance be conducted by an appeal officer (Second AO) under s.317. It would then be open to the Appellant to appeal such a decision to the Chief Appeals Officer under s.318 if she wanted to.

The key question for the Second AO to consider was whether the Revised Decision should be upheld, and the correct effective date of that decision.

Case Report G0130: ZK v Minister for Justice

Title of Payment: N/A

Date of Final Decision: 16 May 2022

Keywords: Oral Hearing; Procedural Safeguards; Fairness; Conflict in Factual Evidence; Credibility; Marriage of Convenience; EU Residency

Organisation who represented the Claimant: n/a

Casebase no: G0130

Case Summary:

In Z.K. v The Minister for Justice & Equality and Ireland and The Attorney General [2022] IEHC 278, Z.K. successfully challenged the decision of the Minister for Justice and Equality (the “Minister”) to revoke the grant to him of EU residency.


Z.K. was a Georgian national who married a Lithuanian national (Z.H.) who had been residing in Dublin since 2006.


The couple said they met on a dating app around May 2016 while Z.K. was still in Georgia. In September 2016, Z.K. travelled to Ireland and, in February 2017, applied for international protection. He admitted the purpose of the application was to obtain a temporary permission to apply to marry. They married in March 2017. They provided evidence to vouch for the bona fides of the marriage.


In April 2017, Z.K. applied to the Minister for a residence card as the spouse of an EU national exercising her EU Treaty Rights in the State. The application was granted in December 2017.


The relationship became strained and, though the couple’s evidence was that they attempted to resolve their difficulties, they ceased living together around October 2018, albeit that there were references to this happening in October 2017 (which they indicated were mistaken). When, in 2019, Z.H. sought a new passport, they indicated that they had ceased living together.


In April 2019, the Minister wrote to set out concerns around the bona fides of the marriage and informed Z.K. of an intention to revoke his permission to reside in the State (the “Decision Letter”). Z.K.’s residence card was revoked in August 2019. Among the reasons given was that Z.K.’s marriage was a marriage of convenience contracted for the purpose of obtaining a derived right of free movement and residence under EU law. In reaching the decision, the Minister considered relevant that some of Z.K.’s wife’s post had continued to be sent to her mother’s residence (where she had previously resided). Further, some of her phone bills addressed to her marital residence were overlooked.


In September 2019, Z.K.’s solicitor requested a review of the decision on Form EU 4 and made representations on behalf of Z.K., also including a transcript of messages and third-party testimonials to vouch for the bona fides of the relationship. In January 2021 the Department prepared a recommendation submission which concluded that the marriage was never genuine.

On 1 February 2021, a letter (the “Review Letter”) upheld the decision to revoke Z.K.’s residence, stating that the decision had been taken because “the Minister was of the opinion that the documentation that you had provided in support of your application was false and misleading as to a material fact, particularly with respect to the EU citizen’s residence in the State”. On 2 February 2021, the Minister sent a letter seeking updated information from the applicants (a “Current Activity Letter”). In March 2021, Z.K. was informed the review decision remained unchanged.

Social Welfare Appeal G0127: Domiciliary Care Allowance

Title of Payment: Domiciliary Care Allowance

Date of Final Decision: 4 July 2022

Keywords: Domiciliary Care Allowance; Social Welfare Payment; Discrimination; Irish Constitution; European Convention on Human Rights.

Organisation who represented the Claimant: N/A

Casebase no: G0127

Case Summary:

The case is that of Donnelly & Anor v Minister for Social Protection & Ors [2022] IESC 31.

This case concerned a challenge to legislation that excluded the first named appellant (“Mr. Donnelly”) from eligibility for a social welfare payment in respect of his severely disabled son, Henry, the second named appellant during a prolonged period when Henry was in hospital. The challenge was brought, under Article 40.1 of the Constitution and Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights, to a decision of the Minister of Social Protection and to certain provisions of the Social Welfare Consolidation Act 2005. The appellants argued that they have been unlawfully discriminated against as compared to families who are in a similar position but caring for a severely disabled child at home. The payment in question is the Domiciliary Care Allowance (“DCA”).

Henry was born with Down syndrome in June 2015 and has suffered with multiple other serious medical conditions. As a result, he was hospitalised for all the time from his birth until November 2017. During the time he was in hospital, Mr. Donnelly gave up his employment. It is apparent from the evidence that the level of care provided to Henry by his parents during this time, while undoubtedly onerous, was to an extent expected by the hospital. Mr. Donnelly applied for the DCA in July 2016 and his application was refused. He sought an internal departmental review of the decision which came to the same conclusion. Henry was discharged home in late 2017 and Mr. Donnelly has been in receipt of the payment since.

Relief was refused in the High Court ([2018] IEHC 421). The Court of Appeal ([2021] IECA 155) affirmed the decision of the High Court. The appellants were granted leave to appeal to the Supreme Court by determination of the 29th July 2021 ([2021] IESCDET 89).

Key Conclusions: The Supreme Court concluded that the appellants had failed to discharge the burden of proving that the measure in question was either invalid having regard to the Constitution or incompatible with the Convention.

Relevant Legislation:

Social Welfare Consolidation Act 2005:

Sections:

186B.— In this Chapter—

‘institution’, means a hospital, convalescent home or home for children suffering from physical or mental disability or ancillary accommodation and any other similar establishment providing residence, maintenance or care where the cost of the child’s maintenance in that institution is being met in whole or in part by or on behalf of the Executive or the Department of Education and Science;

‘international organisation’ means an international intergovernmental organisation, including, in particular and without limiting the generality of the foregoing—

(a) the United Nations Organization and its specialist agencies,

(b) the institutions and agencies of the European Communities,

(c) the Council of Europe, and

(d) the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development;

‘qualified child’ has the meaning given by section 186C;

‘qualified person’ has the meaning given by section 186D.

186C.— A person who is under the age of 16 years (in this section referred to as ‘the child’) is a qualified child for the purposes of payment of domiciliary care allowance if—

(a) a medical practitioner has certified, in such manner as is prescribed, that—

(i) the child has a severe disability requiring continual or continuous care and attention substantially in excess of the care and attention normally required by a child of the same age, and

(ii) the disability is such that the child is likely to require full-time care and attention for at least 12 consecutive months,

(b) the child—

(i) is ordinarily resident in the State, or

(ii) satisfies the requirements of section 219(2),

and

(c) the child is not detained in a children detention school as defined in section 3 of the Children Act 2001 .

186E.— (1) Subject to subsections (2) and (3), domiciliary care allowance is not payable for any period during which a child is resident in an institution.

186D.— (1) A person is a qualified person for the purpose of receiving domiciliary care allowance in respect of a qualified child if—

(a) the child normally resides with that person,

(b) that person provides for the care of the child, and

(c) at the date of the making of the application for domiciliary care allowance—

(i) that person is habitually resident in the State, or

(ii) the requirements of section 219(2) are satisfied in relation to that person.

(2) For the purposes of subsection (1)(a) the Minister may by regulation make rules for determining with whom a qualified child is to be regarded as normally residing.

Social Welfare Appeal G0125: Domiciliary Care Allowance

Title of Payment: Domiciliary care allowance

Date of Final Decision: 10 March 2021

Keywords:  Domiciliary care allowance; appeal; judicial review; evidence; eligibility; change of circumstances

Organisation who represented the Claimant: N/A

Casebase no: G0125

Case Summary:

This case concerned the question of whether it was fundamental to a claim for benefit or assistance under the Social Welfare (Consolidation) Act 2005 (the “Act”) that the person claiming that benefit or assistance should be entitled to it at the time the claim is made. A person may become entitled to a benefit which was previously claimed at a time when they were not eligible. This case concerned the question of whether, when this occurs following the rejection of a claim, is it necessary to make a fresh claim, or can the rejected claim be revived in accordance with the Act.

The facts here concern determinations made by appeals officers to refuse to revise earlier decisions of appeals officers which declined claims for domiciliary claim allowance. The claimants argue that the latter appeals officers erred in stating that any new fact or evidence provided in an application to review a decision must bear on establishing the right of the claimant at the time of the claim for benefit, and not at a later time. Owens J notes that the Chief Appeals Officer disagrees with the applicants’ position that the appeals officers erred and that the Chief Appeals Officer is correct in this view:

“The statutory framework governing decisions and appeals relating to a claim does not permit a claimant to demonstrate that changes in circumstances subsequent to the time of that claim give rise to a right to benefit so as to enable this issue to be revisited in a revival of a claim which has been rejected following an appeal.”

Accordingly, Owens J rejected the judicial review claim that the appeals officers acted contrary to law in determining that a claimant under the 2005 Act must establish entitlement at the time of submission of the claim.

The background to each of LL and DZ’s claims are detailed in the judgment. With respect to LL (and LL’s child H), the initial claim was submitted in April 2015 and was subsequently rejected. In 2019, the applicant’s solicitor provided a letter for the purpose of supporting LL’s application for domiciliary care allowance which detailed a medical prescription from 2017 and contained further information on H’s health. This letter was submitted as “further evidence which was not available at the time of the oral hearing”. It was determined that the letter did not provide any additional information relating to the care required by H at the time of the application in 2015. Owens J supports the position of Chief Appeals Officer that “while an applicant is entitled to rely on evidence that post-dates the original application or any earlier decision, the substance of that evidence must relate to the eligibility of an applicant at the time of the original application for the purpose of deciding whether a decision to refuse that payment was erroneous”.

Owens J was also critical of the delay in bringing judicial review proceedings a “very long time” after the date of the decision which it challenged, and did not find the attributing of the delay to Covid-19 restrictions to be convincing. Owens J found that the excusing circumstances offered were not sufficient to extend the time limit for judicial review under O.84 r.21(3) of the Rules of the Superior Courts.

DZ’s claim (relating to her son K) was made in March 2018, rejected and subsequently appealed. A HSE report was made available in October 2019 relating to K and submitted with a request for review of the original decision. The appeals officer wrote on 31 January 2020 to state that an appeal may only be reviewed if new information of acts come to light which would render the initial appeal decision erroneous at the time it was made, and stated specifically that:

“We appreciate that K’s conditions will present challenges but regret that it has not been established that the original appeal decision in this case was erroneous based on the evidence available at the time…”

Owens J determined that this is not the correct test to apply. New facts and evidence may be presented under the Act (albeit relating to the time of the application). On the basis of this error which may have affected the outcome of the process, Owens J ordered that the decision of 31 January 2020 be set aside and the application be remitted back to the appeals officer.

In the case of DZ, Owens saw fit to extend the time allotted for judicial review on the basis that the initial delay related to circumstances outside the control of DZ and her solicitors, in particular correspondence between solicitors and the Social Welfare Appeals Office.